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Abstract
This thesis consists of three chapters that are empirical investigations of classical ques-
tions in the nancial and industrial economics literature on the inuence of institutions
and industry conditions on the rm's access to nance, the propensity to merge, and
productivity.
In the rst chapter, coauthored with Jan Bena, we examine whether nancial markets
development facilitates the ecient allocation of resources. Using European micro-level
data for 1996-2005, we show that rms in industries with high growth opportunities use
more external nance in nancially more developed countries. This result is particularly
strong for rms that are more likely to be nancially constrained and dependent on
domestic nancial markets, such as small and young rms. Our ndings are robust to
controlling for technological determinants of external nance needs and to using dierent
proxies for growth opportunities.
In the second chapter, I investigate the role of productivity in the selection of rms
into acquisitions and whether acquisitions lead to productivity gains. Using matching
methodology and a large dataset of domestic acquisitions among public and private rms
in Europe over the period 1998-2008, I nd that rst, targets are under-performing be-
fore engaging in horizontal acquisitions; second, there is positive assortative matching in
revenue productivity for rms engaging in vertical acquisitions; and third, economically
and statistically signicant productivity gains exist only for targets acquired in horizontal
acquisitions. Overall, the results for horizontal deals are consistent with the Q-theory
of mergers, which assumes asset substitutability. The results for vertical deals, in which
rms' assets are likely to be complements, are consistent with the search and matching
model built on the property rights theory of the rm.
In the third chapter, coauthored with Jan Bena and Eva Vourvachaki, we examine the
impact of market liberalization, e.g. the removal of state monopolies and entry barriers
commanded by the European Commission as part of the Single Market Program, on the
productivity of utilities, transport and telecommunication services in a set of European
countries. Exploiting the variation in the timing and degree of liberalization eorts across
countries and industries, we nd that liberalization has increased rm-level productiv-
ity but has had no reallocation impact. Based on our estimates, the average rm-level
productivity gain from liberalization amounts to 38 percent of the average within-rm pro-
ductivity gain in network industries over 1998-2007. Our results underscore the growth-
promoting role of liberalization eorts.
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Abstrakt
Tato dizertace obsahuje t°i kapitoly, ve kterých jsou empiricky zkoumány klasické otázky
nan£ní a industriální ekonomie o vlivu institucí a odv¥tvových podmínek na schopnost
rem získat nancování, jejich sklon k akvizicím a jejich produktivitu.
V první kapitole, spolu s Janem Benou, zkoumáme, jestli rozvoj nan£ních trh· vede
efektivn¥j²í alokaci zdroj·. S vyuºitím dat o Evropských spole£nostech za období 1996-
1995, jsme ukázali, ºe rmy v odv¥tvích s nejv¥t²ími r·stovými p°íleºitosti vyuºívají
více externích nan£ních zdroj·, pokud p·sobí v krajinách s rozvinutými nan£ními trhy.
Tento výsledek je obzvlá²t¥ silný pro malé a mladé rmy, které mají vy²²í ²anci omezeného
p°ístupu k nancím a které jsou více závislé na domácích nan£ních trzích. Na²e výsledky
jsou robustné v·£i zahrnutí technologických determinant· pot°eb externího nancování a
v·£i alternativním zp·sob·m m¥°ení r·stových p°íleºitostí,
Ve druhé kapitole zkoumám roli produktivity v selekci rem do akvizic, a jestli akviz-
ice vedou k r·stu produktivity. S vyuºitím empirické metodologie párování na zák-
lad¥ pozorovatelných charakteristik a velké databáze domácích akvizic mezi ve°ejn¥ ob-
chodovanými, jako i privátními rmami v období 1998-2008 jsem ukázal, ºe za první,
akvizi£ní cíle v horizontálních akvizicích mají niº²í produktivitu neº porovnatelné rmy ve
stejných sektorech; za druhé v p°ípad¥ vertikálních akvizic je mezi zú£astn¥nými rmami
pozorovatelné pozitivn¥ asortativní párování dle jejich produktivity; a za t°etí, ekonomicky
a statisticky významný nár·st produktivity existuje jenom u rem p°evzatých v horizon-
tálních akvizicích. Celkov¥ jsou výsledky pro horizontální akvizice konzistentní s Q-teorií
akvizic, která p°edpokládá substitovatelnost aktiv. Výsledky pro vertikální akvizice, ve
kterých jsou rmy spí² vzájemnými komplementy, jsou konzistentní s modelem hledání a
párování zaloºeném na teorii rmy.
Ve t°etí kapitole, spolu s Janem Benou a Evou Vourvachaki, zkoumáme vliv trºní
liberalizace, tj. odstran¥ní státních monopol· a bariér vstupu dle poºadavk· Evropské
Komise jako sou£ást programu jednotného trhu, na produktivitu sektor· utilit, dopravních
a telekomunika£ních sluºeb ve vybraných Evropských krajinách. S vyuºitím variace v
£asování a rozsahu liberaliza£ních snah p°es krajiny a sektory, jsme zjistili, ºe liberalizace
vedla k zvý²ení produktivity jednotlivých rem, ale nevedla k zlep²ení alokace zdroj· v
dot£ených sektorech. Na základ¥ na²ich odhad· je pr·m¥rný nár·st remní produktivity
vyvolán liberalizací na úrovni 38 procent pr·m¥rného r·stu remní produktivity ve zk-




This thesis consists of three chapters that are empirical investigations of classical questions
in the nancial and industrial economics literature. The rst chapter investigates whether
more developed nancial markets make it easier for rms to raise external nance when
they need it. The second chapter studies the role of productivity in the rms' decision to
participate in acquisitions, and whether acquisitions lead to productivity gains. Finally,
the last chapter studies the impact of market liberalization on the productivity of network
service industries in Europe.
In the rst chapter, co-authored with Jan Bena, we study whether nancial market
development facilitates the ecient allocation of resources, one of the primary channels
from nance to growth suggested by the theory. We assess that if more developed nancial
markets allocate capital more eciently, it must be that they are able to identify rms
with growth opportunities and to channel external nance towards these rms when they
need it. The existing literature studies this question without observing the quantity of
external nance raised by rms, resorting instead to aggregate industry-level data on
investments. In this paper, we take a more direct approach and utilize cross-country rm-
level balance sheet data to calculate an explicit rm-level measure of external nance
use. We do so for a large sample of manufacturing rms operating in a set of European
countries that dier in their level of nancial market development.
Employing the identication approach developed by Rajan and Zingales (1998), we
nd that nancial development improves the allocation of capital by channeling external
nance to rms that operate in industries with better growth prospects. This result
is obtained using two alternative proxies for the global industry-specic component of
growth opportunities: (i) industry value-added growth in the U.S. and (ii) the change in
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the global industry price-to-earnings (PE) ratio. Both proxies rely on the assumption that
a global component exists in industry-specic growth opportunities caused by demand and
productivity shifts. For this reason, we focus our analysis on the manufacturing sector of
a homogenous set of European countries with highly synchronized product markets and
regulation, where the key underlying assumption of common shocks to industry growth is
arguably most likely to hold. When we proxy growth opportunities by the growth of U.S.
industries, the additional assumption is that rms in the U.S. are relatively nancially
unconstrained and are able to materialize the growth opportunities they encounter. When
we proxy growth opportunities by the global industry PE ratio, we assume that nancial
markets are integrated to the extent that the common component of growth opportunities
is priced into global industry portfolios.
Our results also suggest that it is especially the small and young rms  presumably
more constrained in their access to public nancial markets and more dependent on do-
mestic nancial markets  that benet from nancial development by being able to raise
more external nance in response to growth opportunities.
In the second chapter, I examine the role of productivity in the rms' decision to
participate in acquisitions and whether acquisitions lead to productivity gains. I reconcile
conicting results in the existing literature by showing that the role of productivity in
the rms' selection into acquisitions and the post-acquisition productivity gains are very
dierent in horizontal and vertical deals. The key insight that motivates the separation
between horizontal and vertical deals is the dierent nature of synergies among potential
acquisition participants. Firms that operate in the same industry, and thus are potential
candidates for horizontal takeovers, are all familiar with the technology of that industry.
Thus, within the industry, the rm-specic intangible capital of one rm is easily re-
deployable on the physical assets of the other rm, in line with the underlying assumptions
of the standard Q-theory of mergers of Jovanovic and Rousseau (2002). The predictions
of this theory that unproductive rms are acquired by the relatively productive ones in
order to experience subsequent productivity gain, are thus most likely to hold for the
horizontal acquisitions.
For the class of mergers between rms operating in industries tied by strong supplier-
producer vertical linkages, however, the complementarity between intangible assets may
be more relevant. Vertically related rms that choose to engage in productive relationship
are facing the risk of a hold-up because either rm can threaten to quit and to search for
another partner. According to the property rights theory of the rm, if the rms' intan-
gible assets are complementary, so that both partners are essential for the realization of
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output, the possibility of hold-up mitigates incentives for ex-ante investments leading to
output loss. The hold-up problem can be mitigated by vertical merger. The search and
matching model of mergers and acquisitions developed by Rhodes-Kropf and Robinson
(2008) incorporates these insights and predicts that under additional, reasonable assump-
tions, the equilibrium selection into vertical acquisitions can be characterized by the
positive assortative matching in which rms merge with partners of similar productivity.
Based on these theoretical insights, I examine the role of productivity in vertical and
horizontal acquisitions using a large sample of domestic acquisitions among public and
private rms in Europe over the period 1998-2008. Using the approach based on matching
on rm industry and size, I nd that rst, targets are under-performing before engaging in
horizontal acquisitions; second, there is positive assortative matching in productivity for
rms engaging in vertical acquisitions; and third, economically and statistically signicant
productivity gains exist only for targets acquired in horizontal acquisitions. Thus, the
results for horizontal deals are consistent with the Q-theory of mergers which assumes asset
substitutability. The results for vertical deals are consistent with the search and matching
model built on the property rights theory of the rm, which assumes complementarity.
The third chapter, co-authored with Jan Bena and Evangelia Vourvachaki, is an em-
pirical investigation of the impact of market liberalization, e.g. the removal of state
monopolies and entry barriers, on the productivity of utilities, transport and telecom-
munication services in European countries. Specically we ask: What is the impact of
liberalization on the productivity of European network service rms? Has liberalization
improved the allocation of resources across rms by bringing gains into the production
scale of the relatively more productive rms?
Our main identifying assumption is that liberalization has been driven by EU-wide
harmonization eorts as part of the EU Single Market Program rather than by the local
industry-specic conditions. Exploiting the variation in the timing and degree of liber-
alization eorts across countries and industries, we nd that liberalization has increased
rm-level productivity but has had no reallocation impact. Based on our estimates, the
average rm-level productivity gain from liberalization amounts to 38 percent of the av-
erage within-rm productivity gain in network industries over 1998-2007.
We also nd that within-rm productivity gains attributable to liberalization are
higher for rms with low pre-liberalization productivity. This result is in line with existing
theories that stress the role of competition in the reduction of managerial slackness. This
may be particularly relevant in our case given that at the beginning of the liberalization
process, network service industries largely featured state monopolies where managerial
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slackness concerns are likely to be important. Overall, our ndings suggest that the
regulatory reforms for network services have been successful in increasing the threat of
competition for incumbents and thus inducing them to become more productive.
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Chapter 1
Financial Development and the Allocation of
External Finance1
Abstract
We examine whether nancial markets development facilitates the ecient allocation
of resources. Using European micro-level data for 1996-2005, we show that rms in indus-
tries with growth opportunities use more external nance in nancially more developed
countries. This result is particularly strong for rms that are more likely to be nan-
cially constrained and dependent on domestic nancial markets, such as small and young
rms. Our ndings are robust to controlling for technological determinants of external
nance needs and to using dierent proxies for growth opportunities. Interestingly, the
explanatory power of the measures of technological determinants identied in prior work
decreases signicantly once growth opportunities are controlled for.
JEL: F3, O16, G3
Keywords: Financial development, External nance, Allocative eciency
1 This paper has been published in Bena, J. and Ondko, P. (2012) Financial Development and the
Allocation of External Finance, Journal of Empirical Finance 19(1):1-25. Earlier version of this paper
has been published in Bena, J. and Ondko, P. (2009) Financial Development and the Allocation of
External Finance, CERGE-EI Working Paper Series, 2009, No. 398. We thank Jan Hanousek, t¥pán
Jurajda, Hernan Ortiz-Molina, Evangelia Vourvachaki, and seminar participants at CERGE-EI and UBC
for helpful comments. This research was partly supported by a research center grant No. LC542 of the
Ministry of Education of the Czech Republic implemented at CERGE-EI, the joint workplace of the
Center for Economic Research and Graduate Education, Charles University, Prague, and the Economics
Institute of the Academy of Sciences of the Czech Republic. We also acknowledge the nancial support
from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada (SSHRC). All errors remaining in
this text are the responsibility of the authors.
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1.1 Introduction
The key role of a nancial system is to acquire information about investment opportunities
and facilitate the allocation of resources into viable projects.2 Recent empirical work uses
aggregate data to present indirect evidence that more developed nancial markets allocate
capital more eciently. Wurgler (2000) estimates the eect of nancial development
on the elasticity of aggregate investment with respect to growth opportunities. Fisman
and Love (2004) measure the eect of nancial development on the growth of industries
with positive opportunities.3 If more developed nancial markets allocate capital more
eciently, it must be that they are able to identify rms with growth opportunities and
to channel external nance towards these rms when they need it.
In this paper, we use micro-level data to examine whether nancial markets devel-
opment has a direct positive impact on individual rms by improving the allocation of
capital. Specically, we ask whether rms that operate in industries with positive growth
shocks are more able to exploit the new opportunities by increasing their external nanc-
ing in countries with higher levels of nancial markets development. If external nance is
more costly than internal nance, rms will turn to nancial markets only after they have
exhausted their internal funds. We show to what extent such rms' demand for external
nance is satised by nancial markets of dierent depth and institutional quality.
Using a large cross-section of manufacturing rms from European countries, we nd
that nancial development improves the allocation of capital by channeling external -
nance to rms that operate in industries with better growth prospects. This result is
obtained using two alternative proxies for the global component of industry growth op-
portunities: (i) industry value-added growth in the U.S. and (ii) the change in the global
industry price-to-earnings (PE) ratio. Both proxies rely on the assumption that there ex-
ists a global component in the industry specic growth opportunities caused by demand
and productivity shifts. For this reason, we focus our analysis on the manufacturing sector
of a homogenous set of European countries with highly synchronized product markets and
2See the survey by Levine (2005) for a summary of nancial systems' functions.
3We discuss how our study ts into this literature in detail in Section 1.2.
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regulation, where the key underlying assumption of common shocks to industry growth is
arguably most likely to hold. When we proxy growth opportunities by the growth of U.S.
industries, the additional assumption is that rms in the U.S. are relatively nancially
unconstrained and are able to materialize the growth opportunities they encounter. When
we proxy growth opportunities by the global industry PE ratio, we assume that nancial
markets are integrated to the extent that the common component of growth opportunities
is priced in global industry portfolios.
Despite relying on dierent assumptions, both proxies yield estimates of similar eco-
nomic magnitude. For example, the dierence in external nance use between (otherwise
comparable) rms that operate in an industry ranked at the 75th as opposed to the 25th
percentile by the U.S. growth is 0.7 percentage points (on average per annum) larger in
the Netherlands than it is in Bulgaria. When we approximate growth opportunities by
global PE growth, we obtain the analogous estimate of 0.6 percentage points.4 The eect
is three to four times larger if we instrument to correct for measurement error in growth
counterfactuals.
Our results also suggest that small and young rmswhich are less likely to be able to
access public nancial markets and are also more likely to depend on domestic nancial
marketsare able to raise larger amounts of external nance in response to growth op-
portunities in nancially more developed countries in comparison to large and old rms.
This supports the view that domestic nancial markets development alleviates the -
nancial constraints of small and young rms by more. We also nd that the degree of
domestic nancial markets development is a much more important determinant of the
ability to raise external nance for rms with highly concentrated ownership structures,
when compared to rms with dispersed ownership.
We contribute to the literature on the nance-growth nexus. This literature is founded
on the argument that the technology used by rms in a given industry is the same across
countries and it thus creates an industry-specic dependence on external nance (Rajan
and Zingales, 1998). We show that the ability of more developed nancial markets to
4The sample mean of external nance use is 0.4 percent and its standard deviation is 3.8 percent.
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provide external nance to rms in industries with strong growth opportunities still holds
when we control for technological determinants of external nance. Interestingly, we
nd that the estimated eect of the measures of technological determinants of external
nance decreases by 10 to 50% once proxies for growth opportunities are included in
our regressions. This is most pronounced when we include a proxy based on the value-
added growth in the U.S. This suggests that the widely used measures of technological
determinants of external nance are partly driven by growth opportunities that were
nanced and hence realized in countries with high nancial development (such as the
U.S.).
The structure of the paper is as follows: Section 1.2 relates our work to the literature;
Section 1.3 presents the methodology; Section 1.4 contains the description of the data;
Section 1.5 presents the results; Section 1.6 presents the robustness checks; and Section 1.7
concludes.
1.2 Related Literature
Theoretical models based on adverse selection or moral hazard imply that nancial devel-
opment improves screening of investment projects and/or enhances monitoring by external
investors, which in turn leads to more ecient allocation of capital to investment projects.5
This section summarizes the empirical literature that tests this broad prediction.
In his seminal paper, Wurgler (2000) estimates the country-specic elasticities of in-
vestment to value added in order to capture the country dierences in the extent to
which investment increases in growing industries and decreases in declining industries.
He shows that the elasticity tends to be larger in countries with larger credit markets,
more informative stock prices, less state-ownership of rms, and greater protection of mi-
nority investors. This important result suggests a causal link from nancial development
to more ecient reallocation of capital.
Wurgler (2000) uses industry-level gross xed capital formation as the dependent vari-
5See for example Boyd and Prescott (1986) for adverse selection and Townsend (1979) for moral hazard
arguments.
18
able as his focus is on the aggregate impact of nancial system development. In our
analysis, instead, we investigate the process of capital allocation at the micro-level which
yields a direct test of the capital allocation eciency hypothesis. There are two key
dierences. First, our dependent variable is the amount of dollars raised rather than in-
vestment, so we do not make any assumptions about how is a dollar of external nance
utilized inside a rm. Second, we do not aim to explain the entire corporate investment,
but only the part that is nanced using external funds.
Wurgler (2000) uses realized industry-country level value added growth as a proxy
for industry growth opportunities. He shows that this proxy can be justied as it is sig-
nicantly positively correlated with more traditional measures of growth opportunities:
average Tobin's Q, price-to-earnings ratio, and sales growth. Indeed, in a country with
a perfectly developed nancial market, realized growth is aligned with demand and pro-
ductivity shocks and hence reects growth opportunities. Also, if latent industry growth
opportunities are positively autocorrelated, it is possible to use current realized growth
to approximate future growth opportunities. However, it is less clear whether potential-
to-realized growth correspondence holds in countries where opportunities anticipated in
the past are not reected in current growth due to nancial or labor market frictions.
Therefore, we digress from Wurgler (2000) and use realized growth in the U.S. (a country
with high nancial market development and low frictions) and price-to-earnings ratios of
global industry portfolios as proxies for industry-level growth opportunities.
The reasons for choosing U.S. growth as a measure of latent global growth oppor-
tunities are similar to country-level studies of Fisman and Love (2007) and Ciccone and
Papaioannou (2006), who test whether investment opportunities caused by global demand
and productivity shifts lead to higher growth in nancially more developed countries.6 Un-
like these two papers, we focus our analysis on manufacturing sectors of a homogenous
set of European countries on a comparable level of economic development and with highly
synchronized product markets where the key underlying assumption of global shocks to
6Ciccone and Papaioannou (2006) further recognize that relying on country-specic growth measures
may lead to spurious conclusions due to measurement error and the possibility of systematic correlation
of the country-specic component of growth opportunities with nancial development.
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industry growth is arguably most likely to hold.
Alternatively, to capture the global component of growth opportunities, we use price-
to-earnings (PE) ratios of world-wide industry portfolios. In contrast to the realized U.S.
industry growth, global industry PE ratio is forward-looking, based on ex-ante expecta-
tions of future growth. A high PE ratio means that investors are willing to pay a high
multiple of current earnings for stocks in a given industry, which happens if they expect
dividend growth.
Bekaert et al. (2007) show that under the stock market integration hypothesis, the
global component of growth opportunities of a given industry should be competitively
priced and reected in the global industry's PE ratio. As a result, a country with a
large share of industries with high global PE ratios should grow faster than the world
economy. On the other hand, the local industry PE ratios would add information about
the country's future growth only if markets are not fully integrated and the opportunities
are priced locally rather than globally. The authors provide evidence in support of the
hypothesis of market integration by showing that a country's industry-weighted global
PE ratios predict future real GDP growth, while the industry-weighted dierence of local
and global PE ratios doesn't have any predictive power for relative economic growth.
Importantly, their analysis suggests that the PE ratio of a global industry portfolio is a
valid exogenous measure of growth opportunities as it does not use local price information
that could be potentially contaminated by the local level of nancial development.7
Our nding that rms with positive growth prospects receive more external nance in
nancially more developed countries directly veries that nancial development alleviates
credit constraints. This result relates our work to rm-level structural investment model
studies. Here, the optimal investment decision follows the Euler equation that trades
o marginal benets of investing today with discounted marginal costs of postponing
investment to the next period. In the absence of nancial constraints, the only relevant
factor aecting a rm's investment decision is a project's growth potential. However, one
7As all European countries in our sample have their stock and banking sectors liberalized in our sample
period, we do not formally test for market integration in our sample and rely on the result of Bekaert
et al. (2007).
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would observe positive elasticity of investments to cash-ow if rms experience diculties
in obtaining external nance. Love (2003) and Islam and Mozumdar (2007) show that
this elasticity is decreasing with nancial development, which indirectly suggests a positive
role of nancial development in alleviating credit constraints.
Alternative tests of the role of nancial system in the improvement of allocative ef-
ciency are based on the neoclassical argument that capital should be allocated such
that its marginal product is equalized across projects. This insight underlies two stud-
ies that investigate the impact of nancial liberalization on capital allocation. Galindo,
Schiantarelli, and Weiss (2007) argue that a suitable approximation for marginal product
of capital is either the sales to capital ratio (appropriate in the case of the Cobb-Douglas
production function) or the ratio of operating prot to capital (valid under constant
returns-to-scale production technology and perfect competition in output markets). They
use rm-level panel data for 12 countries to create proxies for marginal product of capital
and construct the eciency index of capital allocation. Using the index, they show that
eciency increases in periods following nancial liberalization. Abiad, Oomes, and Ueda
(2008) approximates the expected marginal product of capital by the market-to-book
ratio of publicly listed rms, the empirical equivalent of Tobin's Q. Next, he follows a
dierence-in-dierences methodology to assess whether the dispersion in Qs decreases in
the period following liberalization. The advantage of both studies is that they aim to
test simple predictions of neoclassical theory. On the other hand, the assumptions needed
to form empirical proxies for the theoretical concepts are rather strong. In this respect,
we complement these neoclassical approaches by avoiding an empirical approximation of
marginal product of capital and focusing instead on the degree of alignment between
growth opportunities and external nance use.
1.3 Methodology
We test the hypothesis that nancial development improves eciency of capital allocation
by channeling external nance towards rms in industries with the best growth opportu-
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nities. Our main regression specication is








fic ζ + εfic, (1.1)
where EFUfic is the period-average external nance use of rm f from industry i and
country c over the period 1996-2005. FDc denotes the country-level indicator of nancial
development measured as of the beginning of our sample period. GOi proxies global indus-
try growth opportunities. Di and Dc are industry and country xed eects, respectively.
Xfic is a vector of rm-level control variables.
External Finance Use (EFU) is computed as the net increase in the use of external
nance in a given year divided by the total assets as of the beginning of the year (see
equation (1.A.4) in Appendix 1.B).8 A measure of external nancing analogous to our
EFU has been used in rm-level panel setting by Baker, Stein, and Wurgler (2003). The
summary statistics for EFU are given in Table 1.1. The median and the mean EFU in
the sample are close to zero. This is consistent with the fact that, at the rm-level over
time, issuance and repayments of debt and equity should be balanced on average.
To proxy for growth opportunities GOi, we use the period-average value-added growth
rates of industries in the U.S. Alternatively, we use price-to-earnings (PE) ratios of global
industry portfolios. As there are no clear predictions whether it is the level of PE ratio
or the change in the level of PE ratio that capture growth opportunities better, we use
the period-averages of both. Given that our dependent variable captures the average net
additions to external nance, a change in the level of PE ratio seems more appropriate. In
the case of a balanced panel, GOi would be computed over the whole period and applied
to all rm observations. However, as our panel is unbalanced, the period over which we
8In Appendix 1.B, we show that the numerator of EFU is the balance sheet approximation of the
numerator of the external nance dependence measure used by Rajan and Zingales (1998). While Rajan
and Zingales (1998) use capital expenditures in the denominator, we use total assets to scale the net
ow of external nance. The reason is largely technical. Capital expenditure is a ow measure and as
such it can take values very close to zero. For example, Nilsen and Schiantarelli (2003) show that around
30% of Norwegian plants and 6% of rms have zero capital expenditure in an average year. Rajan and
Zingales (1998) use the value of external nance dependence of the industry median rm to characterize
industry specic external nance dependence and, thus, they implicitly assume that capital expenditures
of the median rm are positive. In the context of our rm-level regression with external nance use on
the left-hand side, scaling by a variable that takes values close to zero would lead to excessive outliers.
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compute EFU is dierent across rms. To mitigate the measurement error in capturing
growth opportunities, for every rm, the period used to compute the growth opportunities
counterfactual matches the period over which EFU is computed.
In all our specications, we control for a set of rm-level variables, measured as of the
rst year a rm enters the sample. This is to eliminate the initial dierences in the within-
industry distributions of rms along characteristics that have potentially dierent eect
on the use of external nance. Eectively, we are thus able to compare dierences in EFU
of highly comparable rms operating in environments with varying nancial development
and facing dierent growth opportunities. The set of rm-level characteristics included in
our regression contains size, age, leverage, asset tangibility, the extent to which a rm's
assets can be collateralized, and cash. Finally, we include industry and country dummies
to control for time-invariant unobservable industry- and country-level factors aecting
EFU.
Rajan and Zingales (1998) examine the impact of nancial development on growth
by investigating whether industries with higher need for external nance grow faster in
nancially more developed countries. Presumably, the underlying mechanism behind this
result is that nancial development relaxes nancial constraints, which matters the most
for those rms that are highly dependent on external nance due to specic technology
used in their type of business. Using our measure of external nance use, we are ready to
directly test this mechanism. We estimate








fic ζ + εfic, (1.2)
where Techi denotes industry-specic technological determinants of external nance needs.
We consider three measures of the technological determinants. The rst is the ex-
ternal nance dependence, measured as in Rajan and Zingales (1998). This is an all-
encompassing measure of demand for external nance that is based on the assumption
that in highly developed nancial markets, such as the U.S., industry dierences in the
observed proportion of capital expenditures nanced from external sources reect under-
lying technological dierences among industries.
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In choosing the other two measures, we follow Ilyina and Samaniego (2008) who suggest
R&D intensity and investment lumpiness as more explicit technological determinants of
external nance need. The R&D Intensity is approximated by the average share of R&D
expenditures on capital expenditures of a median rm in each U.S. industry. Firms
operating in R&D intensive sectors may be in greater need for external nance, because
R&D investments are often relatively large at the outset and may be associated with
longer gestation periods, and it is likely that prots from R&D projects materialize over
a long-term horizon.
Lastly, investment lumpiness is a proxy for the degree of mismatch between cash in-
ows and cash outows. Firms that experience large cash-ow mismatches are more
likely to seek outside nancing due to a shortage of internal resources. One reason for the
existence of cash-ow misalignment are investment `spikes,' which are periods in which
capital expenditures exceed their usual levels. Doms and Dunne (1998) show that more
than one half of 12,000 U.S. manufacturing plants in their sample experience a year in
which capital stock increases by over 35% and often the spikes occur in consecutive years.
From the perspective of a structural investment model, this empirical pattern suggests
the existence of important non-convexities in the adjustment costs. Assuming that these
non-convexities are driven by industry-specic technological factors, we calculate Invest-
ment Lumpiness as the average number of investment spikes in relatively frictionless U.S.
industries over a given period.
The proxies for technological determinants of external nance are calculated using
U.S. data over the period under investigation, and thus they may as well be capturing
underlying growth opportunity shocks specic to that period. To verify this, we estimate
regressions where we interact nancial development with growth opportunities as well as
with technological determinants









If measures of technological determinants are signicantly contaminated by growth
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opportunity shocks, we would expect β2 to be smaller than its counterpart in regression
(1.2). The magnitude of this decrease should be larger when GOi is approximated by
value-added growth in the U.S., because it contains U.S.-specic growth shocks which are
largely absent from the proxies based on the PE ratio.
1.4 Data
1.4.1 Sample
Firm-level panel data are obtained from Amadeus (Analyse MAjor Databases from EUro-
pean Sources), which contains balance sheet and income statement information for a large
set of private and public rms spanning all of Europe. We use the `TOP 200 thousand'
module of this database, which contains a subsample of the largest rms.9 The coverage is
incomplete before 1996 and we use data till 2005. We exclude Romania from the sample
due to large inconsistencies in the accounting data of its rms. Denmark and Norway
have only few rms in the nal sample and have been dropped too. Since private rms
are likely to rely more on domestic nancial markets, while public rms are more likely
to be in a position to raise external nance in international bond and equity markets, we
include only private rms in our sample.
Our data-cleaning procedure is in line with the previous research utilizing this database.
First, as in Bena and Jurajda (2011), in order to decrease the noise in average external
nance use, we drop all rms for which less than 5 annual observations of external nance
use is available. As Klapper, Laeven, and Rajan (2006), we use unconsolidated nan-
cial statements to avoid double counting and exclude rms that only report consolidated
statements. Further, we exclude rm-years with very small total assets (less than EUR
1,000), very high leverage (long-term debt more than double the total assets), and very
large prot/loss (absolute value more than ten times the total assets). Additionally, we
drop the bottom and top percentile of year-on-year changes in total assets in order to
9Specically, for a rm to be included in this module, at least one of the following criteria must be
met: For UK, Germany, France and Italy, an operating revenue at least 15 million Euro, total assets at
least 30 million Euro or number of employees at least 150. For all other countries, operating revenue at
least 10 million Euro, total assets at least 20 million Euro, or the number of employees at least 100.
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avoid the inuence of extreme events such as mergers, acquisitions, or spinos. We de-
ate all nancial variables by the producer price index dened over year-country-industry
triple, where industry is dened by the ISIC 2-digit level. Lastly, to minimize the impact
of long tails of rm size and age distributions, we exclude rms in the top percentile of
the distribution by total assets, age, and employment measured as of the rst year the
rm appears in the sample.
1.4.2 Country-level Indicators of Financial Development
First, we use three traditional measures of depth of credit and stock markets: private credit
by deposit banks and other nancial institutions to GDP (Private Credit), stock market
capitalization to GDP (Market Capitalization), and stock market total value traded to
GDP (Market Value Traded). These data are taken from the 2006 version of World
Bank's Financial Structure and Economic Development Database described in detail in
Beck, Demirguc-Kunt, and Levine (2000). We complement measures of nancial depth by
a proxy for the institutional quality of nancial markets as measured by the Accounting
Standards index.10
For robustness, we use measures of the extent of bank ownership by governments
(Government Bank Ownership and Government Bank Control) from La Porta, Lopez-
De-Silanes, and Shleifer (2002), measures of eciency and competition in the banking
sector (Overhead Costs and Net Interest Margin) from Beck, Demirguc-Kunt, and Levine
(2000), and Control Premium estimated by Dyck and Zingales (2004). Finally, we add
two indexes constructed by Barth, Caprio, and Levine (2004) that capture regulatory
environment in which the banking sector operates.
Table 1.2 presents summary statistics for nancial development indicators and Panel B
of Appendix Table 1.A.1 presents complete denitions and sources of these variables.
The cross-country standard deviation is of the same order as the mean for all volume-of-
10Accounting Standards index is constructed based on rating annual reports of companies in 1990
according to the inclusion of 90 items in their balance sheets and as such it is an indicator of the quality
of accounting standards. The index is produced by International Accounting and Auditing Trends (Center
for International Financial Analysis and Research, Inc.) and it ranges from 0 to 90. We scale it down by
100 before using it in regressions.
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nancial-activity measures as well as for the measures of government ownership of banks
and the measures of banking sector's eciency, which suggests a substantial variation in
nancial development. The variation in Accounting Standards is smaller, which is most
likely caused by the lack of data for Ireland and all countries of Central and Eastern
Europe in our sample.
1.4.3 Industry-level Data
The value-added data for the U.S. used to compute our rst proxy for growth opportunities
are taken from OECD STAN database downloaded in 2009. We use the index of volume
of value-added (VALK) for industries on the 2-digit level of ISIC rev 3.1. In some cases,
the volume index of value added and corresponding value-added deator is available only
for a group of two or three industries.11 In these instances we use the corresponding
group deator (VALP) to adjust nominal value-added (VALU), which is available for all
industries.12
The data for the monthly series of global PE ratios are obtained from Datastream. As
of March 2008, Datastream uses the Industry Classication Benchmark (ICB) created by
FTSE Group and Dow Jones Indexes to classify companies into 114 sub-sectors. Following
the approach of Bekaert et al. (2007), we link ICB sub-sectors into 22 manufacturing 2-
digit ISIC industries.13 Whenever more than one ICB sub-sector is linked to a given
2-digit ISIC industry, we calculate the weighted average of the PE ratios of entering sub-
sectors using their market values as weights. Finally, for every industry, we compute
yearly values of the PE ratios by taking the simple mean for all months in a given year.
Following Rajan and Zingales (1998) and Ilyina and Samaniego (2008), we use Compu-
stat to compute industry-level technological determinants of the need and ability to raise
external nance. Instead of using values tabulated in these papers, we re-calculate proxies
using ISIC rev. 3.1 industry classication in order to be able to match them with the
11Specically, these ISIC 2-digit categories are: 15-16, 17-19, 32-33.
12For categories `36 - Manufacturing n.e.c.' and `37 - Recycling,' neither volume nor nominal value-
added data is available.
13We obtained the concordance table used in Bekaert et al. (2007) from the authors. We adjust their
concordance table as the ICB classication has been expanded since their work, and also because Bekaert
et al. (2007) link ICB sub-sectors to the SIC classication while we link them to the ISIC classication.
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Amadeus data.14 In line with Rajan and Zingales (1998), we compute External Finance
Dependence (EFD) as the share of capital expenditures not nanced by the cash-ow from
operations. Capital expenditures is item 128 in Compustat and cash-ow from operations
is dened as cash-ow from operations (item 110 or sum of items 123, 125, 126, 106,
213 and 217 if unavailable) plus change in payables (item 70 or 304 if unavailable) minus
change in receivables (item 2 or 302 if unavailable) plus change in inventories (item 3 or
303 if unavailable). We sum both capital expenditures and cash-ows from operations
over the 1996-2005 period for each rm and compute the rm-level dependence. The
industry level external nance dependence is then dependence of the median rm.
Following Ilyina and Samaniego (2008), we compute R&D Intensity as the share of
R&D expenditures (item 46) in capital expenditures. We sum both the nominator and
denominator over the 1996-2005 period for each rm and compute rm-level R&D in-
tensity. Again, each industry is characterized by a median rm. Investment Lumpiness
is computed as the average number of investment spikes experienced by rms in a given
industry over the 1996-2005 period, where an investment spike is dened as annual capital
expenditure in excess of 30% of the rm's xed assets (item 8).
The summary statistics for the industry-level proxies for growth opportunities and
technological determinants of external nance are presented in Table 1.3. Complete de-
nitions and sources of these variables are provided in Panel C of Appendix Table 1.A.1.
1.5 Results
1.5.1 Financial Development and External Finance Use
We present basic estimates of regression (1.1) in Table 1.4. In all specications, we control
for 3-digit ISIC industry and country dummies and rm-level control variables that are
measured as of the rst year a rm enters the sample (detailed denitions of these variables
are provided in Panel A of Table 1.A.1). The estimates in Table 1.4 suggest that nancial
development improves allocation of external nance by channeling it to rms in industries
14We use the concordance table constructed by the U.S. Census Bureau to link the NAICS 2002
classication used in Compustat to 3-digit ISIC industries.
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with strong growth prospects.
To inspect the economic magnitude of our estimates, we consider the eect of nancial
development in increasing the average use of external nance for rms operating in indus-
tries at the bottom and top quartile of the industry distribution by the real value-added
growth in the U.S. Thus, using our estimated coecients of the interaction terms β̂, we
compute
β̂ × (FDmax − FDmin)× (USGrowth75p − USGrowth25p), (1.4)
where FDmax (FDmin) are the sample maximum (minimum) of the nancial development
indicator, and USGrowth75p (USGrowth25p) are the sample top (bottom) quartiles of the
real value-added growth in the U.S. (equal to 3.3 percentage points in the sample). The
impact of the increase of Total Capitalization from its sample minimum to its sample
maximum on EFU is then 0.38 percentage points. Thus, the dierence in EFU between
rms operating in the industries ranked at 75th and 25th percentiles of the U.S. real value-
added growth is 0.38 percentage points higher in Netherlands than in Latvia, the countries
with the highest and the lowest Total Capitalization in our sample, respectively. Using
Private Credit, Market Capitalization, Market Value Traded, and Accounting Standards
we obtain economic eects of 0.58, 0.16, 0.31, and 0.23 percentage points, respectively.15
For the comparison, the sample mean and standard deviation of EFU are 0.4 percent and
3.8 percent, respectively.
In Panel A of Table 1.5, we complement estimates reported in Table 1.4 with the
estimates obtained using the time-average of the level and growth of global PE ratios as
alternative proxies for growth opportunities. We include both average level and growth
in global PE ratios to investigate whether nancial development improves channeling of
external nances to industries with high expectations of future growth (high level of global
PE ratio) or to industries in which the growth prospects increase over the investigated
period (high growth of global PE ratio). Financial development makes no dierence in
allocating external nance to industries which dier in their average level of expected
15By approximating only for the industry-specic component of growth opportunities we are very re-
strictive. On the one hand, we alleviate endogeneity concerns, but on the other, we introduce measurement
error which typically leads to an attenuation bias.
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growth opportunities. On the other hand, our results suggest that nancial development
helps to facilitate nancing of industries with growing market expectations as measured by
the growth of global PE ratios. Thus, we choose Global PE Growth to be the alternative
proxy for growth opportunities. The economic signicance of estimates obtained with
Global PE Growth is higher when compared to the case of US Growth. Specically, the
quantity (1.4) is calculated as 0.86, 0.90, 0.53, 0.42, and 0.39 percentage points if nancial
development is measured by Total Capitalization, Private Credit, Market Capitalization,
Market Value Traded, and Accounting Standards, respectively.
The regression specications in Panel A of Table 1.5 characterize each rm by the time-
average of its external nance use. While this allows us to investigate the allocation of
external nance across industries over a longer period, it creates the problem of averaging
net external nance to zero. We would expect rms to obtain external nance in periods
of positive shocks and pay it back when returns from investments are realized, which
would show as a negative autocorrelation in time series of external nance use with the
implication of the time average converging to zero with the length of time period. To
bypass this issue, we consider a panel regression specication











fic ζ + εfict, (1.5)
where EFUfict is the external nance use of rm f from industry i and country c in
year t. FDc denotes the country-level indicator of nancial development measured as of
the beginning of our sample period. GOit proxies global industry growth opportunities in
year t. Di, Dc, and Dc are industry, country, and year xed eects, respectively. Xfic is
a vector of rm-level control variables, which we measure as of the rst year a rm enters
the sample.
The estimates of regression (1.5) are reported in Panel B of Table 1.5.16 We use all
three proxies for growth opportunities. The estimated coecients on the interaction terms
`FD × US Growth' and `FD × Global PE Growth' reported in Panel B are positive and,
16We also use two alternative specications of panel regression (1.5). First, we allow the rm-level
control variables to vary over time. Second, we include rm xed-eects instead of the rm-level control
variables in the regression. With both approaches, we nd similar results too those reported in Panel B
of Table 1.5.
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with the exception of the coecient on `Private Credit × US Growth,' are signicant at
conventional levels. Note that the estimated coecients on the interaction terms `Total
Capitalization × Global PE Level' and `Market Capitalization × Global PE Level' are
signicant in Panel B, while they were not signicant in Panel A. The coecients in
Panel B are smaller in magnitude, which is likely due to the fact that our growth proxies
measure year-on-year changes in growth opportunities with an error, which leads to an
attenuation bias. Overall, our panel data analysis suggest that nancial development
improves the allocation of external nance by channeling it to industries with high growth
prospects, and conrms our conclusions obtained using cross-sectional regression analysis.
1.5.2 Dierences across Firms
To explore what mechanism underlies the positive link from nancial development to
external nance use in industries with strong growth opportunities, we check whether
the degree of nancial development matters more for those types of rms that are more
likely to have limited access to public nancial markets and/or those that cannot tap
international bond and equity markets. We investigate this conjecture by focusing on
subsamples of small/large and young/old rms.17
First, we estimate regression (1.1) on a subsample of `small' and `large' rms. These
results are reported in Panels A and B of Table 1.6.18 In Panel A (B) of Table 1.6, a
rm is dened to be small (large) if its size, measured by total assets, is less or equal to
(greater than) the median value of total assets taken across all rms in the same country
2-digit ISIC industry cell. In all specications we consider, the estimated coecients
on the interaction terms `FD × US Growth' and `FD × Global PE Growth' reported
in Panel A of Table 1.6 are always bigger when compared to the analogous estimates
17Small and young rms are likely to exhibit a higher degree of informational opaqueness and thus
end up more nancially constrained than their larger and older counterparts. In surveys, small and
young companies report having less access to external nance than larger and older companies (Beck
et al. (2006), Angelini and Generale (2008)). Beck et al. (2008) nd that industries which are naturally
composed of rms with small size are more likely to grow disproportionally faster than industries with
high share of large companies in countries with high level of nancial development.
18In order to keep Table 1.6 parsimonious, we do not report coecients on the base eects of US
Growth and Global PE Growth as well as on the rm-level controls, but they are included in all regression
specications.
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reported in Panel B. Moreover, the estimates reported in Panel A of Table 1.6 are always
signicant, while those in Panel B of Table 1.6 are almost never signicant. Finally, the
estimated coecients on the interaction terms reported in Panel A of Table 1.6 are bigger
in magnitude in comparison to the estimates reported in Panel A of Table 1.5 that are
based on the full sample. This evidence suggest that small rms in particular are able
to raise more external nance in response to growth shocks in more developed nancial
systems. This supports the view that more developed nancial systems alleviate the
nancial constraints of small rms more.
Second, we estimate regression (1.1) on a subsample of `young' and `old' rms. These
results are reported in Panels C and D of Table 1.6. In Panel C (D) of Table 1.6, a rm
is dened to be young (old) if its age, measured in years since incorporation as of the
rst year a rm enters the sample, is less or equal to (greater than) the median value of
age taken across all rms in the same country2-digit ISIC industry cell. We show that
the estimated coecients on the interaction terms `FD × US Growth' and `FD × Global
PE Growth' reported in Panel C of Table 1.6 are always bigger (and are signicant at
the same or lower levels) in comparison to the analogous estimates reported in Panel D.
This evidence conrms our ndings obtained using subsamples of small/large rms. In
sum, more developed nancial systems are better able to allocate external nance as a
response to growth shocks through alleviating nancial constraints associated with small
and young rms.
An important determinant of a rm's ability to raise external nance is its corporate
governance. For example, Leuz, Lins, and Warnock (2009) nd that U.S. investors do
hold fewer shares in foreign rms where managers and their families have high levels of
control, i.e., in rms with ownership structures that are more conductive to expropriation
by controlling insiders. Motivated by these ndings, we have collected data on ownership
structures of the rms in our sample from the Amadeus ownership database.19 Using
19For each rm, Amadeus identies the shareholders and reports their ownership stakes. Each Amadeus
update provides the ownership information as of the most recent date the data provider (Bureau van Dijk -
BvD) was able to verify it. To cover as many rms as possible, we use seven Amadeus DVD updates: May
2001, May 2002, July 2003, May 2004, October 2005, September 2006, and May 2007. We supplement
this data with more recent updates of Amadeus downloaded from WRDS in July 2007 and April 2008.
Finally, we also use ownership data from Orbis, BvD's product with world-wide coverage, which was
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the detailed data on rms' shareholders, we dene rm-level variable `Ownership Con-
centration' to be the sum of squares (Herndahl-Hirschman index) of direct stakes of all
reported shareholders in the year that is the closest to the rst year a rm enters the
sample, and it remains xed over time. Concentrated ownership structures indicate the
presence of controlling owners who might be in a position to expropriate minority share-
holders. According to Leuz, Lins, and Warnock (2009), such rms should nd it more
dicult to raise external nance from outside investors in less developed nancial systems
as they may not be able to prevent expropriation.
We estimate regression (1.1) on a subsample of `closely held rms' as well as on a
subsample of `rms with dispersed ownership.' These results are reported in Panels E
and F, respectively, of Table 1.6. In Panel E (F), a rm is dened to be closely held
(have dispersed ownership) if its Ownership Concentration is greater than (less or equal
to) the median value of Ownership Concentration variable taken across all rms in the
same country2-digit ISIC industry cell.
The estimated coecients on the interaction terms `FD × US Growth' and `FD ×
Global PE Growth' reported in Panel E of Table 1.6 are always more signicant and
in almost all cases they are also bigger in magnitude when compared to the analogous
estimates reported in Panel F. This suggests that rms with dispersed ownership struc-
tures are better able to satisfy their external nance needs independently of the degree of
domestic nancial markets development. In contrast, for rms with highly concentrated
ownership structures, the degree of domestic nancial markets development is a much
more important determinant of whether such rms are able to raise external nance in
response to growth shocks. These results are consistent with the ndings in Leuz, Lins,
and Warnock (2009) that foreign investors avoid investing in rms with dominant owners
and, as a result, such rms need to rely more on the domestic nancial markets.
issued in November 2008. The resulting ownership dataset gives a unique breadth of cross-sectional
coverage.
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1.5.3 Growth Opportunities and Technological Characteristics
The extensive literature on nance-growth nexus uses the insight of Rajan and Zingales
(1998) that the causal link from nance to growth can be identied by investigating
the access to nance by industries diering in their natural external nance dependence
(EFD). Ilyina and Samaniego (2008) further show that the strongest technological factors
underlying cross-sectional variation in EFD are R&D Intensity and Investment Lumpiness.
In line with these results, it is important to check whether industries dependent on external
nance are actually using more of it in nancially more developed countries. The results in
Panel A of Table 1.7 suggest that this is indeed the case. The coecient on the interaction
of nancial development and the technological measure is positive and signicant with the
exception of Accounting Standards. Interestingly, interactions with R&D Intensity and
Investment Lumpiness are statistically more signicant in explaining improvements in the
allocation of external nance caused by nancial development than EFD.
As discussed in Section 1.3, the dierences in estimates of industrial technological
determinants of dependence on external nance can be partially driven by the dierences
in growth opportunities over the period of their estimation. Specically, the U.S. specic
component of growth opportunities may be the common factor driving the dierences in
the estimates of R&D Intensity, Investment Lumpiness, EFD as well as realized value-
added growth. This would empirically translate into higher correlation between real
growth of U.S. industries and technological determinants of nance and the decrease in
the coecients on their interactions with nancial development in the regressions on
actual use of external nance. For the Global PE Growth proxy for growth opportunities,
this should be less of a worry as the inuence of the U.S. growth component should be
limited.20
The results in Panel B of Table 1.7 are in line with the hypothesis of the existence
of a common factor of U.S. growth opportunities in technological determinants.21 The
20The spearman rank correlations between US Growth and technological determinants of nance are
much higher than their counterparts for Global PE Growth. For example, the rank correlation of R&D
Intensity and US growth is 0.42 with p-value 0.06 while the correlation of R&D Intensity and Global PE
Growth is only 0.06 with p-value 0.80. A similar result is obtained for Investment Lumpiness and EFD,
although in the case of the latter, the correlation with Global PE Growth rises to 0.29.
21In order to keep Table 1.7 parsimonious, we do not report coecients on the base eects of US
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estimated coecients on interactions of nancial development and R&D Intensity and
EFD drops to almost half once interactions with US Growth are included. However,
we actually observe a drop in the estimated coecient on the interaction of nancial
development with US Growth once corresponding interaction with Investment Lumpiness
is included in the specication.
The picture is dierent when we use Global PE Growth as a proxy for growth oppor-
tunities (Panel C of Table 1.7). The estimated coecients on the interaction terms of
nancial development with Global PE Growth are statistically signicant and very similar
in magnitudes to their counterparts in specications which exclude technological inter-
actions (Panel A of Table 1.5). Overall, our evidence suggests that the role of nancial
development with respect to allocation of external nancing is two-fold. On the one hand,
it helps to channel external nance to industries which are presumably more dependent
on it due to technological reasons. On the other hand, more developed nancial markets
are better in providing nance to industries with global growth opportunities.22
1.6 Additional Investigations and Robustness
1.6.1 Capital Expenditures Not Financed by Internal Funds
Our measure of net external nance use does not distinguish between external nance used
for capital expenditures and external nance used for other purposes. As an alternative,
we use capital expenditures not nanced by internal funds (as in Rajan and Zingales
(1998)), which is, in our case, given by equation (1.A.3) in Appendix 1.B. Table 1.8 is
based on this alternative external nance use measure, while being otherwise (sample
and regression specications) identical to Table 1.5. The table shows that all estimated
coecients on the interaction terms of interest are bigger in magnitude and have the
same signicance (are often signicant at lower thresholds) in comparison to the results
reported in Table 1.5. This suggests that the conclusions of our analysis are robust to
Growth and Global PE Growth as well as on the rm-level controls, but they are included in all regression
specications.
22The results reported in Panels B and C of Table 1.7 are robust to using panel regression specications
similar to equation (1.5). See Table 1.OA.4 in Online Appendix 1.C.
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changing the denition of the dependent variable.
1.6.2 Decomposing External Finance Use
In Appendix 1.B, we show that our EFU measure can be decomposed into the amount of
equity raised/repurchased, the amount of long-term debt issued/repaid, and the change in
other non-current liabilities. As there exist major contractual and institutional dierences
among these components of external nance, it is important to assess what is the role
of nancial development in the improvement of their allocation with respect to growth
opportunities. To do so, we run a set of regressions equivalent to specication (1.1)
separately using each component of external nance use as a dependent variable. We
present the results of this exercise in Table 1.9.
Panels A and B document that nancial development improves the allocation of both
equity and long-term debt. When compared to the basic results in Panel A of Table 1.5,
the estimated coecients on the interaction terms suggest that around one third of the
improvement in the allocation of external nance comes in the form of shareholder's
equity, while the remaining two-thirds can be explained by long-term debt. This pattern
is roughly consistent for both proxies for growth opportunities and all measures of nancial
development.
With respect to changes in other non-current liabilities, our results suggest that nan-
cial development makes no improvement in their alignment with growth opportunities.
This result is in line with the expectations given that other non-current liabilities usually
consists of items such as retirement benet obligations, deferred tax liabilities, or long-
term trade debts, and thus they are components of liabilities driven primarily by factors
other than the need to nance growth opportunities.
1.6.3 Error in Measurement of Growth Opportunities
In our analysis, we use real US Growth and Global PE Growth in 2-digit ISIC industries as
proxies for the global component of growth opportunities, which introduces measurement
error to our analysis. The noise present in any proxy may lead us to underestimate the
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coecient of interest due to classical measurement error bias. We investigate the magni-
tude of the bias in two ways. First, having two dierent proxies for growth opportunities
allows us to use two-stage least-squares (2SLS) approach. Under the assumption of the
orthogonality of measurement errors in the two proxies for growth opportunities, we can
use one as the instrument for the other, which allows us to use only the variation common
to both of them to estimate the coecient of interest. We use the interaction of nancial
development with Global PE Growth (US Growth) and Global PE Growth (US Growth)
as instruments for the interaction of nancial development with US Growth (Global PE
Growth) and US Growth (Global PE Growth). The results for both directions are pre-
sented in Table 1.10. Compared to the basic estimates, there is a signicant increase in
the estimated coecients for all measures of nancial development. In general, the order
of increase of the estimates is between 1.7 to 7.2, which suggests that the impact of the
measurement error may be large.23
Second, we use a simple version of simulation-extrapolation (SIMEX) method proposed
by Cook and Stefanski (1994) to assess the magnitude of attenuation bias by comparing
the estimates obtained by using the set of proxies created by adding white noise of varying
precision to the base measure. Specically, for each level of standard deviation ranging
from 0.005 to 0.05, we simulate 100 draws from a multi-variate normal distribution and
add them to a given proxy for growth opportunities. The newly created variable is then
used as a proxy for growth opportunities in the interaction with the Total Capitalization
in specication (1.1). Then, for each level of added noise, we compute the average of
100 obtained estimates and plot it against the standard deviation of added noise. The
results obtained using US Growth are plotted in Figure 1.1.24 The gure allows us to
evaluate the magnitude of the attenuation bias caused by the random error. Extrapolating
back the relationship between standard error of added noise and the average estimate
provides a guess of how the estimate would look like if the measurement error was less
23 Ciccone and Papaioannou (2006) carry out similar 2SLS exercise. In the industry-level growth
regressions, they instrument growth opportunities approximated by the U.S. growth with the world-
average value-added growth by industry controlling for the eects of nancial underdevelopment. They
obtain an increase in coecients of the magnitude ranging between 3 to 6.
24Figure 1.1 is practically unchanged when we use Global PE Growth instead.
37
severe. For example, given that the standard deviation of the US Growth proxy is 0.041,
then under the assumption that the measurement error is responsible for half of this
variation, the quadratic extrapolation of the simulation results would suggest that the
estimated coecient would be approximately 0.035, which is about 25% larger than our
basic estimate.
The results obtained from the 2SLS and SIMEX exercises suggest that there indeed is
attenuation bias caused by measurement error and the two methods indicate somewhat
dierent levels of the bias. Naturally, we don't have any estimate of the proportion of
variance of US Growth or Global PE Growth caused by the measurement error. How-
ever, Figure 1.1 suggests that even if the measurement noise accounted for a very large
proportion in the variation of US Growth, the resulting attenuation bias is not likely to
be of larger magnitude than 2, which is low compared to the results obtained in the 2SLS
exercise. A possible explanation for this discrepancy is a poor extrapolating performance
of quadratic t in the SIMEX exercise, or the existence of non-standard upward bias
common to both proxies for growth opportunities, which would imply the violation of the
assumption of the orthogonality of measurement errors in the 2SLS exercise.25
1.6.4 Alternative Measures of Financial Development
We check robustness of our results by investigating the eect of other dimensions of
nancial development on the allocation of external nance (Table 1.11). First, we test
the hypothesis that the higher the involvement of government in the banking sector,
the lower the eciency of allocation of nance to rms in growing industries. To the
extent that incentives of government as the owner of banks may not be fully in line
with prot maximization, the government banks may be more distorted when allocating
credit. Thus, we would expect that interaction of the government bank ownership and
growth opportunities would be negative. We nd that this is the case for both the level
of Government Bank Ownership and the level of Government Bank Control in the top 10
banks in 1995 as calculated by La Porta, Lopez-De-Silanes, and Shleifer (2002).
25An upward bias common to both proxies may arise if they both approximate growth opportunities
more precisely in more nancially developed countries.
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Second, we investigate whether the operational eciency of the banks and the level of
competition in the banking sector increase allocative eciency. To the extent the com-
petition among banks increases the quality of the nancial sector, it may comparatively
improve the chance of obtaining credit for rms operating in industries with potential
growth prospects. In line with Demirguc-Kunt, Laeven, and Levine (2004), we approxi-
mate operational eciency and competitiveness of banking sector by the Overhead Costs
and the Net Interest Margin. The former reects operational cost ineciencies possi-
bly associated with the market power while the later measures the mark-up between the
interest received from borrowers and the interest paid to savers and thus it eectively ap-
proximates the degree of competition in traditional operations of the bank. Our ndings
suggest that higher mark-ups and cost ineciencies are related to less ecient allocation
of external nance.
Third, we use an all-encompassing market-based approximation of the country-level
institutional quality, namely the control premium estimated by Dyck and Zingales (2004).
The private control premiums correspond to the benets enjoyed by the controlling share-
holder and not shared by other shareholders. They arise as a consequence of the lack of
limits to the extraction of private benets, and they reect the inverse of the level of in-
vestor protection in the country. Dyck and Zingales (2004) show that the control premiums
are higher in countries with less deep nancial markets, more concentrated ownership, less
protected minority shareholders and weaker law enforcement. Our results are in line with
the hypothesis that low quality of institutions is related to lower allocative eciency.
Lastly, we use measures of bank regulation and supervisory practices which, as showed
by Barth, Caprio, and Levine (2004), aect the development and performance of the
banking sector. First, the banking sector development is signicantly negatively asso-
ciated with the restrictions on bank commercial activities, which we capture using the
Restrictions on Bank Activities Index. Second, bank development and performance are
positively associated with regulations that promote private monitoring of banks, which
we capture using the Private Monitoring Index. Both indexes are constructed following
methodology in Barth, Caprio, and Levine (2004). Our results suggest that rms raise
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more external nance in response to growth shocks in nancial systems that feature fewer
restrictions on the activities of banks.
1.6.5 Robustness Checks
We check for the robustness of our results across several dimensions.26 First, as argued in
Klapper, Laeven, and Rajan (2006), there exists substantial diversity in the legal forms
of incorporation in Europe. The comparability of rms across countries can thus be
increased by narrowing the sample to the forms of incorporation equivalent to limited
liability companies. Our results hold for this subsample.
Second, in our dierence-in-dierences model, we regress rm-level external nance use
on the industry-country group term that applies to all rms in the group. Eectively, we
investigate conditional industry-country averages in external nance use and to the extent
that the eciency of this average is driven by the number of individual rms within each
group, the potential concern is that our results may be aected by the industries with
a small number of rms. The results are qualitatively unaected and the investigated
eect is economically stronger when we estimate our basic specication on the sample
constrained to industry-country groups with at least 20 rms.
Third, we account more carefully for the unbalanced nature of our panel when estimat-
ing our cross-sectional regressions. If industry-specic factors aecting external nance
use have been changing rapidly over time, controlling only for industry xed eects can
be insucient. Thus, we amend our baseline specication (1.1), by interacting industry
xed eects with period xed eects. A period dummy is equal to 1 for a given rm if its
external nance use is computed as an average over a given period. Our results are not
aected.
Fourth, we run median regressions which are robust to outliers and allow us to inves-
tigate industry-country median external nance use. The conditional median eects are
economically smaller and in many cases statistically insignicant, but they always hold
proper sign.
26The results presented in this section are available in Online Appendix 1.C.
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Fifth, we also estimate regression (1.1) in which we, in addition to our standard
set of rm-level control variables, control for Ownership Concentration and Ownership
Concentration squared. The sample formation and regression specications are otherwise
identical to those in Table 1.4. The coecients on the interaction term `FD × US Growth'
are bigger in magnitude and are more signicant compared to those reported in Table 1.4.
Last, we check whether our results change if we use a sub-sample of EU-15 countries.
Excluding countries from Central and East Europe (CEE) is justied by two reasons.
First, CEE countries were still in the process of transition to a market economy and
the resulting resource reallocation has been aected by their specic structure of growth
opportunities. Second, EU-15 countries engaged in the single product market in 1993,
which presumably brought higher degree of similarity in the growth opportunities of rms
operating in the same industry across dierent countries. Our results show that leaving
out CEE countries does not aect our ndings.27
1.7 Conclusion
The most important role of a nancial system is to provide external nance to viable rms
so that they can exploit growth opportunities. The primary focus of this paper is to study
whether the nancial markets development improves the eciency of the capital alloca-
tion. Using two alternative proxies for the global industry-specic component of growth
opportunities, we show that comparable rms with growth opportunities obtain signi-
cantly more external nance in countries with more developed nancial markets. We nd
the eect to be economically important. Given that our sample consists of relatively large
and well-established rms, which are shown to be less aected by nancial development,
it is likely that the economic signicance of our results in the overall population is even
larger.
27Additionally, our results are robust to excluding Bulgaria and the Netherlands, which are countries
with the lowest and highest levels of nancial development in our sample.
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1.8 Main Tables
Table 1.1: External Finance Use: Firm Data by Country, 1996-2005
Percentile
Country N Mean S.D. 25th 50th 75th
Austria 129 -0.020 0.062 -0.060 -0.004 0.022
Belgium 1,630 0.000 0.037 -0.012 0.000 0.016
Bulgaria 113 0.023 0.057 -0.001 0.015 0.055
Czech Republic 1,033 -0.007 0.046 -0.027 -0.005 0.014
Estonia 119 0.009 0.046 -0.013 0.002 0.032
Finland 670 -0.007 0.037 -0.024 -0.005 0.011
France 4,629 0.002 0.032 -0.008 0.002 0.015
Germany 539 -0.008 0.059 -0.034 0.002 0.028
Greece 615 0.024 0.034 0.006 0.022 0.041
Hungary 104 -0.011 0.050 -0.039 -0.010 0.019
Ireland 168 0.002 0.044 -0.007 0.000 0.015
Italy 4,941 0.008 0.029 -0.004 0.008 0.022
Latvia 151 0.023 0.054 -0.005 0.014 0.054
Lithuania 54 0.053 0.054 0.022 0.054 0.087
Netherlands 425 -0.005 0.041 -0.019 -0.003 0.006
Poland 1,290 0.000 0.052 -0.024 -0.001 0.022
Portugal 510 0.008 0.039 -0.009 0.006 0.027
Slovakia 64 -0.013 0.049 -0.042 -0.012 0.007
Spain 3,026 0.007 0.033 -0.005 0.003 0.020
Sweden 1,351 -0.006 0.041 -0.023 -0.002 0.013
UK 3,177 0.006 0.038 -0.006 0.003 0.019
Total 24,738 0.004 0.038 -0.010 0.003 0.020
Note: The number of observations in the sample, N, corresponds to the number of rms with
non-missing average External Finance Use (EFU) calculated based on at least 5 annual EFU
values within the 1996-2005 period. Annual EFU is dened as change in shareholders' capital
plus change in a rm's long-term debt plus change in a rm's other non-current liabilities
divided by total assets. Before computing the statistics we remove EFU outliers (we use the
1-to-99 percentile range of annual EFU values). See Panel A of Appendix Table 1.A.1 for
detailed denition of EFU.
Table 1.2: Financial Development: European Countries
Mean S.D. Min Max Min Country Max Country N
Total Capitalization 1.05 0.94 0.08 4.21 Latvia Netherlands 20
Private Credit 0.70 0.68 0.06 3.31 Latvia Netherlands 21
Market Capitalization 0.32 0.34 0.00 1.33 Bulgaria UK 20
Market Value Traded 0.19 0.21 0.00 0.82 Bulgaria Netherlands 20
Accounting Standards 0.64 0.13 0.36 0.83 Portugal Sweden 12
Government Bank Ownership 0.37 0.28 0.00 0.86 UK Bulgaria 18
Government Bank Control 0.38 0.31 0.00 0.92 UK Bulgaria 18
Overhead Costs 3.69 2.19 0.25 9.45 Ireland Bulgaria 19
Net. Int. Margin 3.65 1.92 1.18 7.28 Netherlands Latvia 19
Control Premium 0.17 0.19 0.01 0.58 Netherlands Czech Republic 11
Private Monitoring Index 5.62 1.02 4.00 8.00 Slovakia Finland 21
Restrictions on Bank Activities Index 7.90 1.67 5.00 10.00 UK Bulgaria 21
Note: We present the Min, Max, Mean, and Standard Deviation of country-level nancial development measures across
Europe. Accounting Standards are as of 1990, Control Premium is estimated for the 1990-2000 period, Government Bank
Ownership and Government Bank Control are as of 1995, Private Monitoring Index and Restrictions on Bank Activities Index
are calculated using responses obtained over 1998-2000, and all remaining measures are as of 1996. Total Capitalization,
Market Capitalization, and Market Value Traded are missing for Estonia. Accounting Standards are missing for Bulgaria,
Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Ireland, Lithuania, Latvia, Poland, and Slovakia. Government Bank Ownership and
Government Bank Control are missing for Estonia, Lithuania, and Latvia. Overhead Costs and Net Interest Margin are
missing for Finland and Sweden. Control Premium is missing for Belgium, Bulgaria, Estonia, Greece, Hungary, Ireland,






























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































FD × US Growth 0.028** 0.055*** 0.038* 0.115*** 0.151*
(0.011) (0.016) (0.021) (0.041) (0.085)
US Growth -0.011 -0.019 0.007 -0.003 -0.074
(0.043) (0.043) (0.042) (0.042) (0.071)
log(Total Assets) -0.219*** -0.224*** -0.219*** -0.219*** -0.170***
(0.041) (0.041) (0.041) (0.041) (0.041)
log(Total Assets) Squared -2.463*** -2.420*** -2.456*** -2.459*** -3.901***
(0.843) (0.842) (0.844) (0.844) (0.886)
log(Employees) -0.455*** -0.451*** -0.454*** -0.455*** -0.583***
(0.099) (0.099) (0.099) (0.099) (0.103)
log(Employees) Squared 4.374*** 4.353*** 4.367*** 4.379*** 6.447***
(1.150) (1.147) (1.149) (1.150) (1.211)
Age -0.006 -0.008 -0.006 -0.006 0.014
(0.032) (0.032) (0.032) (0.032) (0.033)
Age Squared -0.032 -0.012 -0.038 -0.035 -0.133
(0.373) (0.373) (0.373) (0.373) (0.390)
Leverage -0.019*** -0.018*** -0.019*** -0.019*** -0.018***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Tangibility -0.013*** -0.013*** -0.013*** -0.013*** -0.012***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Collateral 0.004* 0.003 0.004* 0.004* 0.002
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Cash -0.008*** -0.009*** -0.008*** -0.008*** -0.009***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Constant 0.023*** 0.023*** 0.023*** 0.023*** 0.022***
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Country, Industry FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adjusted R2 0.081 0.081 0.081 0.081 0.080
N 24,619 24,738 24,619 24,619 21,642
Note: The table reports results of OLS regressions on the sample of European private rms. The dependent variable is
the time average of annual rm-level External Finance Use (EFU) dened as change in shareholders' capital plus change
in a rm's long-term debt plus change in a rm's other non-current liabilities divided by total assets. The average is taken
over years in which a rm is present in the sample within the 1996-2005 period. US Growth is the time average of the real
value-added growth of US 2-digit ISIC industries calculated, for each rm, over the same years for which EFU is computed.
Country-level measures of Financial Development (FD) are predetermined. Firm-level control variables come from the rst
year a rm enters the sample and remain xed over time. Logarithm of Total Assets (in EUR millions) is divided by 100.
Logarithm of Employment is divided by 100. Age is the number of years since a rm's incorporation and it is divided by
1,000. Leverage is the ratio of long- plus short-term debt to total assets. Tangibility is the ratio of xed assets to total
assets. Collateral is measured as xed assets plus inventories plus receivables divided by total assets. Cash is the ratio of
cash holdings to total assets. See Appendix Table 1.A.1 for complete denitions and sources of variables. All specications
are linear regressions with outliers removed (we use the 1-to-99 percentile range of the dependent variable). We always
control for country and 3-digit ISIC industry dummies. Robust standard errors (clustered at the industry-country level)
are reported in parentheses; *, **, and *** denote signicance at the 10%,5 %, and 1% levels, respectively.
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Panel A: Cross-sectional Regressions
FD × US Growth 0.028** 0.055*** 0.038* 0.115*** 0.151*
(0.011) (0.016) (0.021) (0.041) (0.085)
US Growth -0.011 -0.019 0.007 -0.003 -0.074
(0.043) (0.043) (0.042) (0.042) (0.071)
Adjusted R2 0.081 0.081 0.081 0.081 0.080
N 24,619 24,738 24,619 24,619 21,642
FD × Global PE Level 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.001 0.002
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.008) (0.015)
Global PE Level 0.021* 0.021* 0.021* 0.022* 0.035**
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.015)
Adjusted R2 0.082 0.081 0.082 0.081 0.080
N 25,703 25,835 25,703 25,703 22,579
FD × Global PE Growth 0.054*** 0.072*** 0.104*** 0.131** 0.216*
(0.012) (0.021) (0.023) (0.051) (0.115)
Global PE Growth -0.053*** -0.043** -0.034** -0.018 -0.117
(0.020) (0.020) (0.017) (0.018) (0.079)
Adjusted R2 0.082 0.082 0.082 0.082 0.080
N 25,703 25,835 25,703 25,703 22,579
Panel B: Panel Regressions
FD × US Growth 0.021** 0.019 0.048*** 0.080** 0.127*
(0.009) (0.015) (0.016) (0.032) (0.066)
US Growth -0.026** -0.015 -0.023** -0.019* -0.088*
(0.013) (0.013) (0.011) (0.011) (0.045)
Adjusted R2 0.016 0.016 0.016 0.016 0.015
N 181,070 181,838 181,070 181,070 161,593
FD × Global PE Level 0.006** 0.005 0.013** 0.014 0.017
(0.003) (0.004) (0.005) (0.010) (0.020)
Global PE Level -0.008** -0.005 -0.007** -0.004 -0.012
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.012)
Adjusted R2 0.016 0.016 0.016 0.016 0.015
N 189,805 190,674 189,805 189,805 169,281
FD × Global PE Growth 0.011*** 0.012** 0.023*** 0.028** 0.047*
(0.003) (0.005) (0.006) (0.013) (0.028)
Global PE Growth -0.004 0.001 -0.001 0.003 -0.021
(0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.019)
Adjusted R2 0.016 0.016 0.016 0.016 0.015
N 189,341 190,829 189,341 189,341 168,360
Note: The table reports results of OLS regressions on the sample of European private rms. Panel A reports results
of cross-sectional regressions, where the dependent variable is the time average of annual rm-level External Finance Use,
dened as in Table 1.4, and US Growth, Global PE Level, and Global PE Growth are time averages calculated, for each rm,
over the same years for which EFU is computed. Panel B reports results of regressions on the panel of rm-year observations
that corresponds to the sample used in Panel A. The dependent variable is the annual rm-level External Finance Use and
growth opportunities proxies US Growth, Global PE Level, and Global PE Growth are allowed to vary over years. All
specications are linear regressions with outliers removed (observations outside the 1-to-99 percentile range of the dependent
variable), include a constant and predetermined rm-level controls (see Table 1.4 notes for their denitions). Specications
in Panel A include country and 3-digit ISIC industry dummies, while specications in Panel B include country, 3-digit ISIC
industry, and year dummies. *, **, and *** denote signicance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively, based on robust
standard errors clustered at the industry-country level.
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Panel A: Small Firms
FD × US Growth 0.037*** 0.069*** 0.057*** 0.138*** 0.243***
(0.010) (0.021) (0.018) (0.040) (0.093)
Adjusted R2 0.074 0.074 0.074 0.074 0.074
N 12,455 12,517 12,455 12,455 11,140
FD × Global PE Growth 0.072*** 0.108*** 0.126*** 0.222*** 0.294*
(0.017) (0.030) (0.034) (0.068) (0.150)
Adjusted R2 0.076 0.075 0.075 0.075 0.074
N 13,005 13,073 13,005 13,005 11,617
Panel B: Large Firms
FD × US Growth 0.022 0.043 0.026 0.111* 0.080
(0.018) (0.028) (0.033) (0.064) (0.124)
Adjusted R2 0.065 0.065 0.065 0.065 0.065
N 12,164 12,221 12,164 12,164 10,502
FD × Global PE Growth 0.030* 0.023 0.079** 0.021 0.114
(0.018) (0.026) (0.037) (0.074) (0.165)
Adjusted R2 0.066 0.065 0.066 0.066 0.065
N 12,698 12,762 12,698 12,698 10,962
Panel C: Young Firms
FD × US Growth 0.031** 0.058** 0.043* 0.124** 0.223*
(0.013) (0.024) (0.024) (0.051) (0.120)
Adjusted R2 0.099 0.099 0.099 0.099 0.100
N 11,974 12,036 11,974 11,974 10,306
FD × Global PE Growth 0.067*** 0.087*** 0.140*** 0.164** 0.402**
(0.019) (0.029) (0.041) (0.078) (0.181)
Adjusted R2 0.101 0.100 0.101 0.100 0.100
N 12,515 12,583 12,515 12,515 10,756
Panel D: Old Firms
FD × US Growth 0.024* 0.050** 0.031 0.102** 0.063
(0.013) (0.021) (0.025) (0.052) (0.100)
Adjusted R2 0.069 0.069 0.069 0.069 0.065
N 12,645 12,702 12,645 12,645 11,336
FD × Global PE Growth 0.033** 0.046* 0.059* 0.073 -0.029
(0.016) (0.026) (0.031) (0.063) (0.133)
Adjusted R2 0.069 0.069 0.069 0.069 0.065
N 13,188 13,252 13,188 13,188 11,823
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Panel E: Closely Held Firms
FD × US Growth 0.044*** 0.076*** 0.061*** 0.199*** 0.325***
(0.011) (0.018) (0.022) (0.047) (0.111)
Adjusted R2 0.069 0.069 0.068 0.069 0.064
N 13,446 13,513 13,446 13,446 12,092
FD × Global PE Growth 0.058*** 0.068*** 0.118*** 0.160*** 0.365**
(0.015) (0.024) (0.030) (0.062) (0.154)
Adjusted R2 0.069 0.069 0.070 0.069 0.064
N 14,055 14,129 14,055 14,055 12,635
Panel F: Firms with Dispersed Ownership
FD × US Growth 0.007 0.022 0.006 0.002 -0.084
(0.021) (0.039) (0.037) (0.067) (0.130)
Adjusted R2 0.107 0.107 0.107 0.107 0.106
N 9,645 9,695 9,645 9,645 8,467
FD × Global PE Growth 0.065** 0.117** 0.106** 0.123 0.010
(0.026) (0.046) (0.047) (0.094) (0.197)
Adjusted R2 0.108 0.108 0.108 0.107 0.105
N 10,029 10,085 10,029 10,029 8,790
Note: The table reports results of OLS regressions analogous to those presented in Panel A of Table 1.5. The dependent
variable is the time average of annual rm-level External Finance Use. Panel A uses the sample of small rms, where a rm
is dened to be small if its size measured by Total Assets is less or equal to the median value taken across all rms in the
same country and 2-digit ISIC industry cell (the country-industry median). Panel B uses the sample of large rms, where a
rm is dened to be large if its Total Assets are greater than the corresponding country-industry median. Panel C uses the
sample of young rms, where a rm is dened to be young if its age since incorporation as of the rst year the rm enters
the sample is less or equal to the country-industry median. Panel D uses the sample of old rms, where a rm is dened to
be old if its age is greater than the country-industry median. Panel E uses the sample of closely held rms, where a rm is
dened to be closely held if its Ownership Concentration, measured by Herndahl-Hirschman Index of direct shareholders'
stakes, is greater than the country-industry median. Panel F uses the sample of rms with dispersed ownership, where rm
is dened to have dispersed ownership if its Ownership Concentration is less or equal to the country-industry median. All
specications are linear regressions with outliers removed (observations outside the 1-to-99 percentile range of the dependent
variable), include a constant, the corresponding growth opportunity proxy as a base eect, rm-level controls (see Table 1.4
notes for their denitions), and country and 3-digit ISIC industry dummies. *, **, and *** denote signicance at the 10%,
5%, and 1% levels, respectively, based on robust standard errors clustered at the industry-country level.











Panel A: Technological Characteristics
FD × R&D Intensity 0.083*** 0.152*** 0.107* 0.263** 0.161
(0.028) (0.055) (0.060) (0.121) (0.278)
Adjusted R2 0.081 0.081 0.081 0.081 0.079
N 23,756 23,862 23,756 23,756 20,921
FD × Investment Lumpiness 0.261*** 0.490*** 0.339*** 0.796*** 0.676
(0.058) (0.127) (0.113) (0.239) (0.525)
Adjusted R2 0.082 0.082 0.082 0.082 0.080
N 25,692 25,824 25,692 25,692 22,571
FD × EFD 0.096** 0.169** 0.140* 0.285 0.484
(0.039) (0.068) (0.085) (0.183) (0.440)
Adjusted R2 0.081 0.081 0.081 0.081 0.079
N 25,441 25,567 25,441 25,441 22,362
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Panel B: US Growth
FD × US Growth 0.025** 0.049*** 0.033 0.109** 0.178*
(0.012) (0.018) (0.024) (0.047) (0.104)
FD × R&D Intensity 0.054** 0.102** 0.062 0.125 -0.076
(0.025) (0.045) (0.053) (0.126) (0.294)
Adjusted R2 0.081 0.081 0.080 0.081 0.079
N 22,672 22,765 22,672 22,672 19,984
FD × US Growth 0.011 0.024 0.016 0.068 0.124
(0.011) (0.018) (0.022) (0.044) (0.087)
FD × Investment Lumpiness 0.239*** 0.435*** 0.314*** 0.648** 0.418
(0.061) (0.134) (0.118) (0.251) (0.530)
Adjusted R2 0.082 0.082 0.081 0.082 0.080
N 24,608 24,727 24,608 24,608 21,634
FD × US Growth 0.024** 0.047*** 0.033 0.105** 0.136
(0.011) (0.017) (0.022) (0.044) (0.090)
FD × EFD 0.062 0.106* 0.098 0.138 0.283
(0.039) (0.060) (0.082) (0.196) (0.452)
Adjusted R2 0.081 0.081 0.081 0.081 0.080
N 24,357 24,470 24,357 24,357 21,425
Panel C: Global PE Growth
FD × Global PE Growth 0.054*** 0.068*** 0.108*** 0.138** 0.252*
(0.013) (0.022) (0.025) (0.056) (0.133)
FD × R&D Intensity 0.050* 0.112** 0.034 0.175 -0.003
(0.028) (0.055) (0.058) (0.126) (0.295)
Adjusted R2 0.082 0.081 0.082 0.081 0.080
N 23,756 23,862 23,756 23,756 20,921
FD × Global PE Growth 0.043*** 0.053*** 0.092*** 0.098* 0.195
(0.012) (0.020) (0.025) (0.051) (0.118)
FD × Investment Lumpiness 0.201*** 0.421*** 0.204* 0.666*** 0.435
(0.060) (0.131) (0.114) (0.244) (0.543)
Adjusted R2 0.083 0.083 0.083 0.082 0.080
N 25,692 25,824 25,692 25,692 22,571
FD × Global PE Growth 0.050*** 0.065*** 0.098*** 0.123** 0.214*
(0.013) (0.022) (0.025) (0.055) (0.126)
FD × EFD 0.059 0.117* 0.072 0.184 0.296
(0.040) (0.068) (0.085) (0.189) (0.458)
Adjusted R2 0.082 0.081 0.082 0.081 0.080
N 25,441 25,567 25,441 25,441 22,362
Note: The table reports results of OLS regressions on the sample of European private rms. The dependent variable is the
time average of annual rm-level External Finance Use dened as in Table 1.4. Panel A reports estimates from specications
that include interactions of nancial development proxies (FD) with technological characteristics. R&D Intensity is the
time average of R&D to capital expenditure ratios of a median rm for each U.S. 3-digit ISIC industry over the 1996-2005
period. Investment Lumpiness is the number of investment spikes experienced by a median rm in each U.S. 3-digit ISIC
industry over the 1996-2005 period. The investment spike is an event when annual capital expenditure exceeds 30 percent
of the rm's stock of xed assets. External Finance Dependence (EFD) is the share of capital expenditures not nanced
by cash ow from operations of a median rm for each U.S. 3-digit ISIC industry over the 1996-2005 period. Panel B
reports estimates from specications that include interactions of nancial development proxies with US Growth as well
as interactions of nancial development proxies with technological characteristics presented in Panel A. Panel C reports
estimates from specications that include interactions of nancial development proxies with Global PE Growth as well
as interactions of nancial development proxies with technological characteristics presented in Panel A. All specications
are linear regressions with outliers removed (observations outside the 1-to-99 percentile range of the dependent variable),
include a constant, the corresponding growth opportunity proxy as a base eect, rm-level controls (see Table 1.4 notes for
their denitions), and country and 3-digit ISIC industry dummies. *, **, and *** denote signicance at the 10%, 5%, and
1% levels, respectively, based on robust standard errors clustered at the industry-country level.
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Panel A: Cross-sectional Regressions
FD × US Growth 0.062*** 0.113** 0.088** 0.260*** 0.600***
(0.023) (0.045) (0.042) (0.092) (0.218)
US Growth 0.022 0.002 0.059 0.038 -0.226
(0.090) (0.092) (0.088) (0.088) (0.171)
Adjusted R2 0.078 0.078 0.078 0.078 0.077
N 24,489 24,609 24,489 24,489 21,493
FD × Global PE Level 0.008* 0.014* 0.010 0.023 0.053
(0.004) (0.008) (0.008) (0.018) (0.038)
Global PE Level 0.006 0.003 0.011 0.009 0.022
(0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.035)
Adjusted R2 0.077 0.077 0.077 0.077 0.075
N 25,566 25,700 25,566 25,566 22,422
FD × Global PE Growth 0.083*** 0.134*** 0.131*** 0.304*** 0.529**
(0.024) (0.040) (0.048) (0.105) (0.249)
Global PE Growth -0.119*** -0.119*** -0.075** -0.088*** -0.333**
(0.038) (0.038) (0.033) (0.033) (0.167)
Adjusted R2 0.077 0.077 0.077 0.077 0.075
N 25,566 25,700 25,566 25,566 22,422
Panel B: Panel Regressions
FD × US Growth 0.064*** 0.088*** 0.118*** 0.236*** 0.385***
(0.016) (0.026) (0.032) (0.061) (0.127)
US Growth -0.076*** -0.066*** -0.052*** -0.053*** -0.256***
(0.023) (0.023) (0.018) (0.019) (0.085)
Adjusted R2 0.027 0.027 0.027 0.027 0.028
N 179,997 180,785 179,997 179,997 160,582
FD × Global PE Level 0.014*** 0.016** 0.028*** 0.039** 0.081**
(0.004) (0.007) (0.008) (0.016) (0.032)
Global PE Level -0.015*** -0.011* -0.011*** -0.008* -0.051**
(0.005) (0.006) (0.004) (0.005) (0.020)
Adjusted R2 0.027 0.027 0.027 0.027 0.028
N 188,670 189,564 188,670 188,670 168,202
FD × Global PE Growth 0.025*** 0.027*** 0.055*** 0.092*** 0.187***
(0.006) (0.009) (0.010) (0.022) (0.047)
Global PE Growth -0.012 -0.002 -0.007 -0.003 -0.106***
(0.008) (0.008) (0.006) (0.007) (0.032)
Adjusted R2 0.028 0.028 0.028 0.028 0.029
N 188,211 189,089 188,211 188,211 167,287
Note: The table uses the sample, variables, and specications as Table 1.5 except that the rm-level External Finance Use
variable is calculated as the time average of annual changes in shareholders' capital plus changes in a rm's long-term debt
plus changes in a rm's other non-current liabilities minus prots/losses from operations plus changes in other shareholders'
funds, all divided by total assets. The average is taken over years in which a rm is present in the sample within the
1996-2005 period.
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Panel A: Changes in Shareholders' Equity
FD × US Growth 0.008** 0.010* 0.017** 0.028* 0.063**
(0.004) (0.006) (0.008) (0.015) (0.031)
US Growth 0.015 0.018 0.018 0.019 -0.010
(0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.025)
Adjusted R2 0.067 0.067 0.067 0.067 0.066
N 23,862 23,978 23,862 23,862 21,188
FD × Global PE Growth 0.010** 0.011* 0.022** 0.018 0.051
(0.005) (0.006) (0.011) (0.018) (0.038)
Global PE Growth -0.008 -0.005 -0.006 -0.000 -0.023
(0.008) (0.008) (0.007) (0.008) (0.027)
Adjusted R2 0.066 0.066 0.066 0.066 0.064
N 24,907 25,036 24,907 24,907 22,099
Panel B: Changes in Long-term Debt
FD × US Growth 0.015*** 0.026** 0.026** 0.060*** 0.096*
(0.005) (0.010) (0.011) (0.022) (0.055)
US Growth 0.014 0.013 0.022 0.019 -0.030
(0.030) (0.031) (0.031) (0.031) (0.047)
Adjusted R2 0.095 0.095 0.095 0.095 0.089
N 23,862 23,978 23,862 23,862 21,188
FD × Global PE Growth 0.025*** 0.033** 0.054*** 0.042 0.049
(0.009) (0.013) (0.018) (0.037) (0.085)
Global PE Growth -0.021 -0.018 -0.014 -0.001 -0.018
(0.013) (0.013) (0.012) (0.011) (0.058)
Adjusted R2 0.095 0.095 0.095 0.094 0.088
N 24,907 25,036 24,907 24,907 22,099
Panel C: Changes in Other Non-current Liabilities
FD × US Growth 0.002 0.012 -0.009 0.010 -0.037
(0.005) (0.011) (0.008) (0.020) (0.036)
US Growth 0.006 -0.001 0.011 0.006 0.026
(0.024) (0.024) (0.023) (0.023) (0.036)
Adjusted R2 0.039 0.039 0.039 0.039 0.035
N 23,859 23,975 23,859 23,859 21,187
FD × Global PE Growth 0.013* 0.022* 0.013 0.040 0.018
(0.007) (0.013) (0.010) (0.026) (0.050)
Global PE Growth -0.019* -0.019* -0.009 -0.013 -0.012
(0.010) (0.011) (0.008) (0.009) (0.034)
Adjusted R2 0.040 0.040 0.040 0.040 0.035
N 24,904 25,033 24,904 24,904 22,098
Note: The table uses the sample, variables, and specications as Panel A of Table 1.5 except that the dependent variables
are, one at a time, individual components of the External Finance Use measure. The dependent variable in Panel A, B,
and C is the time average of annual rm-level changes in shareholders' capital, in a rm's long-term debt, and in a rm's
other non-current liabilities, respectively. All variables are scaled by total assets and then averaged over years in which a
rm is present in the sample within the 1996-2005 period.
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Panel A : Instrumenting by Global PE Growth
FD × US Growth 0.168*** 0.260*** 0.275*** 0.438** 0.846*
(0.050) (0.094) (0.102) (0.179) (0.432)
US Growth -0.022 0.076 0.079 -0.022 -0.101
(0.292) (0.283) (0.281) (0.292) (0.381)
Adjusted R2 0.069 0.072 0.070 0.077 0.068
N 24,619 24,738 24,619 24,619 21,642
First-stage Regression Statistics
F-statistics 58.497 57.283 58.614 57.176 64.252
Panel B : Instrumenting by US Growth
FD × Global PE Growth 0.128** 0.240*** 0.175* 0.547*** 0.793*
(0.050) (0.079) (0.096) (0.203) (0.457)
Global PE Growth -0.142 -0.056 -0.095 -0.142 -0.496
(0.113) (0.103) (0.101) (0.113) (0.326)
Adjusted R2 0.080 0.077 0.082 0.077 0.078
N 24,619 24,738 24,619 24,619 21,642
First-stage Regression Statistics
F-statistics 66.947 66.44 67.124 65.554 75.511
Note: The table reports results of two-stage least-squares regressions. The sample, variables, and specications are as in
Panel A of Table 1.5. In Panel A, `FD × US Growth' and `US Growth' are instrumented using `FD × Global PE Growth'
and `Global PE Growth.' In Panel B, `FD × Global PE Growth' and `Global PE Growth' are instrumented using `FD × US
Growth' and `US Growth.' F-statistic we report for the rst-stage regression is heteroskedasticity-robust Kleibergen-Paap
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Standard Deviation of Added Noise
Figure 1.1: Sensitivity of estimates to added noise in GOi
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1.A Appendix Tables
Table 1.A.1: Denitions and Sources of Variables
Name Denition and Source
Panel A: Firm-level Variables
Total Assets Firm's total assets (TOAS) in billions of Euro. We use the value from the rst year a rm
enters the sample within the 1996-2005 period. Source: Amadeus.
Employees Number of employees (EMPL). We use the value from the rst year a rm enters the sample
within the 1996-2005 period. Source: Amadeus.
Age The number of years since a rm's incorporation, scaled down by 1,000. We use the value
from the rst year a rm enters the sample within the 1996-2005 period. Source: Amadeus.
External Finance Use First, we sum the year-on-year change in shareholders' capital (CAPIt − CAPIt−1), the
year-on-year change in a rm's long-term debt (LTDBt − LTDBt−1), and the year-on-
year change in a rm's other non-current liabilities (ONCLIt −ONCLIt−1). The result is
divided by total assets from the beginning of each year (TOASt−1). Second, we compute
the time average of annual measures from the rst step over the years in which a rm is
present in the sample within the 1996-2005 period. Source: Amadeus.
Leverage Long-term debt (LTDB) plus current liabilities (CULI) divided by total assets (TOAS).
We use the value from the rst year a rm enters the sample within the 1996-2005 period.
Source: Amadeus.
Tangibility Fixed assets (FIAS) divided by total assets (TOAS). We use the value from the rst year a
rm enters the sample within the 1996-2005 period. Source: Amadeus.
Collateral Fixed assets (FIAS) plus inventories (STOK) plus accounts receivables (DEBT) divided by
total assets (TOAS). We use the value from the rst year a rm enters the sample within
the 1996-2005 period. Source: Amadeus.
Cash Cash holdings (CASH) divided by total assets (TOAS). We use the value from the rst year
a rm enters the sample. Source: Amadeus.
Ownership
Concentration
The sum of squares of direct stakes of all reported shareholders (Herndahl-Hirschman
index). We use the value from the the year that is the closest to the rst year a rm enters
the sample. Source: Amadeus.
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Table 1.A.1: Denitions and Sources of Variables
Name Denition and Source
Panel B: Country-level Variables
Total Capitalization Private credit by deposit money banks and other nancial institutions plus stock market
capitalization divided by GDP in 1996. Source: Beck, Demirguc-Kunt, and Levine (2000).
Private Credit Private credit by deposit money banks and other nancial institutions divided by GDP in
1996. Source: Beck, Demirguc-Kunt, and Levine (2000).
Market
Capitalization
Stock market capitalization divided by GDP in 1996. Source: Beck, Demirguc-Kunt, and
Levine (2000).




Index created by examining and rating companies' 1990 annual reports on their inclusion or
omission of 90 items in balance sheets and income statements and published by the Center
for International Financial Analysis & Research, Inc. The maximum is 90, the minimum 0,




Share of the top 10 banks' assets owned by a country's government in 1995. The percentage
of the assets owned by the government in a given bank is calculated by multiplying the share
of each shareholder in that bank by the share the government owns in that shareholder, and




Share of the top 10 banks' assets controlled by a country's government at the 50 percent
level in 1995. The percentage of assets owned by the government in a given bank is
calculated following the same methodology outlined for Government Bank Ownership.
Source: La Porta, Lopez-De-Silanes, and Shleifer (2002).
Overhead Costs Accounting value of banks' overhead costs as a share of their total assets. Scaled up by 100.
Source: Beck, Demirguc-Kunt, and Levine (2000).
Net Interest Margin Accounting value of banks' net interest revenue as a share of their interest-bearing assets.
Scaled up by 100. Source: Beck, Demirguc-Kunt, and Levine (2000).
Control Premium Control premium estimated by Dyck and Zingales (2004) using the sample of 393 controlling




Index of regulatory measures that promote private monitoring of banks constructed by
Barth, Caprio, and Levine (2004) using information on: (a) whether an outside licensed
audit is required of the nancial statements issued by a bank; (b) The percentage of the
top 10 banks that are rated by international credit-rating agencies; (c) whether there is
an explicit deposit insurance scheme; (d) wether the income statement includes accrued
or unpaid interest or principal on nonperforming loans and whether banks are required to
produce consolidated nancial statements; (e) wether o-balance sheet items are disclosed
to the public; (f) wether banks must disclose risk management procedures to the public; and
(g) wether subordinated debt is allowable (required) as a part of regulatory capital. Higher
values indicate more private monitoring. See Barth, Caprio, and Levine (2004) for the exact
formula for calculating the index.
Restrictions on Bank
Activities Index
Index of regulatory measures that allow banks to engage in other than traditional interest-
spread-based activities constructed by Barth, Caprio, and Levine (2004) using information
on: (a) the ability of banks to own and control non-nancial rms; (b) the ability of banks
to engage in the business of securities underwriting, brokering, and dealing; (c) the ability
of banks to engage in insurance underwriting and selling; and (d) the ability of banks to
engage in real estate investment, development, and management. Higher values indicate
more restrictions on non-traditional activities. See Barth, Caprio, and Levine (2004) for the
exact formula for calculating the index.
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Table 1.A.1: Denitions and Sources of Variables
Name Denition and Source
Panel C: Industry-level Variables
R&D Intensity First, for each Compustat rm, we compute the time average of R&D expenditures and
capital expenditures over the 1996-2005 period and take the ratio of the two averages.




First, for each Compustat rm, we compute the average number of investment spikes it
experienced over the 1996-2005 period. An investment spike is dened as an event when
annual capital expenditure exceeds 30 percent of the rm's stock of xed assets. Second,




First, for each Compustat rm, we sum capital expenditures and cash ows from operations
over the 1996-2005 period. Second, for each Compustat rm, we compute the ratio of
capital expenditures minus cash ows from operations over capital expenditures using the
sums obtained in the rst step. Third, we take the ratio from the second step of the median
U.S. rm for each 3-digit ISIC industry. Source: Compustat.
US Growth First, we compute year-on-year growth rates by taking the dierence of natural logarithms
of annual real value added for each U.S. 2-digit ISIC industry. Second, for each rm in our
sample, we compute the time average of year-on-year growth rates over the same years for
which External Finance Use is computed. Source: OECD STAN.
Global PE Level First, we take the world price-to-earnings ratios of industry portfolios as they are dened in
Datastream. Second, for each rm in our sample, we compute the time average of the world
price-to-earnings ratios over the same years for which External Finance Use is computed.
Finally, we match Datastream industries into 2-digit ISIC. Source: Datastream.
Global PE Growth First, we compute year-on-year growth rates of the world price-to-earnings ratio of industry
portfolios as they are dened in Datastream. Second, for each rm in our sample, we
compute the time average of the year-on-year growth rates over the same years for which
External Finance Use is computed. Finally, we match Datastream industries to 2-digit ISIC.
Source: Datastream.
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1.B Balance Sheet Denition of External Finance Use
Rajan and Zingales (1998) dene external nance dependence (EFD) as the share of





To measure external nance use, we nd an analogy to their denition using balance
sheet data that are available for most rms in our sample. In a panel of annual rm balance
sheet items, we can approximate capital expenditure by the change in xed assets (FIAS)
plus depreciation (DEPRE)
CEt = (FIASt − FIASt−1) +DEPREt (1.A.1)
= ∆FIASt +DEPREt.
Cash ow is approximated by rm's operating prot (PL) increased by depreciation
(depreciation is cost but not cash outow) and adjusted for the change in the net working
capital. An increase in current assets (CUAS, i.e., inventories and accounts receivables)
uses cash, while an increase in current liabilities (CULI, i.e., short-term loans and ac-
counts payables) releases cash
CFt = PLt +DEPREt − (CUASt − CUASt−1) + (CULIt − CULIt−1) (1.A.2)
= PLt +DEPREt −∆CUASt + ∆CULIt.
Next, we show how is dierence CEt −CFt related to the amount of external nance
raised. The fundamental balance sheet identity necessitates that change in total assets
equals change in equity plus change in liabilities. Decomposing total assets into xed
assets (FIAS), current assets (CUAS), and cash (CASH); and decomposing total liabil-
ities into shareholders' equity (CAPI), other shareholders' funds (OSFD, i.e., reserves
and retained earnings), long-term debt (LTDB), other non-current liabilities (ONCLI,
i.e., provisions), and current liabilities (CULI), the balance sheet identity becomes
∆FIASt + ∆CUASt + ∆CASHt = ∆CAPIt + ∆OSFDt + ∆LTDBt + ∆ONCLIt + ∆CULIt.
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Using the above equations we can rewrite dierence CEt − CFt as
CEt − CFt = ∆FIASt +DEPREt − PLt −DEPREt + ∆CUASt −∆CULIt
= ∆FIASt + ∆CUASt − PLt −∆CULIt
= ∆CAPIt + ∆LTDBt + ∆ONCLIt − (PLt −∆OSFDt)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=DIVt(Dividends)
−∆CASHt.(1.A.3)
We dene External Finance Use (EFU) as
EFUt =
∆CAPIt + ∆LTDBt + ∆ONCLIt
TOASt−1
. (1.A.4)
The numerator of EFUt stands for the amount of equity raised/repurchased (∆CAPIt)
plus the amount of long-term debt issued/repaid (∆LTDBt) plus the change in other
forms of long-term nancing (∆ONCLIt). (We verify that equation (1.A.3) holds in our
data when we use (1.A.1) and (1.A.2) to compute the left-hand side.) We scale the net
ow of external nance by total assets as of the beginning of each year (TOASt−1). The
reason is that capital expenditure is close to zero for many rms, which makes division
impossible. We scale by total assets because it proxies for rm size and it is a measure
that is the most comparable across rms in our sample.28
28Note that if a rm pays a dividend (DIVt), the corresponding change in other shareholders' funds
is OSFDt − OSFDt−1 = PLt − DIVt, and thus term PLt − ∆OSFDt in equation (1.A.3) is equal to
a dividend paid to shareholders. If a rm does not pay any dividend, DIVt = 0, and the stock of cash
does not change, ∆CASHt = 0, the dierence between capital expenditure and cash ow from operations
is equal to the amount of equity and long-term nancing raised CEt − CFt = ∆CAPIt + ∆LTDBt +
∆ONCLIt.
58
1.C Online Appendix Tables
Table 1.OA.1: Growth Opportunities and Technological Characteristics: Descriptive
Statistics











Mean 2.4% 22.55 1.3% 0.928 1.226 0.051
S.D. 6.3% 7.16 1.4% 1.478 0.723 0.885
N 21 22 22 58 58 58












Global PE Level 0.335 1
(0.138)
21
Global PE Growth 0.165 0.153 1
(0.475) (0.509)
21 21
R&D Intensity 0.416 0.480 0.060 1
(0.061*) (0.028**) (0.795)
21 21 21
Investment 0.342 0.327 0.059 0.653 1
Lumpiness (0.130) (0.147) (0.801) (0.000***)
21 21 21 58
EFD 0.552 0.281 0.293 0.216 0.255 1
(0.010***) (0.217) (0.198) (0.104) (0.054*)
21 21 21 58 58
Note: In Panel A, we present descriptive statistics for US Growth, Global PE Level, and Global PE Growth on 2-digit
ISIC industries and R&D Intensity, Investment Lumpiness, and EFD on 3-digit ISIC industries over the 1996-2005
period (see Table 1.3 and Panel C of Table 1.A.1 for denitions and sources of the variables). Panel B presents
Spearman rank correlations with corresponding p-values in brackets and the number of observations used to estimate
it.
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FD × US Growth 0.032*** 0.061*** 0.043** 0.127*** 0.165*
(0.011) (0.016) (0.020) (0.040) (0.087)
US Growth -0.002 -0.011 0.018 0.007 -0.069
(0.044) (0.044) (0.043) (0.043) (0.072)
log(Total Assets) -0.208*** -0.214*** -0.208*** -0.208*** -0.154***
(0.042) (0.042) (0.042) (0.042) (0.042)
log(Total Assets) Squared -2.556*** -2.507*** -2.546*** -2.553*** -3.908***
(0.859) (0.857) (0.859) (0.859) (0.892)
log(Employees) -0.426*** -0.422*** -0.424*** -0.426*** -0.557***
(0.102) (0.102) (0.102) (0.102) (0.106)
log(Employees) Squared 4.196*** 4.166*** 4.184*** 4.199*** 6.287***
(1.190) (1.187) (1.189) (1.189) (1.235)
Age -0.011 -0.012 -0.011 -0.010 -0.000
(0.032) (0.032) (0.032) (0.032) (0.034)
Age Squared 0.104 0.125 0.096 0.099 -0.003
(0.385) (0.385) (0.385) (0.385) (0.398)
Leverage -0.018*** -0.018*** -0.018*** -0.018*** -0.018***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Tangibility -0.012*** -0.012*** -0.012*** -0.012*** -0.011***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Collateral 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.002
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Cash -0.008*** -0.009*** -0.008*** -0.008*** -0.009***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Ownership Concentration 0.013*** 0.012*** 0.013*** 0.012*** 0.012***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Ownership Concentration Squared -0.012*** -0.012*** -0.012*** -0.012*** -0.013***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Constant 0.023*** 0.023*** 0.023*** 0.023*** 0.021***
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Country, Industry FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adjusted R2 0.082 0.082 0.082 0.082 0.081
N 23,091 23,208 23,091 23,091 20,559
Note: The table uses the sample, variables, and specications as Table 1.4 except that we, in addition, control for Ownership
Concentration and Ownership Concentration squared. Ownership Concentration is Herndahl-Hirschman Index of direct
shareholders' stakes. It is calculated as the sum of squares of direct stakes of all reported shareholders in the year that is
the closest to the rst year a rm enters the sample and it remains xed over time.
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Panel A: Time-varying Firm-level Controls
FD × US Growth 0.021*** 0.024* 0.043*** 0.079*** 0.112*
(0.007) (0.012) (0.014) (0.028) (0.065)
US Growth -0.011 -0.004 -0.005 -0.004 -0.061
(0.012) (0.012) (0.010) (0.010) (0.046)
Adjusted R2 0.019 0.019 0.019 0.019 0.018
N 158,240 158,971 158,240 158,240 143,214
FD × Global PE Level 0.005** 0.005 0.013*** 0.011 0.029
(0.002) (0.003) (0.004) (0.008) (0.019)
Global PE Level -0.008*** -0.006* -0.008*** -0.005 -0.021*
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.012)
Adjusted R2 0.019 0.019 0.019 0.019 0.018
N 165,028 165,843 165,028 165,028 149,228
FD × Global PE Growth 0.006* 0.006 0.015** 0.013 -0.006
(0.003) (0.005) (0.006) (0.013) (0.028)
Global PE Growth -0.003 -0.000 -0.003 0.001 0.008
(0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.019)
Adjusted R2 0.019 0.019 0.019 0.019 0.018
N 165,028 165,843 165,028 165,028 149,228
Panel B: Controlling for Firm Fixed Eects
FD × US Growth 0.018*** 0.013 0.044*** 0.070*** 0.131**
(0.006) (0.012) (0.012) (0.025) (0.057)
US Growth -0.010 0.002 -0.009 -0.005 -0.078**
(0.009) (0.010) (0.008) (0.008) (0.038)
Adjusted R2 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005
N 184,607 185,402 184,607 184,607 164,784
FD × Global PE Level 0.009*** 0.007 0.024*** 0.032*** 0.061***
(0.002) (0.005) (0.004) (0.009) (0.018)
Global PE Level -0.012*** -0.006 -0.012*** -0.008*** -0.041***
(0.003) (0.004) (0.002) (0.003) (0.012)
Adjusted R2 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005
N 192,550 193,431 192,550 192,550 171,769
FD × Global PE Growth 0.006*** 0.005 0.015*** 0.012 0.006
(0.002) (0.004) (0.004) (0.008) (0.017)
Global PE Growth -0.001 0.002 -0.001 0.003 0.001
(0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.012)
Adjusted R2 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005
N 192,550 193,431 192,550 192,550 171,769
Note: The table uses the sample, variables, and specications as Panel B of Table 1.5 with the following modications:
Panel A reports results obtained using specications in which we allow the rm-level controls to vary over time. Panel B
reports results obtained using specications in which we include rm xed eects.
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Panel A: US Growth
FD × US Growth 0.015* 0.010 0.039** 0.061* 0.121*
(0.009) (0.015) (0.017) (0.034) (0.072)
FD × R&D Intensity 0.051* 0.127** 0.027 0.095 -0.032
(0.029) (0.052) (0.058) (0.128) (0.293)
Adjusted R2 0.016 0.016 0.016 0.016 0.015
N 166,797 167,398 166,797 166,797 149,261
FD × US Growth 0.016* 0.009 0.042** 0.067** 0.113*
(0.009) (0.016) (0.017) (0.034) (0.068)
FD × Investment Lumpiness 0.217*** 0.461*** 0.227* 0.549** 0.711
(0.066) (0.138) (0.127) (0.258) (0.550)
Adjusted R2 0.016 0.016 0.016 0.016 0.015
N 180,996 181,764 180,996 180,996 161,544
FD × US Growth 0.019** 0.016 0.045*** 0.073** 0.116*
(0.009) (0.015) (0.016) (0.033) (0.066)
FD × EFD 0.055 0.132** 0.046 0.139 0.215
(0.042) (0.064) (0.084) (0.191) (0.431)
Adjusted R2 0.016 0.016 0.016 0.016 0.015
N 179,123 179,855 179,123 179,123 160,081
Panel B: Global PE Growth
FD × Global PE Growth 0.011*** 0.012** 0.025*** 0.029** 0.054*
(0.003) (0.006) (0.006) (0.014) (0.030)
FD × R&D Intensity 0.054* 0.122** 0.045 0.141 0.095
(0.028) (0.048) (0.058) (0.123) (0.284)
Adjusted R2 0.016 0.016 0.016 0.016 0.015
N 174,719 175,406 174,719 174,719 156,284
FD × Global PE Growth 0.010*** 0.010** 0.022*** 0.025** 0.044
(0.003) (0.005) (0.006) (0.013) (0.028)
FD × Investment Lumpiness 0.218*** 0.440*** 0.263** 0.619** 0.969*
(0.060) (0.121) (0.116) (0.241) (0.533)
Adjusted R2 0.016 0.016 0.016 0.016 0.015
N 189,249 190,106 189,249 189,249 168,299
FD × Global PE Growth 0.010*** 0.011** 0.023*** 0.025* 0.044
(0.003) (0.005) (0.006) (0.013) (0.029)
FD × EFD 0.066* 0.135** 0.081 0.202 0.437
(0.040) (0.063) (0.082) (0.183) (0.427)
Adjusted R2 0.016 0.016 0.016 0.016 0.015
N 187,306 188,129 187,306 187,306 167,219
Note: The table uses the sample, variables, and specications as Panel B and Panel C of Table 1.7 except that we use the
panel of rm-year observations. To proxy for growth opportunities, Panel A uses time-varying US Growth, while Panel B
uses time-varying Global PE Growth. All specications are linear regressions with outliers removed (observations outside
the 1-to-99 percentile range of the dependent variable), include a constant, the corresponding growth opportunity proxy as
a base eect, predetermined rm-level controls, and country, 3-digit ISIC industry, and year dummies.
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Panel A: Limited Liability Companies Only
FD × US Growth 0.023** 0.047*** 0.029 0.091** 0.109
(0.011) (0.017) (0.020) (0.044) (0.083)
Adjusted R2 0.075 0.074 0.075 0.075 0.072
N 16,398 16,516 16,398 16,398 14,629
FD × Global PE Growth 0.056*** 0.070*** 0.115*** 0.190*** 0.303**
(0.013) (0.021) (0.025) (0.054) (0.125)
Adjusted R2 0.076 0.075 0.076 0.075 0.072
N 17,158 17,289 17,158 17,158 15,303
Panel B: Only Industries with at Least 20 Firms
FD × US Growth 0.032** 0.096*** 0.038* 0.121** 0.195**
(0.014) (0.030) (0.023) (0.047) (0.096)
Adjusted R2 0.065 0.065 0.065 0.065 0.065
N 23,284 23,284 23,284 23,284 20,900
FD × Global PE Growth 0.063*** 0.109*** 0.103*** 0.134** 0.246*
(0.014) (0.026) (0.024) (0.057) (0.128)
Adjusted R2 0.066 0.066 0.066 0.065 0.065
N 24,288 24,288 24,288 24,288 21,780
Panel C: Controlling for Industry-Period Fixed Eects
FD × US Growth 0.025** 0.048** 0.036 0.103** 0.100
(0.012) (0.019) (0.024) (0.046) (0.101)
Adjusted R2 0.179 0.178 0.179 0.179 0.188
N 24,619 24,738 24,619 24,619 21,642
FD × Global PE Growth 0.119** 0.047*** 0.056** 0.099*** 0.231*
(0.056) (0.014) (0.023) (0.027) (0.132)
Adjusted R2 0.179 0.180 0.178 0.180 0.188
N 24,619 24,619 24,738 24,619 21,642
Panel D: Median Regressions
FD × US Growth 0.055* 0.006 0.015 0.01 0.043
(0.031) (0.007) (0.014) (0.015) (0.072)
Adjusted R2 0.038 0.038 0.037 0.038 0.036
N 24,619 24,619 24,738 24,619 21,642
FD × Global PE Growth 0.009 0.01** 0.017** 0.017 0.025**
(0.0218) (0.005) (0.008) (0.012) (0.011)
Adjusted R2 0.038 0.038 0.038 0.038 0.036
N 25,703 25,703 25,835 25,703 22,579
Note: The table reports results of OLS regressions in Panels A, B, and C and median regressions in Panel D. The
sample, variables, and specications are as in Panel A of Table 1.5 with the following modications: In Panel A, we use
the sub-sample of companies incorporated with limited liability legal form. In Panel B, we use the subsample of 2-digit
ISIC industry-country pairs with at least 20 rms. Panel C reports estimates obtained while controlling for rm-specic
industry-period dummies (instead of 3-digit ISIC industry dummies), where, for each rm, period is dened as a sequence
of years for which the External Finance Use is available. Panel D reports estimates obtained using median regressions.
Standard errors reported in Panel D are bootstrapped and clustered at the industry-country level.
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FD × US Growth 0.028** 0.055*** 0.039* 0.116*** 0.148*
(0.011) (0.017) (0.022) (0.042) (0.088)
US Growth -0.014 -0.021 0.005 -0.005 -0.075
(0.044) (0.043) (0.043) (0.043) (0.072)
log(Total Assets) -0.219*** -0.225*** -0.219*** -0.219*** -0.169***
(0.041) (0.041) (0.041) (0.041) (0.041)
log(Total Assets) Squared -2.411*** -2.377*** -2.404*** -2.405*** -3.870***
(0.839) (0.837) (0.840) (0.840) (0.883)
log(Employees) -0.455*** -0.451*** -0.454*** -0.455*** -0.582***
(0.099) (0.099) (0.099) (0.099) (0.104)
log(Employees) Squared 4.360*** 4.348*** 4.353*** 4.365*** 6.441***
(1.150) (1.147) (1.149) (1.150) (1.215)
Age -0.007 -0.008 -0.007 -0.007 0.013
(0.032) (0.032) (0.032) (0.032) (0.033)
Age Squared -0.048 -0.032 -0.055 -0.051 -0.121
(0.375) (0.375) (0.375) (0.375) (0.389)
Leverage -0.019*** -0.018*** -0.019*** -0.018*** -0.018***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Tangibility -0.012*** -0.013*** -0.012*** -0.012*** -0.012***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Collateral 0.004* 0.003 0.004* 0.004* 0.002
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Cash -0.008*** -0.008*** -0.008*** -0.008*** -0.009***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Constant 0.023*** 0.023*** 0.023*** 0.023*** 0.023***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Country, Industry FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adjusted R2 0.080 0.080 0.080 0.080 0.079
N 24,619 24,738 24,619 24,619 21,642
Note: The table uses the sample, variables, and specications as Table 1.4 except that we include 2-digit ISIC industry
dummies instead of 3-digit ISIC industry dummies in all specications.
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Panel A: Growth Opportunities
FD × US Growth 0.037*** 0.072*** 0.046** 0.138*** 0.151*
(0.011) (0.015) (0.021) (0.040) (0.085)
US Growth -0.023 -0.036 0.004 -0.009 -0.074
(0.046) (0.046) (0.045) (0.045) (0.071)
Adjusted R2 0.081 0.081 0.080 0.080 0.080
N 21,810 21,810 21,810 21,810 21,642
FD × Global PE Level 0.002 0.002 0.003 -0.001 0.002
(0.002) (0.004) (0.004) (0.009) (0.015)
Global PE Level 0.034*** 0.035*** 0.035*** 0.037*** 0.035**
(0.012) (0.012) (0.011) (0.011) (0.015)
Adjusted R2 0.080 0.080 0.080 0.080 0.080
N 22,753 22,753 22,753 22,753 22,579
FD × Global PE Growth 0.046*** 0.057*** 0.086*** 0.084 0.216*
(0.013) (0.022) (0.024) (0.053) (0.115)
Global PE Growth -0.030 -0.016 -0.011 0.010 -0.117
(0.022) (0.022) (0.018) (0.018) (0.079)
Adjusted R2 0.081 0.080 0.081 0.080 0.080
N 22,753 22,753 22,753 22,753 22,579
Panel B: Technological Characteristics
FD × R&D Intensity 0.082*** 0.143*** 0.100* 0.247* 0.161
(0.028) (0.054) (0.059) (0.127) (0.278)
Adjusted R2 0.079 0.079 0.079 0.079 0.079
N 21,081 21,081 21,081 21,081 20,921
FD × Investment Lumpiness 0.223*** 0.417*** 0.269** 0.634*** 0.676
(0.054) (0.112) (0.108) (0.243) (0.525)
Adjusted R2 0.080 0.080 0.080 0.080 0.080
N 22,745 22,745 22,745 22,745 22,571
FD × EFD 0.125*** 0.199** 0.183* 0.375* 0.484
(0.043) (0.081) (0.094) (0.192) (0.440)
Adjusted R2 0.080 0.080 0.079 0.079 0.079
N 22,536 22,536 22,536 22,536 22,362
Note: The table reports results of OLS regressions on the sub-sample of EU-15 countries. Panel A uses specications and
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2.1 Introduction
There is a long standing debate about what drives rms to engage in acquisitions and
whether they lead to eciency gains. Although there is a range of explanations for the
existence of mergers such as empire building (Jensen, 1986), the exploitation of stock mis-
valuation (Shleifer and Vishny, 2003) or the replacement of poorly performing managers
(Manne, 1965; Jensen and Ruback, 1983), the empirical evidence on the fundamental
question of who buys whom in mergers is mixed. Consistent with the inecient man-
agement hypothesis, the standard neoclassical framework, formalized by Jovanovic and
Rousseau (2002) in the Q-theory of mergers, states that unproductive rms are acquired
by productive rms, and the subsequent transfer of the acquirer's superior technology to
the target's capital results in a productivity gain. While there is evidence on the existence
of abnormal stock returns following the announcement of an acquisition and of operating
performance improvements following acquisition completion,2 the evidence that acquisi-
tion targets under-perform before the deal is weak at best. Agrawal and Jae (2003)
document that signicant pre-acquisition stock return under-performance for the average
target is found only in 2 out of 12 instances they reviewed, and the evidence on operating
under-performance is mixed, too. In further contrast, recent studies by Rhodes-Kropf,
Robinson, and Viswanathan (2005) and Rhodes-Kropf and Robinson (2008) report that
market-to-book (M/B) valuation of targets is higher than that of an average rm, and
that evidence exists for positive assortative matching in pre-acquisition M/B for merging
rms.
In this paper, I reconcile conicting results in the literature by showing that the selec-
tion of rms into acquisitions and post-acquisition productivity gains are very dierent in
horizontal and vertical acquisitions. The key theoretical insight that motivates separate
investigation of horizontal and vertical acquisitions is the dierent nature of synergies
among potential acquisition participants. Firms that operate in the same industry, and
2Among others, Andrade, Mitchell, and Staord (2001) show that shareholders of target rms ex-
perience on average three day abnormal returns of 16 % following the announcement of an acquisition.
Maksimovic and Phillips (2001) report a 2% increase in industry-adjusted TFP of target plants in the
three years following a takeover.
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thus are potential candidates for horizontal takeovers, are all familiar with the technology
of that industry, and all possess some level of know-how or skill on how to use this tech-
nology to deliver the industry-specic product. This implies that rm-specic intangible
capital is easily redeployable on the physical assets of other rms operating within the
same industry, which is the underlying assumption of the standard Q-theory of mergers
of Jovanovic and Rousseau (2002). The predictions of this theory are thus most likely to
hold for the horizontal acquisitions.
However, the assumption of the redeployability of intangible capital is not always rele-
vant. It is less likely to hold in across-industry mergers as a rm operating in one industry
is not necessarily familiar with the technology and physical assets of a rm operating in an-
other. In mergers between rms operating in dierent industries, especially those tied by
strong supplier-producer vertical linkages, the complementarity between intangible assets
may be more relevant. Asset complementarity is particularly important in the property
rights theory of the rm, where joint production requires the ex-ante relationship-specic
investments of both parties, and the division of ex-post revenues is subject to contractual
incompleteness. Vertically related rms that choose to contract with each other are facing
the risk of hold-up as either rm can threaten to quit the relationship and to search for
another partner. If rms' industry-specic intangible assets are highly complementary, so
that both partners are essential for the realization of output, the possibility of hold-up
mitigates incentives for ex-ante investments and leads to underinvestment and thus joint
output loss. Based on these insights, Rhodes-Kropf and Robinson (2008) build a model
of search and matching between rms operating in two distinct industries that are char-
acterized by asset complementarity. Their model predicts that if the cost of searching
for a merging partner is not very high, and the scarcity of rms in both industries is
comparable, positive assortative matching occurs, in which rms merge with partners of
similar quality.
Q-theory of mergers as well as the search and matching model, based on the property
rights theory of the rm, oer a range of testable predictions, and the relevant empir-
ical literature is summarized in section 2.2. However, quite surprisingly, predictions of
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these theories have not yet been investigated using the natural distinction of horizontal
and vertical acquisitions. The sharp dierences in assumptions and predictions of these
theories motivate research questions asked in this paper: How do rms self-select into
being a target or an acquirer in acquisitions, and do their incentives to participate dier
in horizontal and vertical acquisitions? Do acquisitions improve operating performance of
targets in general, or are these gains present only for targets acquired by companies with
highly substitutable assets?
To investigate these questions, I use a sample of domestic acquisitions in the old-
member states of the European Union (EU-15) over the period 1998-2008 that are drawn
from a relatively under-utilized database of mergers and acquisitions  Zephyr, compiled
by Bureau van Dijk (BvD). The advantage of this dataset over other sources is that it
can be precisely linked with the detailed balance-sheet and income statement information
for a large sample of private and public rms covered in Amadeus. This allows for a
detailed investigation of acquisitions involving private rms and thus to ignore possible
implications of theories based on stock market misvaluation.3 Balance-sheet information
in Amadeus allows for the calculating of a key rm-level operating performance measure
used in this study: revenue total factor productivity.
I rst show that the good-rms-buy-bad-rms pattern is a prominent feature of hor-
izontal acquisitions. This result sheds light on the mixed evidence of a target's pre-
acquisition under-performance summarized by Agrawal and Jae (2003). Only rms
which can easily re-deploy their intangible capital to assets of poorly performing tar-
gets are willing to acquire them, which makes target under-performance a salient feature
of horizontal acquisitions.
Second, I nd evidence of positive assortative matching on pre-acquisition revenue
productivity for vertical acquisitions. Further, using a sub-sample of acquisitions between
3Shleifer and Vishny (2003) and Rhodes-Kropf and Viswanathan (2004) oer models in which mergers
result from managerial timing of market mis-valuation of their rms. Shleifer and Vishny (2003) argue
that bidders with overvalued stock use it to buy assets of undervalued targets through merger. Target
managers with a short time horizon are willing to accept the bidder's temporarily overvalued stock.
Rhodes-Kropf and Viswanathan (2004) argue that informationally constrained targets will rationally
accept bids from overvalued acquirers because they over-estimate synergies, especially during periods of
high market valuations.
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rms operating in dierent industries, I show that this pattern increases with the strength
of vertical linkages between industries. This evidence is in line with predictions of the
search and matching model built on the assumption of asset complementarities.
Third, I nd that economically large and statistically signicant gains in targets rev-
enue productivity are present only for horizontal acquisitions. My estimates of these gains
are at least twice as large as those reported in previous studies, which lump all acquisitions
together. This suggests that previous empirical tests of targets productivity gains suered
from low power. Looking at the sub-set of acquisitions where the Q-theory's assumption
of redeployability is most likely to hold increases the power of the test considerably.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. In the next section, I summarize relevant
literature and develop testable hypotheses. Section 2.3 presents the sample and construc-
tion of key variables, section 2.4 presents the empirical results of the developed hypotheses
and section 3.7 concludes.
2.2 Literature Review and Hypothesis Development
2.2.1 Q-theory of Mergers
To build the Q-theory of mergers, Jovanovic and Rousseau (2002) extended the Q-theory
of investment by allowing rms to adjust their capital stock not only by investing into
new assets but also by participating in the market for used assets. The key assumption in
their model is that there is one type of asset which is re-deployable across all rms in the
economy. Firms dier in their productivity, and every rm can transfer its productivity,
a form of intangible capital, to all new and used assets that it buys. In this model, as
in Q-theory of investment, the optimal level of investment increases with Q, the value
of capital inside the rm, proxied by M/B ratio. If a rm's productivity is positively
autocorrelated, then rm's Q increases in its productivity and the level of its investments
will depend on the level of productivity, too. Firms with low productivity will nd it
protable to sell their assets, cash-in on the corresponding market price, and exit, while
rms with productivity exceeding the endogenous threshold will invest. For the investing
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rms, the decision to invest into new or used assets is inuenced by the assumption of
the xed costs of acquiring used capital. Firms with medium productivity, and thus lower
investment needs, will avoid the xed cost and invest only into new assets, while rms
with high productivity will use both margins. Thus, if mergers are simply another form of
investment, then rms with high growth opportunities, and thus high M/B ratios, should
be buying assets from rms with low opportunities, and hence low M/B.
Yang (2008), extended the Q-theory of mergers into the dynamic setting by developing
a dynamic structural model of an industry in which rms are heterogeneous in productiv-
ity, which changes subject to random shocks. In his model, due to decreasing returns to
scale, it is the optimal rm size, not optimal growth, that is the monotonic function of the
rm's productivity. If there is a positive aggregate shock, all rms have an incentive to
increase their scale by investing, while no rm is willing to sell its assets. This makes new
investments more attractive. If shocks are idiosyncratic, then rms with negative shocks
nd it optimal to downsize and sell their assets, while rms with positive shocks may nd
it optimal to invest by purchasing used assets. The main implication of this model is that
changes in productivity, rather than their levels, should matter for the rms' decisions to
engage in acquisitions.
The Q-theory of mergers oers several empirically testable predictions. One class of
predictions focuses on relationships between the aggregate characteristics of an economy in
time. First, the asset re-deployability assumption implies that aggregate merger activity,
or merger waves, should be correlated with the volume of activity in the market for used
capital. Jovanovic and Rousseau (2002) show that this seems to be the case in the U.S.
in the 1971 - 2000 period.
Second, when cross-sectional dispersion in M/B ratios is high, and thus more op-
portunities exist for protable asset reallocation, the amount of merger activity should
increase. Jovanovic and Rousseau (2002) show that the dispersion in M/B ratios indeed
leads movement in aggregate merger activity. Third, the reallocation of assets is likely to
be the consequence of unexpexted economic shocks, such as shocks to the industry's tech-
nological, economical or regulatory environment, which aect the productivity of rms
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operating in the industry in an idiosyncratic way. Along these lines, Harford (2005) shows
that merger waves tend to be preceded by clusters of industry shocks. He also nds that
the actual spike in merger activity occurs only if the capital market is suciently liquid,
which is a necessary condition for rms' access to cheap nancing. In a related work,
Jovanovic and Rousseau (2008) show that merger waves tend to be driven by the need
for the reallocation of capital that is driven by the arrival of major technical change. In
their model, the arrival of new general purpose technology requires rms to reorganize. If
a rm fails to reorganize internally, by a re-adjustment of its workers or physiscal assets,
it will be reorganized externally either by liguidating or by being taken over. Thus, exits
and mergers should rise following major technological shocks, a fact supported by the
data.
Lastly, Yang (2008) shows a positive cross-sectional relationship exists between the
amount of asset reallocation and both the time persistence and the cross-sectional disper-
sion of rm-level productivities in the industry.
While the aggregate predictions of the Q-theory of mergers nd support in the data,
the evidence on the class of predictions that focus on micro-level characteristics of the
rms' behavior is less clear. First, according to the inecient management hypothesis,
rms targeted in takeovers should have poor management, low operating performance
and poor stock performance. Agrawal and Jae (2003) summarize the relevant literature
and conclude that it does not provide strong evidence that targets, as a whole, are under-
performing prior to acquisition. Out of the 12 studies they discuss, only 2 nd evidence
of stock returns under-performance prior to a merger oer. The evidence on operating
under-performance is inconclusive, as well.
Second, the Q-theory of mergers predicts that rms with a high M/B ratio should
be acquirers of rms with low M/B. Andrade, Mitchell, and Staord (2001) nd that an
acquirer's M/B is higher than a target's M/B in more than two-thirds of mergers in the
U.S. since 1973. Related, Jovanovic and Rousseau (2002) show that M&A investments
are 2.6 times more sensitive to a rm's M/B than direct investment, indirectly supporting
the idea that rms with high values of M/B, and thus a higher ability to increase the value
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of a target's assets, use M&As more intensively than purchases of new capital. Rousseau
(2006) further shows that these results extend beyond the U.S. M&A market, applying to
domestic and cross-border mergers among a set of seven European countries. Additionally,
Servaes (1991) nds that the total abnormal stock returns following takeover are larger
when the target has a low M/B, and the acquirer has a large M/B prior to the merger
announcement.
However, Rhodes-Kropf, Robinson, and Viswanathan (2005) report that while the
M/B of targets is on average lower than the M/B of acquirers, target valuations are often
higher than the M/B of the average rm. This nding suggests that instead of high
q buys low q, the pattern high q buys less high q seems to describe the data better.
Recently, Rhodes-Kropf and Robinson (2008) document even stronger empirical pattern:
They nd evidence of positive assortative matching between Acquirers and Targets with
respect to their M/B ratios.
2.2.2 Property Rights Theory of the Firm and the Market for
Mergers
The property rights theory of the rm was pioneered by Grossman and Hart (1986) and
Hart and Moore (1990). Grossman and Hart (1986) note that in a world of incomplete
contracts, it is impossible for the parties to negotiate ex-ante on all future contingencies.
The impossibility of fully contingent contracts leads to ex-post bargaining over the di-
vision of surplus, with the possibility of a hold-up, in states of the world which were
not foreseen. Further, if the ex ante relationship-specic investments are required, the
possibility of a hold-up leads to a misalignment between ex ante investments and ex
post returns accruing to parties in a contract relationship. Grossman and Hart (1986)
show that this misalignment has negative welfare consequences, which can be mitigated
by integrating both parties into one rm.
Hart and Moore (1990) generalize the property rights theory as a theory of the optimal
allocation of asset ownership. One of their main results is that if contracts are incomplete,
the complementary assets should be placed under common ownership. In their model, the
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assets complementarity means that none of the assets are productive unless used together.
This creates scope for mutual dependence between the managers of the complementary
assets, which leads to opportunities for rent seeking. The managers' incentives to invest
ex ante are strongest if the opportunities for rent seeking are minimized, which can be
achieved by allocating decision rights over the use of assets to a single party. In contrast,
for assets without any complementarities there are no benets from joint ownership.
It was only recently that insights from the property rights theory motivated the lit-
erature on mergers and acquisitions. Rhodes-Kropf and Robinson (2008) build a model
of search and matching between rms operating in two distinct industries. Each indus-
try requires a dierent type of intangible or human capital for a rm to be productive.
Further, in each industry, rms are heterogeneous in their productivity. A technology
shock creates the potential for synergy benets from the combined use of assets of both
industries, and synergy gains are increasing in the product of productivities of both rms
engaging in asset combination. Rhodes-Kropf and Robinson (2008) further assume that
contractual incompleteness restricts rms from contracting on the benets of synergies
from asset combinations. The only way to realize such benets is through common control
and the joint surplus created by merging the rms split by bargaining. In this setting, the
rms optimally search for a merger partner trading o their share of potential realized
synergies with a reduced bargaining power and cost of a continued search. Due to su-
permodularity of synergy gains in the productivities of potential merging partners, every
rm is interested in a more productive partner, but this demand increases the bargaining
power of very productive partners, which in turn decreases the share of synergy gains
accruing to the rm in the other industry. Rhodes-Kropf and Robinson (2008) show that
if the costs of a search for a merging partner are low, and the scarcity of rms in both
industries is similar, then supermodularity leads to a match of merger partners that is
positively assortative in productivity as well as in the M/B ratio.4
4In a recent work, David (2011) extends the search and matching model of the M&A market along
several dimensions. Most notably, the technology of transforming the productivities of merger participants
to the productivity of a new entity is assumed to be, more general, the CES production function. This
assumption allows him to embed into the model substitutability as well as complementarity considerations
and thus to explain the mixed patterns in the data. This paper diers from his by showing the particular
margins, the horizontal or vertical relationship between merger candidates, along which substitutability
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The search and matching model with asset complementarities thus provides an expla-
nation for the high buys high and low buys low pattern in the M/B ratios of merger
participants observed by Rhodes-Kropf and Robinson (2008). A further prediction of their
model is that positive assortative matching should be stronger in markets in which the
search costs are low. Using liquidity of the nancial market as a proxy for search costs,
the authors show that the assortative pattern is stronger in periods of high liquidity.
The relationship between asset complementarities and mergers is explored in two other
recent studies. Hoberg and Phillips (2010) provide direct evidence that product market
synergies are important drivers of mergers. They measure the similarity of products of-
fered by every pair of publicly traded rms in the U.S. using a common vocabulary in their
product description in 10-K statements led with the Security and Exchange Commission.
They show that acquirers are willing to merge with partners that have complementary
assets in order to achieve product range expansions, and thus to dierentiate their prod-
uct line from main rivals. However, at the same time, acquirers pick target rms that are
related enough so that they can manage the new assets.
Bena and Li (2010) focus on the complementarity stemming from technological over-
laps between potential merger partners. Using cross-citations between the patents of
potential merger partners, they directly identify whether their innovation activities are
related. They show that more innovative companies are more likely to engage in acqui-
sition activities, the technological overlap between the innovation activities of two rms
has a positive impact on the probability of their merger pairing, and innovation-driven
acquisitions lead to more innovation and improved operating and stock performance.
The relevance of asset complementarities for acquisitions can be illustrated using the
example of Nokia and its recent ght to keep up its position as the world leader in
cellphone market. A recent rise in microprocessor computing power has led to the rise of
smart-phones, a new class of cell-phones in which software and data services play a much
more important role. This has led Nokia to reconsider its market strategy:
Historically, Nokia has been a highly ecient manufacturing and logistics ma-
or complementarity assumptions gain importance.
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chine capable of churning out a dozen handsets a second and selling them all
over the world. Planning was long-term, and new devices were developed by
separate teams, sometimes competing with each otherthe opposite of what
is needed in software, where there is a premium on collaborating and doing
things quickly.
Olli-Pekka Kallasvuo, Nokia's boss from 2006 until September 2010, was
keenly aware of the diculty. To get an infusion of fresh blood, Nokia bought
several start-ups and was reorganized to strengthen its software and services.5
In line with the predictions of property rights theory, it was complementarity between
hardware and software and the lack of know-how in software development that led Nokia
into acquisitions of software companies.
2.2.3 Hypotheses
The evidence from both streams of the literature suggests that both explanations have
some merit in the data. However, their predictions hinge on widely dierent assumptions.
The Q-theory assumes that assets of all rms are perfect substitutes, and they can be
re-deployed at very little cost. In contrast, the search and matching model of Rhodes-
Kropf and Robinson (2008), which builds on the insights of the property rights theory
of the rm, uses the assumption of the existence of two classes of complementary assets
managed by perfectly specialized parties. The predictions of the Q-theory should apply
to settings when assets are highly substitutable, while the predictions of the search and
matching model are likely to be relevant in cases when assets are complementary.
In this paper, I use the industry aliation of rms and information on the between-
industry ow of commodities to distinguish three classes of mergers. First, the high
substitutability of capital embedded in rms is more likely to be present among rms
operating in the same industries. Thus, micro-level predictions of the Q-theory of merg-
ers are likely to be relevant in horizontal mergers, which are dened as mergers in which
both merging parties come from the same industry. Second, building on the property
5Blazing platforms: Nokia at the crossroads, The Economist, London, February 10, 2011.
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rights theory of the rm, the complementarities between physical and more importantly,
intangible assets are likely to be economically most relevant among rms operating in
industries with tight supplier-producer linkages. Indeed, the property rights theory of
the rm has been developed to understand structural choices of organization that form
between vertically related rms. The micro-level predictions of Rhodes-Kropf and Robin-
son's search and matching model are thus likely to be relevant in vertical mergers, which
will be dened as those involving rms operating rms in dierent industries that are
characterized by a high level of intermediate ows.
The predictions of Q-theory regarding the selection into acquisition status lead to:
Hypothesis 1: If the assets of the rms engaging in acquisitions are close
substitutes, the productivity of the target rm should be low, or recently
declining, while the productivity of the acquirer should be high and recently
increasing.
In other words the high buys low pattern is expected to be present in horizontal
acquisitions. This question is of high interest given the lack of clear evidence connected
to the inecient management hypothesis, even though this implication is present in all
neoclassical models of mergers. In Q-theory, the incentives that drive acquisitions are
driven by the re-deployment of assets to productive uses. If signicant portion of mergers
is due to other incentives such as synergy motivations, this prediction is likely to be muted
in the data.
Regarding the self-selection of acquirers and targets, the prediction of the model of
mergers based on the property rights theory is more nuanced. The model essentially
predicts positive assortative matching in performance between rm pairs participating in
acquisition:
Hypothesis 2: The rms that participate in vertical mergers should be of
a similar pre-acquisition industry adjusted productivity. The wedge in pro-
ductivity between targets and acquirers should be decreasing with increasing
complementarity of their assets.
While Rhodes-Kropf and Robinson (2008) oer evidence on positive assortative match-
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ing in M/B ratios in a full sample of US acquisitions, they don't investigate productivity.
More importantly the strength of their model should depend on the degree of asset com-
plementarity between acquirers and targets. While Hoberg and Phillips (2010) and Bena
and Li (2010) investigate asset complementarities as a motive for mergers, neither of these
papera investigate the performance dierences between parties engaging in merger.
Regarding the performance gains in mergers, only Q-theory oers a clear prediction:
Hypothesis 3: The targets acquired by rms with assets that are close
substitutes should experience productivity gains.
There is evidence that productivity of targets increases in acquisitions, e.g.Lichtenberg
(1992), McGuckin and Nguyen (1995), Maksimovic, Phillips, and Prabhala (2008) and
Maksimovic and Phillips (2001). However in this study, I argue that most of the pro-
ductivity gains for targets will be observed among horizontal acquisitions, in which the
re-deployability of the acquirer's human capital to the target's physical assets is the easi-
est.
The model of mergers based on the property rights theory predicts that mergers are
motivated by synergy gains. It has no prediction regarding the performance gains of
targets as the division of surplus between acquirer and target created by synergies is
not clear. However, the model does predict that the rm that arises as a combination of
acquirer and target should be more ecient in providing incentives for relationship-specic
investments compared to the situation prior acquisition. The test of this prediction would
require a reasonable proxy for relationship-specic investments, which is not possible with
the data in this study.
2.3 Data Sample and Variable Construction
2.3.1 Data Sources
The sample of acquisition events is obtained from Zephyr, a new international dataset
of ownership changes compiled by Bureau van Dijk. Compared to other databases of
M&As, the primary advantage of Zephyr is the use of a unique company identication
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number (BvD ID) which allows precise linking with Amadeus, a database of detailed
balance-sheet and income statement information for a comprehensive sample of private
and public rms across all industries in Europe. The merged dataset allows me to compare
the performance of acquiring and targeted rms to similar rms which were not involved
in any ownership transaction. It also allows me to track the performance of companies
for several years before and after the date of deal completion, and as such, it is suitable
for investigating questions posed in this paper. Although Zephyr has been tapped in the
ownership change literature, most of the papers focus on narrow topics and thus utilize
only small sub-samples of Zephyr.6 To my knowledge, this is the rst paper that attempts
to use the broad category of mergers and acquisition deals in Zephyr and link them with
Amadeus. For a thorough description of Zephyr's coverage and structure, as well as the
adjustments necessary for matching the dataset with Amadeus, see Bena, Fons-Rosen,
and Ondko (2009).
The Amadeus dataset is constructed by combining several updates that add infor-
mation over time: DVD updates from May 2002 and May 2004 together with updates
downloaded from WRDS in July 2007, April 2008, August 2009 and February 2010. Every
update contains up to the 10 most recent years of rms' nancial data (if available). Also,
a given rm is present in Amadeus as long as it provides its nancial statements; however,
it is kept in the database only for four extra years after its last ling.7 Combining several
updates, obtained in dierent points in time, allows me to add back the observations for
rms that are not present in more recent updates. The key advantages of this procedure
are rst, it eliminates survivorship bias inherent in the single update of the database, and
second, it extends rms' historical accounting data beyond the most recent 10 years.
6Among others, Grimpe (2007) uses a sample of 179 mergers obtained from Zephyr and Thompson
Deals to study the post-merger integration of rms' R&D units and its eect on innovation activity;
Pasiouras, Tanna, and Zopounidis (2007) study the performance of multi-criteria decision aid prediction
models in identifying acquisition targets in the banking industry on a sample of 168 acquired and 168 non-
acquired banks from the EU-15; Grimpe and Hussinger (2008) investigate the motives for pre-empting
technology competition through mergers and acquisition on a sample of 657 horizontal deals from Europe;
Michaely and Roberts (2006) use Zephyr jointly with SDC Platinum to extract information on IPOs and
going-private transactions to study dierences in the dividend policies of public and private rms.
7For example, a rm that les a nancial statement in 2002 but stops ling in 2003, remains in the
database until 2006. In 2007, the rm is dropped from the sample, and all year entries of the rm are
taken out of Amadeus.
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To classify acquisitions into Unrelated, Vertical and Horizontal categories, I utilize the
UK Analytical Use Table for the year 1995.8 In the UK Input-Output Tables, the indus-
tries are classied by the UK SIC 2003 standard, which recognizes 129 industries out of
which 76 are in the Manufacturing sector. However, both Amadeus and Zephyr provide
the industry aliation of rms in the 4-digit level of the NACE rev. 1.1 classication.
In order to match merger data from Zephyr to the UK SIC industries, I follow the corre-
spondence table between NACE rev 1.1 and UK SIC 2003 classications that is provided
by the UK Statistical Oce together with the Input-Output tables. In general, the UK
SIC industries correspond to 3-digit level NACE rev 1.1 industries, but in some cases, the
correspondence is ner (4-digit) or rougher (2-digit). Given that the relationship between
4-digit NACE rev. 1.1 and UK SIC 2003 is always n-to-1, the denition of an industry in
the analysis will follow the UK SIC 2003 classication.
2.3.2 The Sample
The sample of acquisitions is constructed by constraining the Zephyr dataset to transac-
tions completed between the beginning of January 1998 and the end of May 2008. The
set of countries is constrained to the EU-15 except Luxembourg, which is dropped due
to too few observations. I include only transactions in which both acquirer and target
operate in the same country as cross-country acquisitions are often motivated by reasons
that are not in the focus of this analysis.9 Next, I drop industries with specic regula-
tions and those with very rough correspondence between NACE rev. 1.1 and UK SIC:
Farming (UK SIC 1, 2 and 3), Utilities (UK SIC 85, 86 and 87), Transportation (UK
SIC 95 and 96), Finance (UK SIC 100, 101 and 102), Other business activities (UK SIC
109 to 114), Public sector (UK SIC 115 to 118 and 124 to 129) and Other non-business
activities (UK SIC 120 to 123). Further, I retain only those acquisitions in which the
acquiring rm obtains a majority directly by the means of an acquisition event, that is,
the acquired stake is greater than 50%. Next, I include only acquisitions between rms
8Downloaded from http://www.statistics.gov.uk/
9 For example, cross-border acquisitions are often considered to be a form of foreign direct investment,
where the acquirer is seeking to gain access to a new market or cheap input by utilizing the local country-
specic capability of a target (e.g. Nocke and Yeaple, 2007).
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that are either Public Limited companies, which are private limited-liability companies
that are allowed to issue shares that can be listed or Private Limited companies, which
are private limited-liability companies whose shares cannot be listed. Finally, I keep only
the transactions in which both acquirer and target has a BvD ID non-missing, which is
necessary for obtaining accounting information from Amadeus.
Given the sample of acquisitions obtained from Zephyr, I dene three samples that will
be used to investigate the stated hypotheses. First, the Acquirers Sample consists of all
rms that were participating in acquisition as an acquirer during the sample period. This
sample is used to test hypotheses about the relative performance of Acquirers relative to
the rms that did not participate in M&As. Second, the Targets Sample includes all rms
that were participating in acquisition as a target during the sample period. This sample
is utilized for the performance comparisons of targets and non-participating rms. Third,
the Acquirer-Target Pairing Sample consists of transactions in which both the acquirer
and the target rm were participating in acquisition during the sample period. This
sample is used to test hypothesis 2 on the eect of acquirer-target relative performance
on the probability of acquirer-target pairing.
To examine the eect of performance on decisions to participate in acquisitions and
to investigate post-acquisition targets' performance gains, I use Amadeus to form sam-
ples of pseudo-acquirers, pseudo-targets and pseudo-deals which are then, respectively,
appended to the Acquirers Sample, the Targets Sample and the Acquirer-Target Pairing
Sample. These pseudo-samples are formed in two ways: either by exact matching on
country/industry/year, or by exact matching on country/industry/year combined with
the nearest neighbor matching on size.
First, the Random Acquirers Sample (the Random Targets Sample) is formed by taking
each acquirer (target) from the Acquirers Sample (the Targets Sample) and randomly
selecting up to ve rms that satisfy the following: 1) they were neither an acquirer nor
a target rm in the Acquirer Sample or in the Target Sample; and 2) they operate in
the same country and industry in the year preceding the acquisition as a given acquirer
(target). This procedure is equivalent to exact matching on country/industry/year, where
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year corresponds to year preceding the completion of an acquisition. It yields a set of
matches, one for each acquisition deal, which contains up to 6 rms: 1 actual acquirer
(target) and 5 pseudo-acquirers (targets). As pseudo-acquirers (targets) in the Random
Acquirers Sample (the Random Targets Sample) are selected by conditioning only on
country/industry/year, these samples allow for a preliminary investigation of the role of
size on the participation in acquisitions.
Second, the Matched Acquirers Sample (the Matched Targets Sample) is formed by
taking each acquirer (target) from the Acquirers Sample (the Targets Sample ) and se-
lecting up to ve matching rms that satisfy the following: 1) they were neither acquirer
nor a target rm in the Acquirer Sample or in the Target Sample; 2) they operate in
the same country and industry in the year preceding the acquisition as a given acquirer
(target); 3) their Total Assets are closest to the actual acquirer's (target's) Total Assets
as of the year preceding the completion of the acquisition; and 4) their Total Assets dier
from the Total Assets of the actual acquirer (target) at most by 10%. This procedure is
equivalent to the exact matching on country/industry/year combined with the 5-nearest
neighbor matching in Total Assets with caliper set to 10%. Caliper 5-nearest neighbor
matching non-parametrically controls for rm size, as approximated by Total Assets.
In addition, the Matched Acquirer-Target Pairing Sample is formed by taking each
actual deal from the Acquirer-Target Pairing Sample and selecting up to ve pseudo-deals
formed by pairing pseudo-acquirers and pseudo-targets that are selected to satisfy the
same criteria as those used to construct the Matched Acquirers Sample and the Matched
Targets Sample. This procedure yields a dataset of rm-pairs which are organized in the
set of matches, one for each actual acquisition deal. Each match can contain up to 6 rm-
pairs: 1 actual acquirer-target pair and 5 pseudo acquirers-target pairs. This is equivalent
to the two-sided exact matching on country/industry/year combined with the 5-nearest
neighbor matching in Total Assets with caliper set to 10%, both for the acquirer's and
the target's side of a deal.
83
2.3.3 Classication of Acquisitions
To categorize acquisitions into Horizontal, Vertical and Unrelated, I follow the method-
ology used in Fan and Goyal (2006), Becker and Thomas (2010) and Ahern and Harford
(2010). First, Horizontal transactions are dened as those in which both acquirer and
target operates in the same UK SIC industry. Next, to distinguish Vertical and Unre-
lated acquisitions, I use the measure of Vertical Dependence dened for each industry
pair, which is calculated using the UK Analytical Use table for the year 1995. First, for
industry pair ij, I calculate the dependence of the producing industry i on the supplier
industry j as the share of input ows from j to i on the total output of industry i. How-
ever, it is common that industries in a given pair have non-zero intermediates supply in
both directions. Thus for industry pair ij, I also calculate the reverse index of dependence
of producing industry j on the supplier industry i. With these two quantities in hand, I
dene the index of Vertical Dependence of industries i and j as their maximum.
V ertical Dependenceij = max (
Input F lowsj→ i
Total Outputi
,
Input F lowsi→ j
Total Outputj
).
Finally, I split all between-industry transactions into two groups. Those with the value
of Vertical Dependence of acquirer's and target's industry pair above the median value10
are classied as Vertical and those below as Unrelated.
2.3.4 Productivity Measure
In order to evaluate rms' performance, I will rely on the logarithm of revenue total
factor productivity (TFPR) calculated at the rm level. Revenue total factor productivity
measures the eciency of a given rm in generating sales. Conditional on a vector of
inputs, a given rm can have higher sales either because it is more ecient in transforming
inputs to output, as reected by its high physical productivity, or because it can govern
a higher price for its products, for example as a result of its market power. As noted
by Foster, Haltiwanger, and Syverson (2008), dis-entangling these two eects requires
10Median Vertical Dependence is 1.1% in the Matched Acquirers Sample, 1.0% in the Matched Targets
Sample, and 1.2% in the Matched Acquirer-Target Pairing Sample.
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detailed data on rm-level input and output prices, which are unfortunately not available
in Amadeus. Estimating physical productivity is important for evaluating the impact of
various industry policies on the rm and aggregate productivity. However, the rm entry,
survival and the selection into acquisition status are also likely to be driven by revenue
not physical productivity as the ability to secure revenues by charging a premium price
for the product is important too. Nevertheless, to stress the fact that the performance of
the rms is evaluated using revenue total factor productivity, it is labeled TFPR.
The TFPR is calculated as a dierence between the actual sales of a given rm and
the predicted sales that the rm would generate if it used its actual amount of inputs and
the prevailing technology in the industry. I assume that the transformation of inputs to
output Y in a rm is governed by the Cobb-Douglas production function
Y = AKαLβMγ, (2.1)
where Y is physical output, A is a constant term measuring physical productivity of
the rm, K denotes capital, L denotes labor and M denotes material cost. Multiplying
equation (2.1) with the output price P yields revenues R = PY on the left-hand side,
and further logarithmic transformation gives a familiar specication that can be used to
estimate the parameters of the revenue production function and to estimate the TFPR
of the rm as the estimation residual term:
rit = c+ αkit + βlit + γmit + εit, (2.2)
where small letters denote logarithms of actual values, c is a constant and εit is the
error term. When estimating TFPR, the capital Kit is approximated by the book value
of xed assets. As Amadeus doesn't provide information on the skill level of labor at the
rm level, the labor services Lit are measured using a total wage bill. Given that wages
reect the dierent skill level of workers within the rm, the total wage bill given by the
sum of wage bills for individual workers reects the value of human capital embodied in
labor services, e.g. Hsieh and Klenow (2010), Bloom, Draca, and Van Reenen (2011).
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Finally, material inputs Mit are approximated by the total cost of materials.
Specically, equation (2.2) is estimated using ordinary least squares separately for
each UK SIC industry, while controlling for country and year xed eects. Given the
estimated parameters, rm level TFPR is calculated as TFPRit = rit − (α̂kit + β̂lit +
γ̂mit). This estimation method also makes this paper comparable with other studies in the
acquisitions literature that rely on the estimates of rm productivity such as Maksimovic
and Phillips (2001), Yang (2008) and Li (2011). Appendix 2.B discusses other concerns
and methodological issues that may arise when estimating TFPR.
2.3.5 Sample Overview
Table 2.1 presents the distribution of the within-country transactions in the Acquirers
Sample, the Targets Sample and the Acquirers-Targets Pairing Sample over time and the
type of transaction. There is a total of 2509 targets in the Targets Sample, 2161 acquirers
in the Acquirers Sample and 1015 acquisition deals in the Acquirer-Target Pairing Sample.
From the 2509 domestic acquisitions in the Targets Sample, 1524 are between rms that
operate within same UK SIC industry and are thus classied as horizontal. The share of
horizontal acquisitions is similar in Acquirers and Acquirer-Target Pairing Samples. Given
that across industry deals are classied to Unrelated and Vertical based on the median
Vertical Dependence between industries of acquirer and target, their total number is
similar in all three samples.
The number of transactions is increasing over the 1998 - 2008 period. The trend until
2003 corresponds mostly to an improvement in the coverage of the European transactions
in Zephyr, which coincided with the merger wave that nished in 2002 as reported by
Bartholdy, Blunck, and Poulsen (2009). The second increase after 2005 corresponds to
the M&A wave that was nished just before the nancial crisis of 2008. Importantly, all
three samples show similar temporal trends.
Table 2.2 presents the descriptive statistics for the main variables in all three Matched
samples. In both, the Matched Targets Sample and the Matched Acquirers Sample,
pseudo-targets (pseudo-acquirers) label descriptive statistics for the observations corre-
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sponding to matched rms that are not participating in acquisition during the sample
period. Comparing the size of actual targets as measured by Total Assets (TOAS) with
the average size in the population of all non-participating rms, shown in Panel D, reveals
that actual targets are about 6 times larger. This implies that the selection of targets on
size is not random and that in order to participate on the acquisition market as targets,
rms often have to reach some critical size. When compared to the pseudo-targets selected
by matching on size, which are described in panel A, the actual targets are still about
24% larger. This implies that caliper matching doesn't remove all the dierences in size,
and in the econometric analysis, all specications should control for rm size in order to
remove the residual imbalance.11 In terms of TFPR, the targets are on average 4% less
productive than the pseudo-targets matched by size, and a similar dierence holds for the
comparison of the medians.
Panel B of Table 2.2 presents similar summary statistics for the Matched Acquirers
Sample. The acquirers are about 31 times as large as the average non-participating rm,
about ve times as large as the average target and about 84% larger than a matched
pseudo-acquirer. Acquirers don't appear to be more productive than their industry peers
of similar size as their average TFPR is about 4 percentage points lower than the TFPR
of matched pseudo-acquirers.
Panel C of Table 2.2 presents descriptive statistics for the acquirer-target pairs in
actual acquisition deals and in matched pseudo-deals in the Matched Acquirer-Target
Pairing Sample. In order to provide meaningful comparisons of TFPR for acquirers and
targets coming from dierent industries, rTFPR is calculated as a rm's TFPR z-score,
obtained by subtracting the mean TFPR of its industry and dividing by the industry
standard deviation. The normalization eectively removes across-industry dierences in
the mean and dispersion of productivity. Measuring performance in units that correspond
to standard deviations from the industry average allows me to compare rms operating
11That the dierence between the average size of actual targets (actual acquirers) and the average
size of matched pseudo-targets (matched pseudo-acquirers) is larger than 10%, the value of caliper in
the matching procedure, is explained by the fact that larger rms are more dicult to match. The size
distribution of matched pseudo-targets (matched pseudo-acquirers) is thus more representative of deals
with smaller actual targets (actual acquirers).
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in dierent industries. The proximity of acquirer and target performance measured by
the absolute value of the dierence between Acquirer's and Target's rTFPR appears to
be signicantly lower for actual deals, on average about 11% of the standard deviation of
TFPR. This suggests that acquisitions are pairing rms that are more similar in terms of
their TFPR rank in their respective industries than pseudo-pairs formed by matching on
the industry aliation and size. The average value of Vertical Dependence between the
industries of targets and acquirers in the Matched Acquirer-Target Pairing Sample is 5%,
and its distribution is skewed to the left as the median is 2%. The median value 2% is
somehow higher than the cuto value of 1.2% used to split between-industry acquisitions
into Unrelated and Vertical because the descriptive statistics in panel C include targets
in within-industry acquisitions, as well. The 90 to 10th percentile dierence in Vertical
Dependence is 20 percentage points suggesting large variation in the vertical relationship
between targets and acquirers.12
Table 2.3 decomposes the Matched Targets Sample in panel A, the Matched Acquirers
Sample in panel B and the Matched Acquirer-Target Pairing Sample in panel C into
Unrelated, Vertical and Horizontal deals. Panels A and B show that the number of
actual acquisition participants quoted on the stock exchange is very small: It is almost
negligible in theMatched Targets Sample and about 17% in theMatched Acquirers Sample.
Comparing actual targets with matched pseudo-targets in panel A shows that the TFPR
under-performance of actual targets is 4% in Horizontal acquisitions, which is in line with
Hypothesis 1. There is evidence of the TFPR under-performance of targets in Unrelated
acquisitions, too. Actual targets in vertical deals have similar TFPR to their matched
pseudo-targets.
In panel B, actual acquirers seem to under-perform matched pseudo-acquirers by about
7% in Unrelated deals and by 3% in Vertical and Horizontal deals. Finally, the absolute
value of the dierence between the acquirer's and target's rTFPR is 15 percentage points
lower for actual vertical deals than for vertical pseudo-deals and similar comparison holds
for horizontal deals. This suggests that vertical relatedness is a factor that drives the
12The distribution of Vertical Dependence in the Matched Targets Sampleand the Matched Acquirers
Sample is similar, but not reported.
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acquisition pairing of rms of similar performance.
2.4 Results
2.4.1 The selection of Acquirers and Targets
What is the role of TFPR and its recent trends in the selection of companies into the
role of acquirers or targets in acquisitions? In order to answer this question, I start with
an investigation of a selection of targets and acquirers in the Random Target Sample and
in the Random Acquirers Sample. As counterfactual pseudo-targets (pseudo-acquirers)
in these samples are selected randomly by matching only on country/industry/year, an
analysis on these samples enables me to investigate the potential confounding eects of
rm size. This step is important as it is well known that more productive rms tend to be
larger than less productive ones (e.g. Syverson (2011)). Yet, large rms have presumably
a greater scope to participate in acquisitions either due to nancial or informational
frictions. Not controlling appropriately for rm size would thus bias the estimate of the
importance of rm TFPR on the decision to engage in acquisitions.
In order to investigate the role of rm size, I estimate a set of simple logit models
using the Random Target Sample and the Random Acquirers Sample, both of which have
a cross-sectional structure: For each matchm, there is 1 actual target (actual acquirer) and
up to 5 pseudo-targets (pseudo-acquirers) with the explanatory variables measured as of
the year preceding the acquisition deal. For both targets and acquirers, the logit models
are estimated rst jointly and second separately for three categories of acquisitions>
Unrelated, Vertical and Horizontal, indexed by superscript X ∈ {U,V,H} respectively.
The models take the form:
TargetXfm = α + β TFPRfm + γ log(TOAS)fm (2.3)
+ Y ear FEm + εfm.
The dependent indicator variable TargetXfm equals 1 if rm f is the actual target in
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match m and 0 otherwise. TFPRfm denotes the TFPR level in the year preceding the
acquisition. Specications estimated on the Random Acquirers Sample replace TargetXfm
by the equivalent variable dened for acquirers, AcquirerXfm.
13
Table 2.4 presents the estimates of average marginal eects from the logit model
specied in equation 2.3 for the Random Targets Sample in panel A and for the Random
Acquirers Sample in panel B. Columns 1-3 present estimates obtained without controlling
for the rm size. Unconditionally on rm size, Targets and Acquirers in all types of
acquisitions are more productive than randomly selected rms operating in their respective
industries in a year preceding the acquisition. However, controlling for rm size, by
including log(TOAS)fm, columns 4-6 reveal that the productivity advantage of targets
and acquirers appears to be merely driven by their large rm size.
This implies that the careful investigation of the role of productivity on the selec-
tion into acquisitions has to be based on the comparisons of participating rms with
rms operating in the same industry that are of comparable size. For this, I employ the
Matched Targets Sample and the Matched Acquirers Sample, in which pseudo-targets and
pseudo-acquirers are selected by matching on industry as well as size. Non-parametrically
controlling for rm size in this way is superior to a simple linear model. To investigate the
selection of targets, I estimate a set of xed-eects (i.e., conditional) logit models, which
take advantage of the logistic specication of the likelihood function that allows me to
partial out unobserved match-specic characteristics. In a similar fashion as xed eects
panel models, this approach allows for a controlling of unobserved country/industry/year
factors that are common to all rms within the match. The disadvantage of this approach
is that it is not possible to calculate the marginal eects on the response probabilities as
match xed eects, which should be plugged into the calculation, are not estimated in the
process. For this reason, I will present estimated coecients, which can be interpreted as
the eect of the explanatory variables on the log of the odds-ratio log(pi/(1− pi)), where
pi is the probability of participating in an acquisition. The models take the form:
13 The standard errors are estimated by clustering on the match level under the assumption of intra-
class correlation of error terms within matches. This assumption is maintained through all specications
that follow.
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TargetXfm = α + β TFPRfm + γ log(TOAS)fm (2.4)
+ Target Characteristicsfm
+ MatchFEm + εfm.
where X ∈ {U,V,H} indexes the type of acquisition; TFPRfm is a measure of rm
TFPR, entered either as a level or a change in the year preceding the acquisition; Target
Characteristicsfm is a set of control variables measured as of the year preceding the
completion of an acquisition. An equivalent set of xed-eects logit models is estimated
to investigate the selection of acquirers.
Table 2.5 presents the estimates of average marginal eects from the logit model
specied in equation 2.4 for the selection of Targets. Columns 1-3 in panel A show that,
using theMatched Targets Sample, less productive rms are more likely to become targets
in horizontal and unrelated acquisitions, but there is no signicant role of productivity in
the selection of vertical targets. Columns 4-6 add additional controls for the rms' cash
ow, revenue growth, cash balances, leverage, form of incorporation and publicly quoted
status. While, the estimated coecients are reduced considerably becoming insignicant
for unrelated acquisitions in column 4, the result for horizontal acquisitions is conrmed in
column 6. The estimated coecient -0.24 on TFPR in column 6 suggests that decreasing
TFPR by 1 standard deviation, about 0.4, increases the log of the odds-ratio by about
0.096. This magnitude is almost one-tenth of the unconditional within-sample log of
the odds-ratio of being a horizontal target, -1.14. Note that controlling for rm size by
means of matching removes most of the unbalancedness as coecient on log(TOAS) is
insignicant, except of column 5.
In panel B, TFPR level is replaced by TFPR growth in the last year preceding the
acquisition. Columns 3 and 6 show that rms with declining productivity and low cash
stock are more likely to be targeted in horizontal acquisitions, but this is not the case for
targets in other types of acquisitions. In addition, low cash ow increases the likelihood of
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being targeted in all types of acquisition. This suggests that nancial or liquidity reasons
are important determinants of being targeted by a horizontally or vertically related as
well as an unrelated acquirer. Lastly, being incorporated as a Public Limited Company
increases the chance of being a target in all types of deals, as well. In Public Limited
Companies, the shareholders' equity is explicitly divided into stakes that can be easily
sold, which makes this type of incorporation form easier to acquire.
Table 2.6 presents the estimates for the selection of acquirers in the Matched Acquirers
Sample. In panel A, in columns 1 and 4 the estimated coecient of the TFPR level is
signicant and negative, while the coecient on cash ow in column 4 is positive. This
implies that diversifying acquirers in unrelated acquisitions are rms that are under-
performing in productivity but have signicant positive cash ow shocks.
In panel B, TFPR growth is statistically insignicant in all columns. In column 6 for
horizontal deals, the coecient on Sales Growth is estimated to be positive in both panels
A and B. This suggests that even though horizontal acquirers are not over-performing their
industry peers of similar size in terms of TFPR, they are experiencing signicantly faster
growth in sales, which is the reason for their acquisition choices. The other signicant
factor that is driving the selection of acquirers in all types of deals is their publicly quoted
status.
Overall, conditional on rm size, these results do not directly conrm the prediction
of Q-theory of mergers that acquirers are rms with superior productivity or recent pro-
ductivity growth. This holds even in the sub-set of horizontal acquisitions, where the key
assumption of asset substitutability is more likely to be satised. On the other hand other
variables that are related to rm performance, such as high sales growth for horizontal
deals and high cash ow for vertical and unrelated deals, are signicant factors improving
the likelihood of being an acquirer.
As a robustness check, I modify equation 2.4 to one which includes only industry and
year xed eects.
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TargetXfm = α + β TFPRfm + γ log(TOAS)fm (2.5)
+ Target Characteristicsfm
+ Industry FEm + Y ear FEm + εfm.
Equation 2.5 is estimated using a standard logit regression. This approach allows me
to calculate the marginal eects of explanatory variables, which are easier to interpret;
however, not controlling for match xed eects can potentially bias the estimates due to
unobserved country/industry/year factors.
Appendix Table 2.A.1 presents coecient estimates for equation 2.5 for the selection
of Targets in the Matched Targets Sample, and appendix Table 2.A.2 presents results for
the equivalent specication of the selection of acquirers in the Matched Acquirers Sample.
Both tables conrm results presented in Tables 2.5 and 2.6.
Overall, the presented evidence partially supports Hypothesis 1. Firms with low and
declining productivity are more likely to be targets in horizontal deals. This supports
the inecient management hypothesis that poorly managed rms are more likely to be
acquired only by rms with similar assets, in line with the Q-theory of mergers. Predic-
tions of Q-theory for the selection of acquirers are inconclusive. On the one hand, neither
productivity nor its recent trend are signicant factors in the selection of acquirers which
is at odds with the predictions of the Q-theory of mergers. On the other hand, sales
growth appears to aect the selection of horizontal acquirers positively. However impor-
tantly, it is stressed that this holds only after carefully conditioning on rm size. Without
conditioning on size, productivity becomes the important factor in the selection of rms
into acquirers in all types of acquisitions.
TFPR is not a signicant factor in the selection of rms into vertical acquisitions, nei-
ther as acquirers nor as targets. Together with descriptive statistics provided in Table 2.3
these suggest that rms participating in vertical acquisitions are of similar productivity.
A formal test of this hypothesis is presented in the next section.
93
2.4.2 Acquirer-Target Pairing
Observed productivity similarity of acquirers and targets in vertical acquisitions is in line
with the predictions of the search and matching model of Rhodes-Kropf and Robinson
(2008). The necessary assumption of asset complementarity is presumably more likely to
be satised for vertical deals than for other types of acquisitions. However, instead of
comparing vertical targets and acquirers to their peers, one should ask whether actual
targets and actual acquirers participating in vertical acquisitions are closer to each other
in terms of their productivity than pseudo-pairs of non-participating rms which operate
in the same respective industries and are of comparable size.
To address this question, I use the Matched Acquirer-Target Pairing Sample. I test
for the eect of the distance in normalized productivity rTFPR between rms in a given
pair p on the probability of pairing in actual acquisition by running a xed-eects logit
regression of the form:
Actual Dealpm = α + βDistance(rTFPRpm) (2.6)
+ Acquirer Characteristicspm + Target Characteristicspm
+ MatchFEm + εpm,
where the dependent variable Actual Dealpm is one if rm pair p is the actual acquirer-
target pair and zero otherwise. Distance(rTFPRpm) is the absolute value of the dier-
ence in pre-acquisition normalized productivity rTFPR between rms in a given pair,
where rTFPR is TFPR normalized to account for the industry average and dispersion
as described in section 2.3.5. Acquirer Characteristicspm and Target Characteristicspm
include other control characteristics of acquirers and targets measured as of the year
preceding the completion of a deal.
The estimated coecients from the logit regressions of specication 2.6 are presented
in Table 2.7. Column 1 shows that in the sample of all types of acquisition deals, distance
in rTFPR is negatively related to the probability of pairing in acquisition. Column 5
conrms that this result is robust controlling for the characteristics of individual rms
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in pairs. If the distance in rm productivities increase by 1 standard deviation of within
industry TFPR distribution, the log of the odds-ratio of a rm-pair participating in actual
acquisition decreases by 0.31. This is about one-third of -0.88, which is the within sample
log of the odds-ratio of acquisition pairing.
Results for the sub-samples of unrelated, vertical and horizontal deals without included
rm-level controls are presented in columns 2, 3, 4 and with included controls in columns
6, 7 and 8. Comparing columns 7 and 5, the eect of the distance rTFPR is almost
two times as large in the sample of vertical acquisitions as in the full sample. Estimated
marginal eects on the sub-sample of horizontal acquisitions in columns 4 and 8 are a
little higher than the results obtained in the full sample, columns 1 and 5.
Two observations emerge from the results in Table 2.7. First, similarity in rTFPR is
a signicant factor in observed acquisition pairing. Second, the eect of the distance in
rTFPR is strongest in the sample of vertical deals but still present, albeit with a lower
magnitude, in the sample of horizontal deals. The second observation is consistent with
the fact that supplier-producer vertical relationships, or other types of unobserved com-
plementarities, exist also within UK SIC industries. This is an artifact of the coarseness
of industry classication and the limitation of this empirical strategy. The only way to
clearly alleviate this concern would be to observe actual producer-supplier relationships
at the rm-level. To my knowledge, such a dataset hasn't been tapped in the economic
literature yet.
One way to provide a check on the importance of supplier-producer industry links in
the observed patterns of merger pairing is to use the sub-sample of matches correspond-
ing to across-industry acquisitions and estimate the model where Distance(rTFPRpm) is
interacted with the actual measure of vertical dependence between industries of rms be-
longing to a given pair p as well as with the proxy for technological similarity of acquirer's
and target's industries. Using the assumption that the technological similarity of two in-
dustries is revealed by the similarity of inputs used in the production, I approximate the
technological similarity of two industries by the variable called Supplier Similarity, cal-
culated as the simple correlation of their respective inputs vectors. These inputs vectors
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are dened in the space of supplying industries on the UK SIC level and their elements
are calculated as a share of inputs from the supplying industry in the total output of the
receiving industry. As in the case of the index of V ertical Dependence, they're calculated
using the UK Analytical Use table for the year 1995. Including these two interaction
terms allows me to investigate how the eect of distance in rTFPR on the likelihood of
pairing varies with vertical dependence and technological similarity. Specically, I run a
xed-eects logit regression:
Actual Dealpm = α + βDistance(rTFPRpm) ∗ V ertical Dependencem (2.7)
+ γDistance(rTFPRpm) ∗ Supplier Similaritym
+ δDistance(rTFPRpm) (2.8)
+ Acquirer Characteristicspm + Target Characteristicspm
+ MatchFEm + εpm.
The estimated relationship between vertical dependence and the average marginal
eects of Distance (rTFPRpm) as well as their estimated 95% condence interval is
reported in Table 2.8. As the degree of vertical relatedness of the industries corresponding
to rm-pair increases, the eect of the distance in rTFPR on the probability of engaging
in acquisition gets more negative. This holds in all specications, whether they include
additional rm-level control variables or the interaction of the distance in rTFPR with
Supplier Similarity. This conrms the results obtained in columns 6 and 7 of Table 2.7.
Thus, the presented evidence suggests an important role for vertical relatedness on the
observed patterns in the positive sorting of rms into acquisition deals.
As a robustness check, I modify equation 2.6 to include only year and acquirers' and
targets' industry xed eects and estimate it using standard logit regression. The results,
presented in Table 2.A.3, conrm the main ndings presented in Table 2.7. Column
5, for the sample of all acquisitions, suggests that if the distance in rm productivities
increases by 1 standard deviation of within-industry TFPR distribution, the probability
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of a rm-pair participating in an actual acquisition decreases by 5%. This is about one-
sixth of 28%, which is the within-sample probability of acquisition pairing. The estimated
marginal eect for the sub-sample of vertical acquisitions is more than twice as big. For
the comparison, Rhodes-Kropf and Robinson (2008) estimate that increase in the distance
in M/B by 1 standard deviation decreases the probability of acquisition pairing by 9%.
Overall, the evidence presented in this section suggests the existence of positive as-
sortative matching in vertical acquisitions in line with the Hypothesis 2. The eect of
the dierence in productivities on the probability of acquisition pairing is negative, and
this is most pronounced among rms operating in industry-pairs with a strong vertical
relationship.
2.4.3 Productivity Gains in Acquisitions
The last part of the investigation concerns targets' productivity gains following acqui-
sitions. The prediction of the Q-theory of mergers stated in Hypothesis 3 is: Targets
acquired by rms with assets that are a close substitute should see gains in productivity.
Before turning to the dierence-in-dierences econometric model, I explore the produc-
tivity dynamics of target rms relative to their industry peers of similar size in the 3-year
window surrounding the year of acquisition. For this purpose, I will use the Matched Tar-
gets Sample with two modications. First, in order to mitigate the potential truncation
bias, I limit the investigation only to deals that are completed by the end of year 2005,
at least 3 years before the end of the sample period. Second, I retain only rms for which
TFPR is available at least in one year before and one year after the acquisition. Finally, I
include only deals in which targets were targeted at most once during the sample period,
which mitigates concerns about the eects of multiple acquisitions on rm's productivity.
In order to describe relative productivity, I perform a series of two-sided t-tests of
equality in TFPR. These tests are performed separately for each category of acquisitions
and for each of the 3 years before and after the year of acquisition. Each t-test performs
a comparison of the average TFPR of actual targets with the average TFPR of pseudo-
targets that operate in the same industry and are closest to the actual targets in terms
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of size in one year preceding the actual deal.
The results of this series of t-tests are summarized in Table 2.9. The TFPR of unrelated
as well as vertical targets is very similar and not statistically dierent from the TFPR
of their industry peers with similar size. In line with the evidence presented in Table
2.5, unrelated targets appear to be a bit less productive compared to their peers over
the three-year period before acquisition. Productivity of vertical targets is on par with
that of their peers before the acquisition. Lastly, the productivity of horizontal targets
deteriorates in the 3-year period before their acquisition, and it is about 5% lower than
the TFPR of their peers within 1 year preceding the deal, the dierence being signicant
at the 1% level. Note that in the 1st year after the acquisition, the negative productivity
gap of horizontal targets disappears, and in the 3rd year after the deal, the productivity
of horizontal targets is 2% higher than productivity of corresponding pseudo-targets.
To investigate the TFPR gains of targets in acquisitions formally, I employ two sets of
models: dierence-in-dierences model with rm-xed eects (FEM) and lagged depen-
dent variable model (LDVM). The key identifying assumption of FEM is that conditional
on unobserved time invariant characteristics (and exogenous time varying factors), the
selection of rms as acquisition targets is random. However, it is likely that this assump-
tion may be inappropriate in the current context, as the productivity of actual horizontal
targets declines before the acquisition (see evidence in Tables 2.5 and 2.A.1). This is
reminiscent of the results from the literature evaluating the eects of training programs,
which usually nd that participants in these programs exhibit a drop in earnings just
prior to joining the program  i.e. Ashenfelter's dip, Ashenfelter (1978). As shown in
Angrist and Pischke (2008), among others, in the case when treatment (i.e. acquisition)
is determined by the low pre-treatment value of the variable of interest (i.e. TFPR), the
gain from treatment estimated using FEM will be biased upwards. As a remedy, Angrist
and Pischke (2008) suggest to estimate gains from treatment using LDVM, which explic-
itly conditions for the dependent variable in the period just before the treatment, but
does not control for xed eects. However, if the identifying assumption of FEM is cor-
rect, but the gain from treatment is estimated using LDVM, it will be biased downwards.
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Estimates obtained using FEM and LDVM thus provide bounds upon the causal eect of
acquisition on TFPR.
In this setting, FEM can be specied as:
TFPRfmt = α + βAfterft ∗ TargetXfm (2.9)
+ γ1Afterft + γ2Target
X
fm
+ FirmFEfm + Y ear FEt + εfmt,
where TargetXfm is an indicator variable equal one if the rm is an actual target, and
zero otherwise; and Aftert is an indicator variable equal to 1 for the year after acquisition
and zero otherwise. The coecient on the interaction term Aftert∗TargetXfm, captures the
dierence in the before-after change in the dependent variable between actual targets and
pseudo-targets belonging to matchm. For each type of acquisition indexedX ∈ {U, V,H},
this specication is estimated on three panel sub-samples, each of them having two time
series observations: the pre-acquisition value and the post-acquisition value. In each
subsample, the pre-acquisition year corresponds to 1 year before the actual deal, but the
sub-samples dier in post-acquisition year, which corresponds to 1, 2 and 3 years after
the deal, respectively for each subsample. Separately investigating the before-after change
for each of the 3 years after acquisition allows me to capture the dynamics of the TFPR
change.
The LDVM is specied as:
TFPRfmt+s = α + βTarget
X
fm + γTFPRfmt−1 (2.10)
+ log(TOAS)fmt−1 + Y ear FEt + εfmt,
where TFPRfmt+s is TFPR s years after the deal, s taking values 1, 2, or 3. As in
the case of FEM, equation 2.10 will be estimated jointly, as well as separately for each
type of acquisition X ∈ {U, V,H}.
The estimates for specication 2.9 are presented in Table 2.10.a and for specication
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2.10 in Table 2.10.b. Columns 1-4 (5-8, 9-12) present the estimates of TFPR gains between
1 year before and 1 year (2 years, 3 years) after the deal. If all acquisitions are considered
as being of one type, the estimated average targets' TFPR gains over the 3-year period,
which are reported in column 9 are between 1.7% for LDVM (Table 2.10.b) and 3.1% for
FEM (Table 2.10.a). This is in line with existing evidence: For example, Maksimovic and
Phillips (2001) report 2% increase in industry-adjusted revenue productivity three years
following the acquisition.
However, once acquisition types are distinguished, the results change considerably.
Estimates from both FEM and LDVM show that only horizontal targets experience sta-
tistically signicant TFPR gains. Their TFPR rises by 4.5% (column 12 of Table 2.10.b)
more compared to their matched peers by the third year after acquisition if estimated by
LDVM and by 6.3% (column 12 of Table 2.10.a) if estimated by FEM.14 Firms targeted
in unrelated as well as vertical acquisitions don't experience any signicant abnormal
productivity gains, in fact their estimates are slightly negative for vertical deals.
From the reported numbers of targets in Tables 2.9 and 2.10.a it is clear that there
is substantial attrition of all types of targets following acquisition. Due to the attrition,
possible concern with the results can be that targets that remain in the sample after the
deal are those which are better performing. While this is likely to be the case, there is no
apparent reason why such a bias would appear only for the subset of horizontal targets
and not for targets belonging to the other two groups. Maksimovic and Phillips (2001)
and Maksimovic, Phillips, and Prabhala (2008) report signicant restructuring in targeted
rms following the acquisition. The observed attrition can thus be either due to simply
the acquirer dismantling the targeted rm, re-incorporating it as a new organization or
incorporating it into itself. Unfortunately, Amadeus data do not allow for a detailed
investigation of reasons for the targets attrition.
Overall the presented nding that post-acquisition productivity increases signicantly
for targets acquired in horizontal acquisitions and not in other types of acquisitions is
consistent with the prediction of the Q-theory of mergers stated in Hypothesis 3. Substi-
14In line with the discussion of the dierences between FEM and LDVM, estimates obtained using
LDVM tend to be lower.
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tutability of assets appears to be the necessary condition for fast and successful transfer
of acquirers' human and intangible capital and thus targets' productivity gains.
2.5 Conclusion
Using a comprehensive dataset of corporate acquisitions in Europe over the period 1998-
2008, I show that while the good-rms-buy-bad-rms pattern is a prominent feature of
horizontal acquisitions, there is positive assortative matching on rms' revenue produc-
tivity in vertical acquisitions. Furthermore, economically meaningful and statistically
signicant gains in revenue productivity and protability are present only among targets
acquired in horizontal deals. Overall, these ndings are consistent with the Q-theory of
mergers as well as the search and matching model of mergers based on asset complemen-
tarities. The results also suggest that to understand the sources of productivity gains, it
is important to rst understand the underlying incentives to merge and second, given the
diering incentives, to investigate separately the dierent categories of mergers.
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2.6 Main Tables
Table 2.1: Domestic Acquisitions over Time
Year Unrelated # Vertical # Horizontal # Unrelated # Vertical # Horizontal # Unrelated # Vertical # Horizontal #
1998 21 20 75 10 11 43 6 4 4
1999 21 14 57 15 12 36 10 1 13
2000 37 17 43 23 8 40 11 6 8
2001 36 29 96 21 16 56 8 14 24
2002 49 66 179 41 56 149 32 27 66
2003 45 65 200 38 62 178 28 22 88
2004 50 47 173 37 51 162 37 17 52
2005 63 68 172 58 48 188 43 21 75
2006 66 84 239 56 68 239 41 35 106
2007 78 78 236 66 66 224 53 39 84
2008 18 13 54 14 8 61 7 8 25
Total 484 501 1524 379 406 1376 276 194 545
The table reports the number of within-country acquisitions by the year of the deal being completed. Transactions are categorized into Unrelated,
Vertical and Horizontal based on the measure of Vertical Dependence between the primary industries of Acquirer and Target and their belonging to
the same industry, see text. All Samples consist of within-country transactions that were completed between the beginnin of 1998 and the end of
May 2008, and the stake acquired in the transaction was at least 50%. Furthermore, both firms participating in a transaction must operate in the EU-
15; they are either „Public‟ Limited companies, which are private limited-liability companies that are allowed to issue shares that can be listed or
„Private‟ Limited companies, which are private limited-liability companies whose shares cannot be listed; they don’t operate inthe Farming,
Utilities, Transportation, Finance, Other business activities, Public sector and Other non-business activities. The argets Sample consists only of
transactions in which both the target and the acquirer can bematched to Amadeus by BvD ID – year, where year corresponds tothe year preceding
the transaction; for the actual target, at least one pseudo-target can be found in Amadeus that operates in the same country/industry in the year
preceding the transaction, and it’s Total Assets differ from the Total Assets of the actual target at most by 10 %. The Acquirers Sample consists only
of transactions in which both the acquirer and the target canbe matched to Amadeus by BvD ID – year, where year correspondsto the year
preceding the transaction; for the actual acquirer, at leasone pseudo-acquirer can be found in Amadeus that operates in he same country/industry
in the year preceding the transaction, and it’s Total Assetsdiffer from the Total Assets of the actual acquirer at most by10 %. The Acquirer-Target
Pairing Sample consists only of transactions in which both participants can be matched to Amadeus by BvD ID – year, where yar corresponds to
the year preceding the transaction; for both the actual acquirer and the actual target , at least one pseudo-acquirer andpseudo-target can be found in
Amadeus that operate in the same country/industry in the year preceding the transaction, and it’s Total Assets differ from the Total Assets of the
actual acquirer (actual target) at most by 10 %.
Targets Sample Acquirers Sample Acquirer-Target Pairing Sample
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Table 2.2: Sample Description
Mean S.D. 10th Percentile Median 90th Percentile
Actual Targets:
TOAS 25.28 95.78 0.85 5.63 44.78
TFPR 1.33 0.35 0.93 1.27 1.84
Pseudo Targets:
TOAS 20.46 80.53 0.83 5.02 36.03
TFPR 1.37 0.36 0.95 1.31 1.92
Actual Acquirers:
TOAS 129.76 1357.06 2.65 20.94 190.34
TFPR 1.43 0.41 0.96 1.35 2.06
Pseudo Acquirers:
TOAS 70.68 789.77 1.96 15.61 120.62
TFPR 1.47 0.41 0.99 1.39 2.14
Actual Deals:
| Acq.(rTFPR) - Targ.(rTFPR) | 0.83 0.70 0.12 0.64 1.84
Vertical Dependence 0.05 0.07 0.00 0.02 0.20
Pseudo Deals:
| Acq.(rTFPR) - Targ.(rTFPR) | 0.94 0.73 0.12 0.78 2.03
Population:
TOAS 4.12 531.07 0.015 0.22 2.46
TFPR 1.18 0.43 0.764 1.11 1.70
The table reports summary statistics in the year preceding the acquisition for actual targets and pseudo-targets in the Matched Targets
Sample in Panel A; for actual acquirers and pseudo acquirers in the Matched Acquirers Sample in Panel B; for actual deals and pseudo
deals in the Matched Acquirer-Target Pairing Sample in Panel C; and for the population of firms not participating in any acquisition in
panel D. To form the Matched Targets Sample (Matched Acquirers Sample), for each actual target (actual acquirer) at most five pseudo-
targets (pseudo-acquirers) are selected in Amadeus as firms that oper te in the same country/industry in the year preceding the transaction
and their Total Assets differ from the Total Assets of the actul arget (actual acquirer) at most by 10 %. To form the Matched Acquirer-
Target Pairing Sample, pseudo-deals are formed by pairing (without replacement) selected pseudo-acquirers and pseudo-targets that
correspond to actual acquirer and actual target in a given actualdeal. The population of firms considered in panel D corresponds to all
firms not participating in an acquisition that are active in theyear preceding the actual deal in all country/industries corresponding to actual
deals that belong to the Acquirer-Target Pairing Sample. TOAS denotes Total Assets in millions of Euros. TFPR denotes normalized Total
Factor Productivity which is calculated as a residual from a logrithmic Cobb-Douglas regression model estimated on the population of all
firms in Amadeus separately for each industry by OLS while controlling for country/year fixed effects. rTFPR denotes a normalized TFPR,
which is calculated as a deviation of the actual TFPR for a given firm/year from the mean value in a corresponding country/industry/year
and scaled by the corresponding standard deviation. Vertical Dependence is a measure of vertical proximity between industries of Acquirer
and Target. It is calculated as the higher of the intermediate flows from the Acquirer’s industry to the Target’s industry scaled by the
Target’s industry output and the intermediate flows from the Target’s industry to the Acquirer’s industry scaled by the Acquirer’s industry
output. Between-industry intermediate flows and industry outputs are calculated using the UK Input-Output Tables for 1995. Descriptions
of the samples are provided in Table 2.1 and text.
Panel A.: Matched Targets Sample
Panel B.: Matched Acquirers Sample
Panel D.: Population of Non-Participating Firms
Panel C.: Matched Acquirer-Target Pairing Sample
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Table 2.3: Descriptive Statistics by Type of Acquisition
Unrelated Vertical Horizontal
Actual Targets:
Observations # 484 501 1524
Quoted # 11 9 19
Mean TFPR 1.32 1.35 1.33
Pseudo Targets:
Observations # 1699 1650 5241
Quoted # 10 13 35
Mean TFPR 1.36 1.35 1.36
Actual Acquirers:
Observations # 379 406 1376
Quoted # 74 70 235
Mean TFPR 1.40 1.43 1.44
Pseudo Acquirers:
Observations # 1116 1200 4092
Quoted # 32 19 64
Mean TFPR 1.47 1.46 1.47
Actual Deals:
Observations # 276 194 545
Mean | Acq.(rTFPR) - Targ.(rTFPR) | 0.95 0.83 0.77
Pseudo Deals:
Observations # 642 548 1591
Mean | Acq.(rTFPR) - Targ.(rTFPR) | 0.95 0.98 0.92
The table reports summary statistics by the type of acquisition in the year preceding the acquisition for actual targets and pseudo-
targets in the Matched Targets Sample in Panel A; for actual acquirers and pseudo-acquirers in the Matched Acquirers Sample
in Panel B; and for actual deals and pseudo-deals in the Matched Acquirer-Target Pairing Sample in Panel C. Descriptions of
the samples are provided in Table 2.1 and text. The procedure to select pseudo-targets, pseudo-acquirers and pseudo-deals is
described in Table 2.2 and text. The categorization of acquisitions into Unrelated, Vertical and Horizontal is described in the
text. Observations # reports the number of observations. Quoted # reports the number of firms with publicly listed stock. Mean
TFPR reports average Revenue Total Factor Productivity. 
Acquisition:
Panel A.: Matched Targets Sample
Panel B: Matched Acquirers Sample
Panel C.: Matched Acquirer-Target Pairing Sample
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Table 2.4: The Role of Size in the Selection of Targets and Acquirers on Productivity
Unrelated Vertical Horizontal Unrelated Vertical Horizontal
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
TFPR 0.126*** 0.177*** 0.131*** -0.042 0.034 0.011
(0.026) (0.025) (0.014) (0.030) (0.027) (0.015)
Log ( TOAS ) 0.088*** 0.085*** 0.081***
(0.008) (0.008) (0.004)
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Targets # 442 413 1292 442 413 1292
Obs. 1979 1759 5558 1979 1759 5558
TFPR 0.194*** 0.231*** 0.231*** -0.019 0.024 0.001
(0.026) (0.027) (0.013) (0.018) (0.022) (0.011)
Log ( TOAS ) 0.062*** 0.090*** 0.077***
(0.010) (0.014) (0.009)
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Acquirers # 423 407 1374 423 407 1374
Obs. 1872 1708 5935 1872 1708 5935
Next Year Participation in Acquisition:
Panel A: Targets Selection
Panel B: Acquirers Selection
The table reports average marginal effects from logit models on the Random Targets Sample in Panel A and the Random Acquirers Sample
in Panel B. The Random Targets Sample (the Random Acquirers Sample) is constructed by randomly matching each actual target (actual
acquirer) in the Targets Sample (Acquirers Sample) with at most five pseudo-targets (pseudo-acquirers) in Amadeus that operate in the same
country/industry in the year preceding the transaction. In each column, the comparison group consists only of pseudo-targets (pseudo-
acquirers) that were matched to actual targets (actual acquirers) belonging to the sub-sample corresponding to the type of acquisition
(Unrelated, Vertical, Horizontal) in a given column. Log (TOAS) is a natural logarithm of total assets in millions of Euros. All specifications
include constant and year fixed effects; their estimates are not reported. Robust standard errors (clustered at the match level) are reported in
parentheses. ***, **, * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
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Table 2.5: The Selection of Targets on Productivity: Fixed Eects Logit Model
       
       Unrelated Vertical Horizontal Unrelated Vertical Horizontal
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
TFPR -0.382** 0.062   -0.307*** -0.134   0.169   -0.241** 
(0.171)   (0.164)   (0.091)   (0.219)   (0.196)   (0.113)   
Log ( TOAS ) -2.240   -1.074   0.605   -2.689   -2.628*  1.248   
(1.651)   (1.349)   (1.031)   (2.088)   (1.532)   (1.215)   
Cash Flow -1.223** -1.108*  -1.246***
(0.610)   (0.672)   (0.339)   
Sales Growth 0.268   -0.285   -0.117   
(0.202)   (0.183)   (0.100)   
Cash 0.537   0.351   -0.433*  
(0.403)   (0.445)   (0.244)   
Leverage 0.070   0.073   -0.149   
(0.245)   (0.255)   (0.147)   
Public Limited Company 0.763*** 0.546*** 0.612***
(0.187)   (0.175)   (0.102)   
Quoted 0.490   0.673   0.332   
(0.546)   (0.453)   (0.377)   
Match Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Targets # 484 501 1524 375 391 1177
Obs. 2183   2151   6765   1587   1567   4875   
TFPR Growth -0.040   -0.190   -0.397** 0.300   0.399   -0.427** 
(0.319)   (0.284)   (0.157)   (0.385)   (0.346)   (0.177)   
Log ( TOAS ) -2.950   -1.319   0.895   -2.163   -1.792   1.507   
(1.911)   (1.470)   (1.176)   (2.188)   (1.593)   (1.267)   
Cash Flow -1.197*  -1.202*  -1.189***
(0.640)   (0.693)   (0.354)   
Sales Growth 0.124   -0.383*  -0.073   
(0.214)   (0.222)   (0.111)   
Cash 0.540   0.466   -0.508** 
(0.424)   (0.485)   (0.253)   
Leverage 0.177   0.069   -0.105   
(0.257)   (0.284)   (0.153)   
Public Limited Company 0.771*** 0.475*** 0.655***
(0.190)   (0.181)   (0.105)   
Quoted 0.486   0.865*  0.453   
(0.562)   (0.472)   (0.388)   
Match Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Targets # 417 427 1310 356 364 1106
Obs. 1784 1749 5533 1479 1423 4485
Next Year Target in Acquisition:
Panel A: TFPR Level
Panel B: TFPR Growth
The table reports average coefficient estimates from fixed-effects logit models on the Targets Sample that condition on the full set of match
fixed effects. The dependent variable is an indicator variable equal to one if a given firm is a target in an acquisition during the following
year and zero otherwise (that is, all covariates are lagged by one year). In each column, the comparison group is derived only from pseudo-
targets that were matched by industry/country/year and size to actual targets belonging to the sub-sample corresponding to the given column.
The selection of pseudo-targets is described in Table 2.2 and text. Panel A reports results for the level of TFPR in a given year. Panel B
reports results for the TFPR Growth between the current and previous year. Log (TOAS) is a natural logarithm of total assets in millions of
euros. Cash Flow denotes cash flow in the year before the transaction scaled by total assets. Sales Growth denotes change in log sales in the
year before the transaction. Cash is cash balance scaled by total assets. Leverage is total debt excluding accounts payables scaled by total
assets. Public Limited Company is an indicator variable equal to one if a given firm is a private limited-liability company that is allowed to
issue shares that can be listed. Quoted is an indicator variable equal to one if a given firm has publicly listed stock. Robust standard errors
(clustered at the match level) are reported in parentheses. ***, **, * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
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Table 2.6: The Selection of Acquirers on Productivity: Fixed Eects Logit Model
Unrelated Vertical Horizontal Unrelated Vertical Horizontal
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
TFPR -0.844*** -0.222   -0.368*** -0.939*** -0.127   -0.133   
(0.207)   (0.168)   (0.090)   (0.310)   (0.198)   (0.113)   
Log ( TOAS ) -1.237   0.330   0.337   0.034   2.899   1.440   
(1.589)   (1.632)   (0.847)   (2.349)   (1.893)   (1.118)   
Cash Flow 2.414** 2.178** -0.203   
(1.071)   (1.000)   (0.420)   
Sales Growth 0.161   -0.022   0.412***
(0.217)   (0.245)   (0.116)   
Cash 0.278   -0.843   -0.243   
(0.610)   (0.538)   (0.278)   
Leverage -0.252   0.373   -0.448***
(0.350)   (0.300)   (0.173)   
Public Limited Company 0.595** 0.202   0.312***
(0.261)   (0.230)   (0.121)   
Quoted 1.837*** 3.467*** 2.209***
(0.432)   (0.543)   (0.234)   
Match Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Acquirers # 379 406 1376 276 328 1044
Obs. 1495   1606   5468   1026   1216   3884   
TFPR Growth -0.522 -0.007 0.061 -0.613 -0.058 -0.080
(0.340) (0.351) (0.162) (0.506) (0.423) (0.217)
Log ( TOAS ) -0.036 1.568 1.476 1.134 2.835 0.629
(1.880) (1.794) (0.932) (2.418) (1.969) (1.137)
Cash Flow 2.008* 1.488 -0.084
(1.037) (0.956) (0.419)
Sales Growth 0.235 -0.028 0.443***
(0.259) (0.278) (0.131)
Cash 0.139 -0.774 -0.290
(0.600) (0.540) (0.288)
Leverage -0.322 0.414 -0.480***
(0.339) (0.296) (0.177)
Public Limited Company 0.692** 0.094 0.305**
(0.278) (0.229) (0.125)
Quoted 2.043*** 3.414*** 2.486***
(0.390) (0.538) (0.242)
Match Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Acquirers # 327 362 1187 294 328 1066
Obs. 1224 1330 4496 1050 1173 3874
Next Year Acquirer in Acquisition:
Panel A: TFPR Level
Panel B: TFPR Growth
The table reports coefficient estimates from fixed-effects logit models on the Acquirers Sample. The dependent variable is an indicator
variable equal to one if a given firm is an acquirer in an acquisition during the following year and zero otherwise. In each column, the
comparison group consits only of pseudo-acquirers that were matched by industry/country/year and size to actual acquirers belonging to the
sub-sample corresponding to the given column. The selection of pseudo-acquirers is described in Table 2.2 and text. Panel A reports results
for the level of TFPR in a given year. Panel B reports results for the TFPR Growth between the current and previous year. Explanatory
variables are described in Table 2.5 and text. Robust standard errors (clustered at the match level) are reported in parentheses. ***, **, *
























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 2.8: The Probability of Acquirer-Target Pairing in Between-Industry Acquisitions
(1) (2) (3) (4)
| Acq.(rTFPR) - Targ.(rTFPR) | 0.024   -0.049   -0.074   -0.257   
(0.112)   (0.178)   (0.168)   (0.267)   
| Acq.(rTFPR) - Targ.(rTFPR) | * Vertical Dependenc -6.394*  -9.837*  -6.467*  -11.542** 
(3.708)   (5.346)   (3.659)   (5.181)   
| Acq.(rTFPR) - Targ.(rTFPR) | * Supplier Similarity 0.292   0.817   
(0.340)   (0.527)   
Match Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Additional Acquirer and Target Controls Yes Yes
Deals # 470 348 470 348
Observations # 1660 1130 1660 1130
The table reports coefficient estimates from fixed-effects logit models on a cross-section of across-industry acquisition
in the Matched Acquirer-Target Pairing Sample corresponding to the year before an acquisition event. The dependent
variable is equal to one if a given firm pair is participatingi an actual acquisition during the following year and zero
otherwise. In each column, the comparison group consists only of pseudo-pairs in which both firms were matched by
industry/country/year and size to actual participants in acquisition belonging to the sub-sample corresponding to the
given column. Vertical Dependence is defined in Table 2 and text. Supplier Similarity is calculated as the simple
correlation of the inputs vectors between the acquirer’s and t rget’s industry, where the input vector is defined in the
space of supplying industries on the UK SIC level, and its elem nts are calculated as a share of inputs from the
supplying industry in the total output of the receiving industry. Columns 2 and 4 include additional firm-level controls
as in Tables 2.5 and 2.6 for both Target and Acquirer. Their estimates are not reported. Robust standard errors
(clustered at the match level) are reported in parentheses.***, **, * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels,
respectively.
Table 2.9: Productivity Comparisons of Targets and Their Matches
Diff. T-stat. N. Diff. T-stat. N. Diff. T-stat. N.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
-3 Years -0.038 -1.15 148 0.010 0.27 148 0.009 0.42 392
-2 Years -0.034 -1.11 161 0.013 0.36 157 -0.029 -1.37 439
-1 Year -0.019 -0.69 192 0.009 0.25 174 -0.050 -2.63*** 507
+1 Year -0.027 -0.93 192 0.021 0.60 174 -0.009 -0.44 507
+2 Years -0.022 -0.72 166 0.023 0.63 138 0.018 0.80 415
+3 Years -0.036 -1.01 126 -0.011 -0.28 103 0.024 0.97 305
The table reports within-match differences in performance between actual targets and their corresponding pseudo-targets in the Matched
Targets Sample that is constrained to events completed before 2006; transactions in which the target was targeted in acquisition at most
once during the sample period; and firms for which TFPR is observed at least in 1 year before and 1 year after the acquisition event.
Each row corresponds to a comparison for a year relative to the year of an actual acquisition event. Columns 1-3, 4-6, and 7-9 report
comparisons for unrelated, vertical, and horizontal targets, respectively. For each comparison, column Diff. reports the actual difference
between the TFPR of an actual target and the mean performance of corresponding pseudo targets; column T-stat. reports t-statistics of the 
t-test of the equality of the means; and column N. reports the number of actual targets. ***, **, * denote significance of the t-statistics in
the two-sided t-test of equal means at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
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Table 2.A.1: The Selection of Targets on Productivity
       
       Unrelated Vertical Horizontal Unrelated Vertical Horizontal
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
TFPR -0.116*** -0.018   -0.073*** -0.090*  -0.012   -0.072***
(0.038)   (0.031)   (0.018)   (0.046)   (0.035)   (0.020)   
Log ( TOAS ) 0.023*** 0.008** 0.017*** 0.008   0.007   0.007***
(0.004)   (0.004)   (0.002)   (0.006)   (0.005)   (0.003)   
Cash Flow -0.233   -0.117   -0.203***
(0.145)   (0.130)   (0.059)   
Sales Growth 0.038   -0.055*  -0.020   
(0.050)   (0.033)   (0.018)   
Cash Stock -0.233   -0.117   -0.203***
(0.145)   (0.130)   (0.059)   
Leverage 0.038   -0.055*  -0.020   
(0.055)   (0.045)   (0.023)   
Public Limited Company 0.043   -0.006   0.021** 
(0.026)   (0.020)   (0.011)   
Quoted 0.189   0.144*  0.097   
(0.125)   (0.087)   (0.068)   
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Targets # 484 501 1524 375 391 1177
Obs. 2183 2151 6765 1587 1567 4875
TFPR Growth -0.007   -0.032   -0.084*** 0.044   0.091   -0.086***
(0.076)   (0.064)   (0.032)   (0.084)   (0.076)   (0.033)   
Log ( TOAS ) 0.013*** 0.007** 0.012*** 0.001   0.007   0.003   
(0.004)   (0.003)   (0.002)   (0.005)   (0.005)   (0.002)   
Cash Flow -0.231   -0.154   -0.188***
(0.150)   (0.150)   (0.057)   
Sales Growth -0.007   -0.094** -0.013   
(0.050)   (0.048)   (0.019)   
Cash 0.086   0.054   -0.082*  
(0.101)   (0.100)   (0.043)   
Leverage 0.051   0.040   -0.001   
(0.058)   (0.054)   (0.022)   
Public Limited Company 0.046*  -0.008   0.024** 
(0.027)   (0.024)   (0.010)   
Quoted 0.217   0.199** 0.117*  
(0.133)   (0.097)   (0.066)   
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Targets # 417 427 1310 356 364 1106
Obs. 1784 1749 5533 1479 1423 4485
The table uses same sample, variables, and specifications as in Table 2.5, but reports average marginal effects from logit models. All
specifications include constant, industry and year fixed effects; their estimates are not reported. Robust standard errors (clustered at the
match level) are reported in parentheses. ***, **, * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
Next Year Target in Acquisition:
Panel A: TFPR Level
Panel B: TFPR Growth
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Table 2.A.2: The Selection of Acquirers on Productivity
       
       Unrelated Vertical Horizontal Unrelated Vertical Horizontal
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
TFPR -0.144*** -0.068*  -0.093*** -0.139*** -0.058   -0.058** 
(0.037)   (0.036)   (0.019)   (0.050)   (0.044)   (0.023)   
Log ( TOAS ) 0.034*** 0.030*** 0.034*** 0.013** -0.001   0.013***
(0.004)   (0.005)   (0.002)   (0.006)   (0.007)   (0.003)   
Cash Flow 0.397*  0.486** 0.005   
(0.227)   (0.242)   (0.095)   
Sales Growth 0.018   -0.001   0.096***
(0.041)   (0.052)   (0.026)   
Cash 0.397*  0.486** 0.005   
(0.227)   (0.242)   (0.095)   
Leverage 0.018   -0.001   0.096***
(0.073)   (0.062)   (0.035)   
Public Limited Company 0.050*  -0.043   -0.029*  
(0.029)   (0.030)   (0.015)   
Quoted 0.404*** 0.788*** 0.600***
(0.066)   (0.098)   (0.050)   
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Acquirers # 379 406 1376 313 348 1163
Obs. 1495 1606 5468 1140 1285 4297
TFPR Growth -0.086   0.003   0.009   -0.174*  0.012   -0.010   
(0.061)   (0.073)   (0.034)   (0.100)   (0.094)   (0.050)   
Log ( TOAS ) 0.025*** 0.021*** 0.027*** 0.003   -0.004   0.008** 
(0.003)   (0.004)   (0.002)   (0.006)   (0.007)   (0.003)   
Cash Flow 0.446*  0.367   0.019   
(0.239)   (0.249)   (0.101)   
Sales Growth 0.057   -0.014   0.103***
(0.051)   (0.057)   (0.031)   
Cash -0.015   -0.182   -0.058   
(0.112)   (0.122)   (0.065)   
Leverage -0.081   0.098   -0.095** 
(0.071)   (0.062)   (0.038)   
Public Limited Company 0.042   -0.062** -0.022   
(0.029)   (0.031)   (0.016)   
Quoted 0.421*** 0.745*** 0.621***
(0.066)   (0.098)   (0.058)   
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Acquirers # 327 362 1187 294 328 1066
Obs. 1224 1330 4496 1050 1173 3874
Next Year Acquirer in Acquisition:
Panel A: TFPR Level
Panel B: TFPR Growth
The table uses same sample, variables, and specifications as in Table 2.6, except it reports average marginal effects from logit models. All
specifications include constant, industry and year fixed effects; their estimates are not reported. Robust standard errors (clustered at the














































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































2.B Issues Involved in the TFP Estimation
Apart from the diculty to distinguish the physical TFP due to a lack of rm-level price
data, there are other methodological issues that may arise when estimating the Cobb-
Douglas production function. First, it is likely that productivity shocks unobserved to
the econometrician but observed by the rm are correlated with input choices, which
introduces a simultaneity problem. Additionally, using a balanced panel, as is often the
case in previous productivity studies, results have a selection bias if no allowance is made
for entry and exit. In response to these issues, several alternative estimators have been
proposed in the literature (see Eberhardt and Helmers, 2010 and Van Beveren, 2012
for recent reviews). Among them are traditional approaches to overcome endogeneity
issues such as xed eects, instrumental variables and GMM estimators as well as semi-
parametric approaches based on clearly specied structural assumptions about the timing
of productivity shocks and their propagation into input choices by rms such as Olley and
Pakes (1996) and Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) and their extensions in Ackerberg, Caves,
and Frazer (2006) and De Loecker (2011).
However, as noted by Eberhardt and Helmers (2010), none of these approaches are
without problems. Fixed-eect estimators can only tackle time-invariant endogeneity, and
instrumental variables and GMM estimators are often based on instruments that are either
weak or of questionable validity. Structural approaches are based on a control function
approach, where unobserved productivity shocks are controlled for using functions of rm
state and choice-level variables that are derived from the underlying choice problem of the.
Olley and Pakes (1996) use the assumption that rm investment is strictly monotonic in its
capital and productivity to back-out the unobserved productivity shock from the observed
capital and investments. As such it requires data on capital expenditures which are often
missing in large panels such as Amadeus. Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) try to avoid
this by controlling for productivity shocks using the function of capital and intermediate
inputs, which are often available in the rm-level data. Both these approaches achieve
identication through specic structural assumptions on the timing of a rm's choices of
inputs and their law of motion across periods. The failure of these assumptions can result
115
in the coecients of production function being non-identied. Eberhardt and Helmers
(2010) compare various production function estimators and note that the coecients on
labor and capital vary signicantly across approaches. For example, using the Levinsohn
and Petrin (2003) approach, they estimate coecient on labor to be 0.2, which is too far
from the expected value of around 0.7, to reect the observed share of income accrued to
labor, which is usually about 0.6 to 0.8. In contrast, the Olley and Pakes (1996) procedure
yields a too low capital coecient. Given these concerns, I resort to the simplest estimator
of the production function using ordinary least squares. This choice makes this study
comparable with previous studies on the productivity eects of acquisitions, too.
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Chapter 3
Productivity Gains from Services Liberalization
in Europe1
Abstract
As part of the Single Market Program, the European Commission commanded the
liberalization and regulatory harmonization of utilities, transport and telecommunication
services. This paper investigates whether and how this process aected the productivity of
European network rms. Exploiting the variation in the timing and degree of liberalization
eorts across countries and industries, we nd that liberalization increased rm-level
productivity but had no reallocation impact. Based on our estimates, the average rm-
level productivity gain from liberalization amounts to 38 percent of the average total
within-rm productivity gain in network industries. The results underscore the growth-
promoting role of liberalization eorts.
JEL: D24, K23, L11, L51
Keywords: Productivity, Liberalization, Allocative eciency, Services, Firm-level data
1Earlier versions of this paper have been published in Bena, J., Ondko, P. and Vorvachaki, E. (2011)
Productivity Gains from Services Liberalization in Europe, EERC Working Paper No. 11/15E. and Bena,
J., Ondko, P. and Vorvachaki, E. (2011) Productivity Gains from Services Liberalization in Europe,
CERGE-EI Working Paper Series, 2011, No. 452. Financial support from the Economics Education &
Research Consortium (Grant No. 10-1491) and the Grant Agency of the Czech Republic (GrantNo. P403-
111-2293) is greatly appreciated. We would like to thank Christos Genakos, Christian Fons-Rosen, Stepan
Jurajda, Steve Rivkin, David G. Tarr, Vladimir Vakhitov, Diana Weinhold, all the panels of experts and
participants of EERC workshops, and conference participants at the 2011 Econometric Society European




In advanced economies, services grow continuously in their importance as nal goods and
also as inputs in production.2 In view of their potential to strongly aect economy-wide
performance, the European Commission extended its Single Market Program to services.
In this process, the Commission commanded the liberalization and harmonization of ser-
vices regulation among the EU member countries. The reforms were rst implemented
in network service industries: telecommunications and post, transportation, and utilities.
Such a policy priority stemmed from the fact that network services were highly regulated
and often monopolized in the EU. As services provided by network industries are essential
inputs to other industries, the European Commission envisaged a large scope for gains
throughout the economy from increased competition. While a single market for services
is currently incomplete and subject to active policy debates, the scope for productivity
gains from such regulatory eorts remains largely unknown.
In this paper, we investigate the impact of the European network services liberaliza-
tion on productivity. Specically, we ask: What is the impact of liberalization on the
productivity of European network services rms? Has liberalization improved the alloca-
tion of resources across rms by bringing gains to the production scale of the relatively
more productive rms? What is the quantitative importance of these margins? While
we address important policy questions, we make a relevant contribution to the literature
that examines how competition aects aggregate productivity.
The building blocks of our identication strategy are the following: First, unlike for
other services, the removal of state monopolies and entry barriers for network industries
is mostly complete to date. Second, we rely on measures of liberalization that capture the
compliance of member-country regulations with the European Commission liberalization
commands. Third, we put forward an empirical framework, where we identify the impact
of liberalization on within-industry productivity moments using cross-country variation
2As an illustration, market services in the Eurozone in 1970 accounted for 26% of intermediate pro-
duction and 39% of value added. Their contribution increased to 36% and 50%, respectively, by 2007.
This excludes the community, social and personal services (NACE codes L to Q) that alone account for
20% of total production.
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in the extent and timing of liberalization.3 Importantly, we exploit variation due to the
EU-wide harmonization principle while controlling for latent factors that shape policy or
productivity outcomes.
To address these questions, we use a European rm-level dataset, which spans the
entire liberalization window (19982007). The main ndings highlight that the liber-
alization induced an important increase in rm-level Total Factor Productivity (TFP).
Namely, the within-rm gains from liberalization are quantitatively important as they
amount to 38% of the actual within-rm productivity gains in our sample. Meanwhile,
there is no evidence that the more productive rms grew disproportionately more in size
due to liberalization.
Our ndings show institutions that foster competition are important for achieving high
productivity outcomes. They are consistent with the view that regulatory distortions, like
product market regulations, can distort rm-level decisions concerning investment, em-
ployment and technology (adoption or innovation) and thereby negatively aect rm-level
and aggregate performance. Moreover, our ndings support the view that the presence of
bad regulations across EU members is an impediment for Europe's competitiveness and
future growth (e.g., see the Sapir, Aghion, Bertola, Hellwig, Pisani-Ferry, Rosati, Viñals,
Wallace, Buti, Nava et al., 2004).
In fact, bad product market regulations can have particularly severe productivity
implications in the presence of strong growth opportunities, as was the case with the rapid
diusion of the Information and Communication Technologies (ICT) in the 1990s (e.g., see
Jorgenson, Ho, and Stiroh, 2005). Indeed, the emergence of the new economy triggered
a persistent divergence in aggregate productivity between Europe and the United States
(Van Ark, O'Mahony, and Timmer, 2008). Multiple studies (e.g., Oulton and Srinivasan,
2005; Inklaar, O'Mahony, and Timmer, 2005; Inklaar, Timmer, and Van Ark, 2008) show
that the main driver of Europe's underperformance is the poor productivity growth of
the European distribution, nancial and business services. Importantly, these industries
3The observed variation in policy change is driven by the initial level of regulation in each country
and the policies taken to meet the European command for harmonization of regulations. See also Section
3.4.1
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are fully open to competition in the United States, but remain highly segmented and
regulated in Europe (see Inklaar, Timmer, and Van Ark, 2008 and Arnold, Nicoletti, and
Scarpetta, 2008 for a review).4 In sharp contrast, Europe maintained its competitiveness
in manufacturing and network services during the ICT episode (Inklaar, Timmer, and
Van Ark, 2008). Given that manufacturing was already fully liberalized in Europe by
the early 1990s, and in view of our evidence of strong productivity gains from network
services liberalization in the 1990s, there is an important scope for productivity gains
from extending the EU-wide liberalization program for services.5
Our ndings are in line with the conclusions coming from earlier studies of the produc-
tivity implications of policy-induced liberalizations. In this stream of research, multiple
studies concern a single country (e.g., for the case of trade liberalization in Columbia see
Eslava, Haltiwanger, Kugler, and Kugler, 2009) or a single industry (e.g., for telecommu-
nications in the United States see Olley and Pakes, 1996). As such, they are vulnerable to
concerns regarding the endogeneity of the liberalization policy or the external validity of
the results. Our approach that combines multiple industries and countries reduces these
concerns and makes our evidence a valuable contribution.
Our evidence in support of the growth-promoting role of competition is also consistent
with the insights from studies that look into the impact of competition on productivity
without exploiting specic regulatory reforms. This is the case in Bloom, Draca, and
Van Reenen (2011) who investigate the role of import competition from China for Euro-
pean rms. For a broader sample of countries, Bartelsman, Haltiwanger, and Scarpetta
(2009) relate the cross-country productivity dierences with market distortions that result
in the misallocations of resources across rms.
Finally, it is worth noting that our empirical specication is very dierent from the one
based on neo-Schumpeterian models that features in earlier studies of the within-industry
4In the United States, professional services industries took advantage of the growth opportunities
associated with ICT. Specically, the United States services exhibited strong labor productivity due to
both strong capital deepening, particularly of ICT, and strong TFP growth (e.g., Triplett and Bosworth,
2003; Basu, Fernald, Oulton, and Srinivasan, 2003).
5That more competitive services can foster aggregate economic performance is further supported by
Barone and Cingano (2011), who show for a sample of OECD countries that manufacturing industries
which use services inputs grow faster and more intensively in countries with lower services regulatory
burdens.
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productivity impact of services liberalization in Europe. In this line of research, Nicoletti
and Scarpetta (2003) use industry-level data to investigate the neo-Schumpeterian pre-
diction that industries closer to their technological frontier grow faster in more liberalized
markets. They nd no support that the level of competition in services has a positive
impact on their own productivity growth. In contrast, Inklaar, Timmer, and Van Ark
(2008) nd evidence of such a positive eect, when they restrict their sample to network
services.6 This underscores the limitation in Nicoletti and Scarpetta (2003) that captures
services liberalization using an Input-Output weighted average of measures of restrictive
regulations for all services, independently of whether they are liberalized or not.7 Their
approach introduces a downward bias in their estimate of the impact of liberalization. In
addition, their measure of liberalization is hard to interpret as its variation does not come
from removing regulatory barriers within each specic services industry and is confounded
with the regulatory barriers of other industries.8 To overcome such limitations, we focus
on the productivity impact of industry-level regulatory barriers. We also highlight that
the existence of within-industry dierences in liberalization across countries provides the
necessary variation that allows the identication of dierent sources of productivity gains.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 3.2 summarizes the related theoretical and
empirical literature, Section 3.3 presents our data, Section 3.4 lays out our methodology,
Section 3.5 presents our results and Section 3.6 concerns our robustness checks. Finally,
Section 3.7 concludes.
3.2 Theoretical Considerations and Hypothesis Devel-
opment
The removal of industry distortions, like regulatory entry costs or the abolition of state
monopolies, are expected to increase competition among rms. Models of industry equi-
librium with rm heterogeneity highlight that such a liberalization policy would aect
6See also Boylaud and Nicoletti (2000) for telecommunications alone.
7A similar argument is discussed in Inklaar, Timmer, and Van Ark (2008).
8Similar arguments apply to Arnold, Nicoletti, and Scarpetta (2008), who estimate the within-rm
productivity gains from liberalization.
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industry productivity through three distinct channels: rst, the within-rm productivity
growth for the continuing rms in the industry that corresponds to the intensive margin
of aggregate productivity; second, the within-industry productivity growth across rms'
reallocation of resources, e.g., labor and output shares; and third, the selection mecha-
nism, meaning the entry and exit decisions of rms. The latter two channels correspond
to the extensive margin of aggregate productivity growth. Even though theory is clear
about the impact of the margins of competition on aggregate productivity, it bears mostly
confounded predictions regarding their direction.
In particular, there are ambiguous theoretical predictions regarding the ultimate di-
rection of the within-rm growth channel. This is because higher competition can aect
rm-growth in a number of ways that can go in opposite directions. First, continuing rms
decide to expand their production capacity via physical investment. Alesina, Ardagna,
Nicoletti, and Schiantarelli (2005) show that high competition results in lower prot mar-
gins and thus lowers the shadow price of capital, which increases the rm's investment
rate. However, this result is challenged in the presence of formerly government-backed
monopolies that tend to have ineciently large production capacity.9
Second, competition impacts the TFP of incumbents because it aects incentives to
adopt new technologies or innovate. Acemoglu, Aghion, and Zilibotti (2006) show that
for rms that are away from their industry's technological frontier, it is optimal not to
innovate but instead adopt the best-practice technologies. For such technologically lag-
gard rms, competition creates stronger incentives to invest in the adoption of frontier
technologies (see Parente and Prescott, 1994). To the contrary, for rms that are close to
their industry technology frontier, competition bears a non-linear eect on their innova-
tion decisions and thereby growth (Aghion, Howitt, and García-Peñalosa, 1998; Aghion,
Bloom, Blundell, Grith, and Howitt, 2005).
In particular, the neo-Schumpeterian models highlight that innovation incentives are
driven by the dierence between pre-innovation and post-innovation rents. If compe-
tition reduces pre-innovation rents, it increases the incremental payo from innovation
9Similarly, theory does not provide clear guidance regarding what to expect from the impact of com-
petition on the capital intensity (capital-labor ratios) of rms.
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and encourages innovation as a means of escaping competition. In contrast, if com-
petition reduces post-innovation rents, it discourages innovation through the standard
Schumpeterian eect. These imply an inverse-U relationship between competition and
innovation activity within an industry, i.e., increased competition would have a positive
impact on industry innovation only for low levels of initial competition. The results fur-
ther highlight that the peak of the inverse-U relationship will occur at a higher degree of
competition level in more neck-and-neck industries, i.e., where rms already compete
closely. Therefore, removing entry barriers in industries with very low or no competition
is expected to cause higher innovation and thereby growth. The eect should be higher
the more increased competition reduces pre-innovation rents.
An additional explanation why competition can foster within-rm productivity is pro-
vided by the trapped factors hypothesis of Bloom, Romer, and Van Reenen (2010). The
trapped factors refer to inputs, like human capital skills, that are highly rm-specic.
When a rm faces higher competition in producing low-tech products, then the opportu-
nity cost of its trapped factors falls. As a result, when the incumbent rms can innovate
more easily than their competitors, then they have an incentive to reallocate teir factors
toward innovation and the production of high-tech goods.
Finally, rms can grow due to an improvement in their managerial quality.10 The
impact of competition on managerial incentives is ambiguous in environments featuring
asymmetric information/moral hazard problems (see Nickell, 1996, for a review). On the
one hand, competition can increase managerial eort and reduce slackness, either by in-
creasing the threat of rm liquidation or by an improvement in the quality of the manager's
monitoring. The latter is due to the fact that competitors' performances oer owners ad-
ditional sources of information for aggregate productivity shocks. On the other hand,
managerial incentives worsen if managerial compensation packages are aligned to rm
prots that are eroded by competition (see Vickers, 1995). Schmidt (1997) consolidates
these opposing eects of competition to show that starting from the state of monopoly,
there is a U-shaped eect of higher competition on managerial slackness. If managerial
10See Bloom and Van Reenen (2007) regarding the importance of managerial practices for rm-level
productivity.
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slackness results in lower productivity, this suggests a nonlinear eect of liberalization on
rms with initially dierent levels of productivity.
A heterogeneous eect of liberalization across rms could be also driven by regulations
that are explicitly tied to rm size or by aggregate regulations that can have asymmetric
eects across rms in the presence of additional market frictions, like those relating to
capital or labor inputs (e.g., see Guner, Ventura, and Xu, 2008). For example Beck,
Demirguc-Kunt, and Maksimovic (2005) provide evidence that industries with a higher
share of very small rms in the United States grow faster in countries with more developed
nancial systems, suggesting that small rms face higher constraints in obtaining external
nancing.
Turning to the remaining margins of industry productivity, it is worth noting that in a
frictionless environment, in the spirit of Lucas (1978), rm size should be perfectly corre-
lated to rm productivity. Thus, any deviations from the optimal allocation of resources
across productive units due to regulatory costs would distort aggregate productivity down-
wards.11 Indeed, a reduction of entry costs in static models of industry equilibrium with
heterogeneous rms implies a positive within-industry reallocation of resources across
rms (see Melitz, 2003; Melitz and Ottaviano, 2008). This is because as a response to the
lower entry costs there is increased rm entry, so that a higher number of rms compete
in the market. This results in lower average markups and prots, so that the productivity
cut-o for surviving in the industry increases in the long-run. In other words, increased
competition induces the least productive rms to exit and shifts resources towards the
most ecient rms in the market. As a result, industry productivity increases.
While the selection margin is clearly predicted to contribute positively to industry
productivity in the long run, this is not necessarily the case in the short run. The transi-
tion dynamics of the Melitz (2003) model suggest that in the short run, the productivity
of the entering rms is lower than before the removal of entry barriers as the rms that
11There is a large and growing literature that attributes low aggregate productivity to dierences in
the misallocation of resources within/across rms (see Banerjee and Duo, 2005). This line of research
highlights the role of aggregate or rm-specic, policy-driven distortions in creating the scope for such mis-
allocations, particularly in environments with rm-heterogeneity in productivity (e.g., Hsieh and Klenow,
2010; Bartelsman, Haltiwanger, and Scarpetta, 2009; Guner, Ventura, and Xu, 2008; and Restuccia and
Rogerson, 2008)
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enter initially are the marginal ones that were previously deterred (a similar argument
is featured in Branstetter, Lima, Taylor, and Venancio, 2010). At the same time, there
are dynamic models of industry equilibrium, like vintage capital or neo-Schumpeterian
models, where it is shown that entrants have the strongest incentives to be on the techno-
logical frontier. All this discussion suggests that the role of selection is open to empirical
investigation.
To summarize the testable predictions derived from theory: Competition can aect
within-rm productivity outcomes, but the predicted direction of its eect is not clear.
Moreover, higher competition is predicted to induce the more productive rms to grow in
size and enjoy higher market shares. The number of both entrants and rms in an industry
are expected to go up while there are ambiguous predictions about their productivity
identity compared to the average rm in the liberalized industry.
We are able to investigate the direction of the within-rm productivity impact of
liberalization and test the hypothesis of the positive reallocation of resources. Due to our
data limitations that are illustrated in the following section, we are not able to investigate
selection through exit and entry at a reasonable level of precision.
3.3 Data and Sample
3.3.1 The OECD measure of product market regulation in net-
work services: The ETCR
Starting from 2001, the OECD produces indicators of product market regulation  the
ETCR indexes  for network services: telecommunications and post, railways, road
freight, airlines, electricity and gas. The industry-level indicators are broadly available
for 21 OECD countries and cover the period 19752007. Details about the construction
of these indexes are in Conway and Nicoletti (2006).12
The ETCR index for each industry is a quantitative measure that ranges between 0
12For detailed documentation and recent data updates, see the OECD webpage:
http://www.oecd.org/document/36/0,3343,en_2649_34323_35790244_1_1_1_1,00.html.
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and 6, reecting increasing restrictiveness of regulatory provisions to competition. The
construction of the industry-level ETCR indexes is based on two principles. First, the
regulations in each industry-country are judged in terms of their restrictiveness only in
areas where the regulation theory and technological features suggest that there is scope
for market competition. Therefore, an industry ETCR index does not judge regulatory
outcomes in cases of natural monopolies, i.e., large economies of scale. This principle is
particularly important for the network services that are the subject of our study. Second,
the industry-level ETCR indices are constructed on the basis of qualitative information
in the Regulatory Indicators Questionnaire provided by national governments (1998, 2003
and 2008) and complemented by the OECD and other international organizations data.
Hence, these indicators are, in spirit, fully objective measures of competition that aim to
capture the stance of the regulatory environment in a given country-industry with respect
to promoting market competition. This makes the measures of restrictive regulations we
use robust to any bias related to local market conditions and the stage of the business
cycle.13
Finally, the ETCR indexes cover a number of regulatory areas summarized using more
disaggregated indexes of product market regulation. The regulatory areas for network ser-
vices are barriers to entry, public ownership, price controls, market structure and vertical
integration. The industry-specic indicators dier in terms of which regulatory areas are
covered, and they are summarized in Table 3.A.1 of the Appendix. This cross-industry
variation reects the relevance of each regulatory area for a particular industry. In this
regard, it is worth noting that regulatory barriers to entry and public ownership are the
two areas universally covered. The areas of market structure and vertical integration are
meant to capture the enforcement or eectiveness of the regulations as they reect the
dimensions of the actual industry competition stance.
We summarize the information on product market liberalization for each industry-
country at two levels. First, we use the Index of Overall Liberalization (IOL) that
13Such a bias is a concern in the case of subjective competition measures that are based on individual
responses to surveys. For a detailed discussion of the relevant advantages of the objective measures see
Nicoletti and Pryor (2006).
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includes information on barriers to entry and public ownership only. We leave out the
lower-level indexes that capture market structure and vertical integration because they
are prone to be contaminated by factors that are endogenous to drivers of industry-
performance. Second, we employ the Index of Entry Liberalization (IEL) that concerns
entry regulation exclusively. We examine in isolation the role of entry regulations because
they refer solely to the de jure elements of the regulatory environment. In contrast, the
information in IOL regarding state ownership share is indicative of incumbent market
power and eective barriers to entry, and as such it captures also de facto elements of
the competition environment. To ease the interpretation of the results of our empirical
investigation, we measure both indices on a scale of 0 to 6, where 6 corresponds to the
most liberalized marked and 0 to the most regulated market.
To facilitate the intuition for how a unit-change in IOL maps onto changes in the
regulatory environment of the industry, consider the following hypothetical scenario for
the case of telecommunications. Assume that the industry started with the highest degree
of regulatory barriers and presence of monopoly: IOL score 0. A one-unit improvement
for such a telecommunications industry would require that legal conditions of entry into
the trunk, international and mobile telephony changed from franchised to 1 rm to
franchised to 2 or more rms. A full removal of entry barriers, i.e., a change in such
legal conditions to free entry, would cause a six-unit change in IEL but a three-unit
change in IOL. Thus, IOL can increase by more than three units only if the removal of
entry barriers is accompanied by a reduction in the percentage of public ownership of
shares of the largest rm in the mobile telecommunications sector and in the public
telecommunication operator by at least 50% of their initial level on average.14
3.3.2 Firm-level data
In order to track the contributions of individual producers to the dynamics of the pro-
ductivity of an industry, we use Amadeus, a Europeanwide, rm-level dataset. It is
14The average four-year change in IOL amounts to 0.66 points in our sample. The IOL is an equal-
weights' average of public ownership and entry sub-indices, for which the average four-year change is 0.95
and 0.39, respectively. Thus, more than two-thirds of the observed change in IOL is driven by the change
in the entry sub-index.
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compiled by Bureau Van Dijk (BvD) by harmonizing companies' annual reports obtained
from various European vendors. The key advantage of Amadeus for our purpose is that
it covers both public and private companies of all size categories across all industries for
most countries.
Amadeus is available in multiple updates that add information over time. Every
update contains a snapshot of the currently active population of rms as well as up to the
10 most recent years of rms' nancial data (if available). Also, a given rm is present in
Amadeus as long as it provides its nancial statements; however, it is kept in the database
only for four years after its last ling. For example, a rm that les a nancial statement
in 2002 but stops ling in 2003 remains in the database until 2006. In 2007, the rm is
dropped from the sample and all year entries of the rm are taken out of the Amadeus
database. Given this feature of Amadeus, we construct our dataset by combining several
updates, specically DVD updates from May 2002 and May 2004 together with updates
downloaded from WRDS in July 2007, April 2008, August 2009 and February 2010. This
procedure allows us to add back observations for rms that are not present in more recent
updates. The key advantages of this procedure are: it eliminates the survivor bias inherent
in a single update of data and it extends rms' historical accounting data beyond the most
recent 10 years.
We use also the EU KLEMS database in order to obtain country-sector specic output
and intermediate input deators with the base year being 1995. EU KLEMS uses the
two/three digit NACE rev. 1.1., which is broader than the classication of industries in
this study. For this reason, we need to use the same aggregate deator for all industries
within a given EU KLEMS two/three digit sector. The correspondence between the EU
KLEMS sectors and the network industries for which the OECD reports ETCR indexes
is summarized in Table 3.A.2 of the Appendix.
3.3.3 Final sample
To construct our nal sample from Amadeus, we rst select all rm-year observations
in the industries of interest for which the values of revenues, xed assets, material costs
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and employment variables are not missing. When the total wage bill is available, but
employment is missing, we impute employment as the ratio of the total wage bill over
the average wage of the corresponding industry. The latter is estimated as the simple
average of wages calculated over rms in the same industry-year that report both the
total wage bill and employment. Next, we drop all observations of rms with less than
20 employees since their reported information is often missing or likely unreliable. Then,
we drop observations in the top percentile of employment and revenues distribution as it
is likely that these correspond to conglomerates operating over many markets that could
bias our results. Last, we drop the Netherlands, Luxemburg and Slovakia, countries for
which there are too few observations.
Table 3.1 reports the descriptive statistics for value added per employee, employment
and IOL for our nal unbalanced sample that spans 6 network services industries over
the period 19982007. There is substantial cross-sectional variation in labor productivity
and employment for the median rm in our sample. Labor productivity is the highest
for the median rms in France, Germany and Austria, with Sweden following closely.
The bottom end of labor productivity features the former transition countries (the Czech
Republic, Hungary and Poland). Countries dier also in terms of the level of restrictive
regulations in their network industries in 1998: France and Italy, together with the group
of former transition countries, are among those with the most restrictive regulations in
1998. By 2007, however, the regulatory environments of EU countries had converged.
Indeed, Table 3.2 shows countries that started as the most restrictive are the ones that
experienced stronger liberalization over the sample period. The group of highly liberalized
industries involves telecommunications, gas and electricity services. In contrast, post and
railways are among the least deregulated industries.
Table 3.3 reports the descriptive statistics across industries in our sample. Airlines,
electricity and gas services have the highest median labor productivity presumably because
of the high capital intensity of these industries. The median rm size appears to be more
balanced across industries, and it is the highest in the transportation industries, airlines
and railways. The electricity industry is the one most represented in our sample.
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3.4 Methodology
3.4.1 Identication strategy: The European Union legal frame-
work for services liberalization
The crucial assumption for the identication of the eect of liberalization on productivity
is that the EU-wide regulations aimed at liberalization are not driven by local market
and growth conditions. This is ensured by the EU legal structure. In particular, all
liberalization policies that are part of the EU's Single Market Program are based on a
series of Directives that are approved by majority voting in the European Parliament.
Directives set out the objectives and the timeframe of reforms. Such reforms are based on
the need to ensure European-level outcomes and are thus independent of country-specic
circumstances. In response to the EU Directives, member countries design their own
policies to fulll the reform goals by the set deadline.
Services Directives concern reforms to liberalize and harmonize regulatory frameworks
for services among European Union members. They timely followed the liberalization of
manufacturing industries in the 1990s and were largely viewed as a further step towards
the fulllment of the goals of the 1993 Single Market Program for goods.15 Services
liberalization is consistent with the European Common Market key goal to establish a
single market for goods and services by the removal of physical and regulatory barriers.
The ultimate goal is to ensure competitiveness and sound long-run growth prospects for
Europe. In this process, the European Commission prioritized the liberalization of net-
work services because of their key importance as inputs for manufacturing. An additional
driver for the case of telecommunications was the strong growth opportunities envisaged
in relation to ICT. It is worth highlighting that the removal of entry barriers for services
is particularly important for ensuring competition in such markets. This is because they
are largely non-tradable and, as such, there is a limited scope for increased competition
via imports.
Therefore, in view of the features of EU-wide regulations outlined above, we can ar-
15This is because of evidence that performance in manufacturing can be constrained by services per-
formance (see Raa and Wol, 2001).
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gue that industry-specic liberalization reforms during the liberalization windows of the
Directives are not initiated based on industry-country specic conditions and productiv-
ity prospects. The increasing compliance of countries to the EU Directives for network
services liberalization is summarized in Figure 3.1. In our data, there are both a positive
IOL trend across EU member countries as well as indications of shrinking cross-sectional
variance. The developments of the median IOL reect market developments in the elec-
tricity industry, which is the median industry in our sample. There, the rst and second
EU Electricity Market Directives were issued in 1996 and 2003 respectively, with a trans-
position deadline in 2007. A detailed exposition by industry and country is oered by
Figure 3.2 (complemented by Table 3.2).
Our approach is potentially vulnerable to skepticism regarding whether dierences in
the degree and timing of compliance across countries/industries are driven themselves
by local market or growth conditions. For instance, related to the implementation of
Electricity Directives, Jamasb and Pollitt (2005) explain the poor performance of Spain
and Italy, arguing that regulators appeared weak in the face of established incumbent
company interests (p. 17; see also benchmarking reports by the EU). We address such
concerns in Section 3.5.2 appealing explicitly to the harmonization principle.
3.4.2 Measures of productivity
To investigate the impact of liberalization on productivity, we estimate rm-level Revenue
Total Factor Productivity (TFPR) that captures the eciency of a rm in generating
sales using its inputs and the industry-specic technology. We recover three measures
of TFPR: the logarithm of revenue total factor productivity estimated by ordinary least
squares (TFPR OLS), the logarithm of revenue total factor productivity estimated by
Levinson and Petrin (TFPR LP), and the Wooldridge-Levinsohn-Petrin (TFPR W-LP)
estimator.
To estimate all measures of TFPR, we use deated sales as a measure of output, mate-
rial inputs measured as material costs deated by the intermediate inputs deator, capital
approximated by the book value of xed assets, and labor measured by the number of
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employees in a rm. Assuming an industry-specic logarithmic Cobb-Douglas produc-
tion function in capital, labor and materials, TFPR is calculated as the residual of the
estimated industry production function.
There are potential sources of bias when estimating the production function. The
unobserved productivity shocks known to a rm are likely to contemporaneously aect its
input choice, which introduces a simultaneity bias to the estimated parameters of the
industry-specic production function.16 This suggests that when the production function
parameters are estimated using OLS, the estimates are subject to a positive bias. This is
particularly the case for the estimated parameters on exible inputs, such as materials.
To deal with the simultaneity bias, a number of alternative estimators have been proposed
in the literature (see Eberhardt and Helmers, 2010 for a recent review). The most popular
estimators are those by Olley and Pakes (1996) and Levinsohn and Petrin (2003). The
Olley and Pakes (1996) estimator is based on a set of structural assumptions about the
timing of a rm's input choices and their law of motion over time, as well as on the
assumption concerning the rm's productivity process. Specically, this approach assumes
that capital takes (a one-period) time-to-build and that productivity follows a rst-
order Markov process. In this setting, investment is strictly monotonic in the rm's
capital and productivity. Inverting this relationship allows controlling for the unobserved
productivity shock using a general function of the observed capital and investment of the
rm. As such, this estimation method requires data on capital expenditures, which are
not reported in Amadeus. The Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) estimator is based on similar
structural assumptions but is less demanding on data information. Productivity shocks
are controlled for using a function of capital and intermediate inputs, which are available
in our rm-level data. Using intermediate inputs to proxy for unobserved productivity
shocks avoids the imputation of capital expenditures series from the stock of capital.17
Thus, as the second measure of TFPR, we use the one estimated using the Levinsohn and
Petrin (2003) approach, and we label it `TFPR LP'.
16Additionally, using a balanced panel can introduce selection bias if there is no allowance for entry
and exit. As discussed earlier, our sample does not suer from such a bias by construction.
17Moreover, compared to Olley and Pakes (1996), using the Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) method is a
way to avoid dropping observations with zero investment and thus utilize the full sample.
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To the extent that there is collinearity between labor and the non-parametric function
of capital and materials that proxy for the unobserved productivity shock, the Levinsohn
and Petrin (2003) estimator may fail to identify the production function parameters of the
variable inputs.18 For this reason, we also estimate rm productivity using the one-step
GMM formulation of the Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) estimator proposed by Wooldridge
(2009) that is robust to this potential bias. In addition, the GMM framework provides
eciency gains and allows us to recover robust standard errors. In our application, we use
a formulation in which unobserved productivity shocks are approximated by a 3rd-order
polynomial in material spending and capital. Following De Loecker (2011), we estimate
an industry-specic, value-added production function in order to ensure the identication
of the perfectly variable material input. The double-deated value added is calculated
as deated revenues minus deated materials, obtained using the appropriate industry
deators. The resulting productivity measure is labeled `TFPR W-LP'.
As a nal note, since Amadeus lacks rm-level information about prices, our estimates
of production function parameters are potentially subject to an omitted prices bias. If
there is a correlation between inputs and the rm-level price deviation from the industry-
level price index, Klette and Griliches (1996) show that the omitted prices translate into
a negative bias of the estimated scale elasticity. This suggests that any TFPR measure
would deviate from physical productivity due to price dispersion and the bias in the scale
elasticity. This implies that, when we are interested in estimating the impact of liber-
alization on rm-level productivity, the estimates confound the impact of liberalization
on the actual rm-level physical productivity with its impact on the dispersion of prices
across rms and demand conditions.
The solution proposed by De Loecker (2011) for this bias is the structural estimation
of the production function, while conditioning for shifts in the CES-based rm residual
demand. His identication of the demand parameters relies on the dierences in varia-
tion in aggregate-level (segment/industry) output and rm-level (product) demand shifts
18The collinearity is due to the fact that, as an optimally chosen input, labor is likely to also be a
deterministic function of the unobserved productivity and capital (see Ackerberg, Caves, and Frazer,
2006, for a detailed discussion).
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stemming from policy change, in his case tari liberalization. To disentangle the eect
of policy change on productivity from that on demand conditions, he further assumes
that a policy change shifts the rm-level residual demand instantaneously, and it aects
rm-level productivity only with a lag. His strategy is not applicable in our setting since
our liberalization index (IOL or EOL) does not vary at the rm level but only at the
country/industry level.
In this context, it is worth noting that if European network services liberalization was
successful in increasing competition, then average prices (mark-ups) and their dispersion
would fall over time. This, in turn, suggests that our estimates would tend to underesti-
mate the productivity impact of liberalization (a similar argument is found in Syverson,
2011). In an attempt to explore the importance of this bias for our baseline regressions,
we have examined the relation between liberalization and rm-level, price-cost margins
in our sample.19 We nd no systematic relation between them, which is in line with the
existing evidence regarding the absence of the impact of European networks liberaliza-
tion on prices and their dispersion (see Fiorio and Florio, 2009 and the review therein).20
Overall, this evidence suggests that there is no systematic bias coming from mark-up and
price dynamics. Therefore, mark-up and price dynamics could only introduce pure noise
in our TFPR measures, and our estimates could be, if anything, downward biased.
As a further way to check the robustness of our results to using alternative productivity
measures, we also report results for labor productivity measured by the logarithm of value
added per employee (ln(Va/Empl)). Table 3.A.3 shows the correlations between dierent
measures of productivity in our sample. The correlations are reasonably high even though
the ones between TFPR OLS and other productivity measures are lower.
19We approximate price-cost margins by the earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amorti-
zation divided by sales, following Aghion et al. (2005). The regressions of price-cost margins on IOL are
available upon request.
20A number of European Commission evaluations are available at:
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_nance/structural_reforms/product/network_industries/index_en.htm.
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3.4.3 Within-rm productivity change of incumbents
To explore the within-rm productivity gains from the network services liberalization, we
investigate the relationship between the rm-level productivity growth and liberalization
in the rm's industry. We account for time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity at the
country/industry level by means of controlling for country and industry xed eects.
The xed-eects and rst-dierences models can often lead to an attenuation bias.
This is particularly the case in settings where the exogenous variable of interest is highly
auto-correlated and where outcomes are expected to respond to changes in conditions over
a longer period of time. This is because even when the exogenous variable of interest is
precisely measured, its variation over short time periods may only poorly approximate the
incentives of rms to adjust their productivity. Thus, rst dierencing eliminates most of
the useful information about true incentives to adjust and results in inconsistent estimates
(see McKinnish, 2008). This is a potential issue in our setting since we estimate the
productivity response of rms to changes in regulatory policy that is highly correlated in
time. In our sample, the autocorrelation of the liberalization index is 0.73.21 We therefore
follow the literature and use instead a long-dierences estimator that tackles this source
of bias.
Formally, our baseline regression model can be stated as:
∆pfcit = β∆Libcit +Xcit + εfcit, (3.1)
where ∆ denotes the long-dierence operator, which corresponds to four-year dier-
ences in our baseline specication;22 fcit is the index of observation for rm f in country
c, industry i and year t; pfcit is a rm-level productivity measure and Libcit is the index
of liberalization in country-industry-year, IOL or IEL. Finally, the vector Xcit denotes a
set of country/industry/year controls.23
21Calculated by regressing the liberalization index on rm xed eects and applying the Baltagi and
Wu (1999) procedure for testing for the autocorrelation of residuals in unbalanced panel data.
22The exact choice of the number of years is subject to a trade-o between the attenuation bias resulting
from using a too-short period and a reduction in sample size resulting from a too-long period. We obtain
similar results when using 3- or 5-year dierences.
23The set of included controls Xcit corresponds to already dierenced variables.
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In order to control for country-specic aggregate trends and shocks, such as the catch-
up process of the new member states or the dierent timing of country-specic reforms
and nancial conditions, Xcit includes the full set of country-year xed eects λct. Fur-
thermore, including λct mitigates worries that our estimates are aected by the spillovers
from other reforms that are simultaneous to the network services liberalization of a given
industry, which would be a concern if countries were implementing reforms in the form of
reform packages.
Vector Xcit contains the full set of industry xed eects λi capturing dierences in
industry-specic average trends. If the liberalization eorts were correlated with unob-
served industry-specic global growth opportunities in the cross-section, our estimate of
β would be biased upwards. Thus, in the model, which includes country-year and in-
dustry xed eects, the coecient of interest is identied from the dierent timing and
magnitude of the liberalization across countries within the same industry.
In an alternative specication, we control for unobserved dierences in country-industry
specic trends by replacing industry xed eects λi with the full set of country-industry
xed eects λci. The country-industry xed eects absorb all dierences in the average
trend of productivity at the country-industry level. Therefore, their inclusion consid-
erably reduces the variation that can be used for the identication of β. Notably, if
the pace of the liberalization were constant over the whole sample period in any given
country-industry cluster, the coecient β would not be identied.
Finally, we extend the specication by including industry-year xed eects λit. Con-
trolling for λit mitigates concerns that the timing and scope of the liberalization by local
authorities might be aected by industry-wide global productivity shocks (common across
all countries).
Taken together, in our preferred specication, we control for country-industry xed
eects λci, country-year shocks λct and industry-year shocks λit. Thus, given the use of
the four-year dierences estimator, β is identied only from dierences in the dynamics of
productivity change in periods of signicant liberalization and periods of low liberalization
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while controlling for country-specic and industry-specic shocks.24
3.4.4 The reallocation of market share between incumbents
To explore the reallocation channel, we investigate the dierences in the employment
growth of rms in the same industry that dier in their lagged productivity.25 As dis-
cussed in Section 3.2, the theory predicts liberalization that strengthens competition
causes inecient rms to shrink and allows the more ecient rms to increase in size
relative to the average rm in the industry.
To test this prediction, we estimate the four-year-dierences model of employment
growth of the form:
∆emplfcit = α∆Libcit + β∆Libcit × pfict−4 + γpfict−4 +Xcit + εfcit, (3.2)
where ∆emplfcit stands for the change in employment between year t and year t−4. If
the liberalization has a positive eect on aggregate productivity through the reallocation
channel, we would expect coecient β to be positive, indicating that the employment of
productive rms is increasing disproportionally more than the employment of relatively
less productive rms.
As in the case of specication (3.1), Xcit includes country-year, industry-year and
country-industry xed eects in order to control for country and industry shocks and
country-industry average trends. The sources of identication are the same as in the case
of specication (3.1).
24 We assume an intra-class correlation of rm productivities within country/industry groups and thus,
in all specications, the standard errors are estimated by clustering on this level.
25We focus on reallocation in terms of variable inputs as output/revenues shares would become vaguely
dened in increasingly integrated European markets. In this way, we also make our results directly com-
parable with earlier studies regarding the reallocation impact of increased competition (e.g., Bartelsman,
Haltiwanger, and Scarpetta, 2009). Besides, employment growth features among the key policy objectives




We present our main estimation results concerning the impact of liberalization on within-
rm TFP productivity and cross-rm allocation of resources.
Table 3.4 presents the results on the impact of liberalization on the four-year average
TFP change at the rm level. Panel A presents the results of regressions for the four-year
change in IOL, and Panel B presents analogous results for the four-year change in IEL.
As discussed in detail in Section 3.3.1, the former is expected to capture more features of
the state of market competition that incumbents face. The dependent variable in columns
(1)-(4) of both panels is our baseline LP-based estimate of TFPR. Columns (5)-(7) report
the estimates using, respectively, the TFPR W-LP, the TFPR OLS, and real value added
per employee (see Section 3.4.2 for details).
The within-rm specication in column (1) of Panel A regresses the average rm TFP-
growth on the change of the liberalization index while using country-year xed eects
that capture country-level macro shocks. This points to a 6.3% increase in within-rm
productivity due to a one-unit change in IOL. The regression in column (2) adds industry
xed-eects to control for potential bias driven by a positive correlation between industry-
specic trend growth and liberalization. Indeed, the estimate reduces in magnitude and
is estimated more precisely. Column (3) controls for country-industry trends instead of
industry ones. In this case, the coecient of interest is identied by the cross-country
time variation in the liberalization of a given industry and rm productivity outcomes.
This corrects for any positive bias from the dierential long-term growth opportunities of
the same industry across countries, due to, for example, dierences in countries' industrial
structure. Consistent with this intuition, the estimate reduces further in column (3).
In column (4), we add industry-year xed eects that control for any policy and/or
technology related shocks that are common across rms operating in the same industry.
As a result, the coecient of interest now increases to 6.4%, suggesting a negative bias
in the estimates of columns (1)-(3) that only partially correct for industry-specic time-
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varying factors. The suggested negative correlation between our liberalization measure
and industry-year xed eects could be due to the fact that policy makers are more willing
to carry out liberalization measures when the industry is hit by negative technological
shocks. It may also capture increased foreign competition driven by overall European-
wide liberalization. As a means of robustness checking, columns (5) through (7) repeat
the regression of column (4) for our alternative measures of productivity.
Turning to Panel B of Table 3.4, the estimates overall conrm the presence of within-
rm TFP gains from entry liberalization. In contrast to the results in Panel A for changes
in IOL, the estimates are uniformly lower (on the order of 2.4% for a unit-change of the
index; see column (4)) and broadly weaker in signicance. The dierences in estimates
between the two panels across the same specications are due to the dierence in the
source and degree of variation between IOL and IEL. As discussed in Section 3.3.1, this
dierence is arguably driven by dierent information that these indexes include and by
the fact that IEL captures one particular aspect of competition that aects incumbent
rms only indirectly.
The evidence of strong within-rm TFP gains in Table 3.4 raises the question whether
the initially high-TFP rms also expanded in size in response to the liberalization. As
discussed in Section 3.2, the theory predicts that liberalization should improve productiv-
ity by improving the allocation of resources across rms in the industry. This would show
up as a stronger correlation between size and productivity across rms in the industry.
However, the results we present in Table 3.5, across all specications in columns (1)-(7),
entail no compelling evidence that such a positive reallocation was underway.26
To summarize, the results support the presence of within-rm, four-year productivity
gains from the liberalization that are on average 5.5%. Assuming that our linear speci-
cation is a valid description of all potential liberalization events, our results suggest that a
26We have also investigated the cross-sectional relationship between allocative eciency and the lib-
eralization index. Using the cross-sectional decomposition of Olley and Pakes (1996), the industry pro-
ductivity at any point in time can be decomposed into two terms: 1) the simple average of rm-level
productivity and 2) the covariance between market shares and productivity. The latter term is a simple
proxy for allocative eciency. Using our sample, we calculated the average OP covariance term for every
country/industry and regressed it on the liberalization index while controlling for industry and country
xed eects. The results show no systematic relationship between IOL and the OP covariance term.
These regressions are available upon request.
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change in IOL score from 0 to 6, e.g., full liberalization in four years, would be associated
with 33% within-rm productivity gains. To get more intuition about the quantitative
importance of our estimates, we examine the percentage of total actual within-rm pro-
ductivity change that is explained by the liberalization in our data. To this end, we treat
each rm in our sample as part of an aggregate network services industry, which is de-
ned by all the rms in our sample. We predict the four-year, within-rm productivity
change based on our estimated coecient of interest and on the change in IOL in the
respective country-industry where a rm operates. Then, we take a weighted average of
the predicted within-rm productivity change, where each rm is weighted by its initial
employment share out of total employment in our sample. The predicted within-rm pro-
ductivity growth amounts to 5.2% on average over our sample period. In a similar way,
we nd that the weighted average of the actual realized within-rm productivity growth
in our sample is on average 13.5%. Therefore, up to 38% of the within-rm productivity
gains of European network services in our sample can be explained by liberalization. This
calculation underscores that the EU-wide liberalization eorts can be important drivers
of aggregate productivity outcomes.
3.5.2 Endogeneity of the liberalization
In this section, we address the concern that the European network services liberalization
policies are not exogenous to productivity shocks of rms operating in the liberalized
industries. This concern is relevant because the actual implementation of the reforms
adopted at the EU-level is left to national governments. In our empirical framework, by
taking long dierences over the liberalization index and controlling for country-industry
xed eects, as well as for country- and industry-year xed eects, we account for the
role of any politico-economic factors with such sources of variation.
Therefore, we are left to correct for any remaining factors varying at the country-
industry-year level that are related to local policy choices that determine the degree and
timing of liberalization. As an example, national governments may prefer to minimize the
political costs of liberalization and choose to liberalize more and/or earlier the industries
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with weaker expected growth prospects. In this case, due to the negative selection of
industries into the liberalization, we would underestimate the eect of liberalization on
rm-level TFP. Furthermore, the liberalization policy could be driven by time-varying
local industry factors relevant for rm-level productivity such as monopoly power or strong
labor unions that relate to the political costs/benets from liberalization. To the extent
that our baseline specication does not explicitly control for such factors, the resulting
omitted-variables problem may bias our coecient of interest.
For these reasons, we investigate whether the observed changes in IOL are correlated
with initial industrial characteristics that relate to the political costs/benets of the liber-
alization.27 The characteristics we consider are the number of rms and the median rm
size. These act as a proxy for monopoly power and industry concentration and thereby
the scope for the existence of a strong business lobby. Total industry sales proxy for the
importance of the industry in the economy. Total employment and the average wage in
the industry proxy for the magnitude of political costs that arise from labor unions op-
posing competition due to the fear of job or wage losses. Finally, the average productivity
of the industry proxies for the growth prospects, for example, due to catch-up.28
The results are presented in Table 3.6. In each cell of Panel A, we report the estimated
coecient from the regression of the average four-year change of the liberalization index
(IOL) on the industry characteristic in the respective column. The value of industry
characteristics is taken as of the beginning of the sample period. In all cases, we control
for country and industry xed eects. In a similar way, in Panel B, we check the corre-
lation between the four-year change in the liberalization index and the four-years-lagged
value of each industry characteristic while controlling for country-year and industry xed
eects. Overall, the results show no statistically signicant correlation between the initial
industrial characteristics and the subsequent change in IOL. The only exception is the
initial total number of rms in the industry that is negatively correlated with subsequent
change in IOL in the cross section (at the 10% signicance level). Still, this correlation
27A similar approach is followed by Topalova and Khandelwal (2011).
28The total number of rms and total employment are taken from Eurostat. The median rm size
(employment) and average wage are calculated using the Amadeus sample.
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disappears in the respective panel regression as shown in Panel B.
Finally, in the last column, we investigate the correlation of the change in IOL with
its initial level. The latter is the politico-economic outcome that is inherited from the
past and summarizes the initial condition of regulation in the industry. We nd that it is
the only statistically signicant and economically important determinant of the change in
IOL. The relationship is even stronger in the panel data estimation, where the estimated
t-statistic is close to 10. The negative correlation between the change in IOL and its
initial level captures the fact that, for those industry-country pairs that started as more
liberalized (high level of IOL), there was a smaller scope for liberalization and thereby,
they could experience a smaller change in their IOL index than the change experienced
by country-industry pairs in our sample on average.
The correlation between the change in the liberalization index and its lagged value is
consistent with the harmonization objective of the EU Directives. To further support this
insight, we investigate how the strength of this correlation over earlier periods, 19781987
and 19881997, compares to the one over our sample period, 19982007. For each of
the three periods, Panel A of Table 3.7 presents estimates from regressions of the four-
year change in IOL on the four-year lagged IOL and an intercept. The comparison of
the estimated constant terms across the three time periods suggests that the 19982007
period was the one with the strongest liberalization eorts as the IOL of a fully regulated
industry was expected to increase on average by 1.5 over the four years. The IOL of a
fully regulated industry increased only by about 0.7 during the 19881997 period, and
essentially remained constant during the 19781987 period. Furthermore, the 19982007
period experienced the highest convergence of IOL as the estimated coecient on the
lagged IOL in column (1) is negative and highly statistically signicant. The convergence
pattern is much weaker during the 19881997 period and virtually non-existent in the
19781987 period. Panel B of Table 3.7 repeats the same exercise while controlling for
country-year and industry xed eects. Even in this case, the strength of the convergence
in IOL is almost twice as large in the 19982007 period than it is in the 19881997 period,
while there is no evidence of convergence during the 19881997 period.
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The strong harmonization pattern in IOL during 19982007 suggests that the initial
IOL level serves as a good proxy for the EU command for the network industries' liber-
alization that is exogenous to local rms' TFP growth. Therefore, we can use the lagged
level of IOL as an instrument for the change in IOL in each country-industry in our sample
over time. By doing so, we seek to explain TFP growth by the change in liberalization
as predicted by the initial liberalization state, given the need to reach common policy
objectives as set by the EU-wide harmonization eorts. The identifying assumption is
that the initial liberalization state aects rm-level TFP growth only through its eect
on the scope for liberalization policy and is uncorrelated with unobserved productivity
shocks or other latent factors aecting rm-level productivity.
The results from the two-step ecient GMM estimation, using the four-year-lagged
IOL as an instrument, are presented in Panel A of Table 3.8, while Panel B of the table
presents the results from the corresponding rst-stage regressions.29 The regressions in
columns (1)-(3) of Table 3.8 follow, one by one, our baseline specications in columns
(4)-(6) of Table 3.4. The GMM estimates are uniformly higher by about one percent-
age point for all employed measures of TFPR compared to the OLS ones, suggesting a
negative bias in the OLS estimates. Such a negative bias arises if local authorities are
choosing the timing and the scope of liberalization in order to respond to the prospects of
declining industry productivity. For instance, such declining productivity could take place
in the face of increasing foreign competition, if the rest of the EU members completed
liberalization earlier. Hence, if anything, our evidence suggests a negative selection of
industries into liberalization.
3.5.3 Additional results
As discussed in Section 3.2, there are theoretical reasons to examine whether the positive
impact of liberalization is dierent across rms of dierent productivity level or size.
To investigate the possibility of the heterogeneous impact of liberalization on rms of
dierent productivities, we split rm-year observations into two categories based on their
29Any dierences between the results between Panel B of Table 3.10 and column 8 of Table 3.8 are due
to the unbalanced nature of our nal rm-level sample.
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position relative to the median of the productivity distribution. Specically, we construct
an indicator variable that takes value 1 if the productivity of a given rm is higher than
the median productivity of its industry and is 0 otherwise. Then, we extend specication
(3.1) by including the interaction of the lagged value of this dummy variable with the
change in the liberalization index.
The resulting specication is
∆pfcit = β∆Libcit + βh∆Libcit × pHighfcit−4 + γp
High
fcit−4 +Xcit + εfcit, (3.3)
where pHighfcit−4 is an indicator variable equal to 1 if a rm's productivity is above the
median productivity of its industry as of four years ago and is zero otherwise. If produc-
tivity gains from liberalization come mostly from the productivity improvements of rms
with initially low productivity, we expect β to be positive and βh to be negative. The term
pHighfcit−4 controls for the possibility of dierent productivity trajectories of rms that dier
in their lagged productivity, i.e., due to `catch-up' eects. As in the case of specication
(3.1), we include a set of country/industry/year control variables Xcit, which consists of
country-year xed eects λct, industry-year xed eects λit and country-industry xed
eects λci.
Table 3.9 presents the estimates of specication (3.3). The results suggest that the
TFP gains from the liberalization are decreasing in the initial productivity of rms. This
is in line with the predictions of Schmidt (1997) that when initial competition is very
low, then increased competition would decrease managerial slackness, which translates
into higher productivity. It is also consistent with the fact that, at the beginning of the
liberalization process, the network services industries largely featured state monopolies
where managerial slackness concerns are likely to be important (e.g., due to the lack of
threat of ring).
The other scope for the heterogeneity of the estimated eect we consider asks whether
the liberalization asymmetrically aected rms of dierent initial size. This is investigated
by estimating a model analogous to specication (3.3), where we replace indicator pHighfcit−4
by its analog for the rm's position relative to the median of the employment distribution,
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emplHighfcit−4:
∆pfcit = β∆Libcit + βh∆Libcit × emplHighfcit−4 + γempl
High
fcit−4 +Xcit + εfcit. (3.4)
The estimates of specication (4) presented in Table 3.10 do not provide support that
the impact of liberalization is heterogeneous across size. This suggests that either the
policies were in no way specic to rm size, or other rm-size-specic distortions did not
aect rms' responses in productivity.
3.6 Robustness checks
We perform a series of robustness checks for our main results on the impact of liberalization
on within-rm productivity growth and reallocation. First, in Panel A of Table 3.A.4,
we show that our results are robust to dropping the countries that joined the European
Union in 2004, the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland. If EU accession had a positive
impact on the productivity of network services industries due to reasons other than the
liberalization of these industries, including these countries could bias our results. We thus
exclude these three countries from the sample and re-estimate our main specications
that correspond to columns (4)-(6) in Table 3.4 and columns (4)-(6) in Table 3.5. For the
reallocation equation, we report only the coecient on the interaction term of the change
in IOL and lagged productivity. The results are qualitatively similar to our main results.
Second, we investigate whether the countries that are the most represented in our
sample drive our results. As Table 3.1 shows, the most represented countries are Germany,
Italy and Spain, each of which accounts for more than 10% of the sample. In Panels B
to D of Table 3.A.4, we remove each of these countries one by one and re-estimate our
main specications on the resulting sub-samples. Again, our results remain qualitatively
unchanged.
Third, we investigate whether our results are sensitive to the dierences in sample
coverage across industries or to the inclusion of industries with very strong liberalization
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experiences. We repeat a similar exercise as before by checking the robustness of our
results on the sub-samples that are created by dropping, one by one, each of the suspect
industries. Tables 3.A.5.a and 3.A.5.b show that our results also survive this check.
Fourth, we investigate whether our results are robust to excluding country/industry
clusters that have unbalanced rm size distribution relative to the one reported for the
aggregate population of rms in Eurostat. In principle, combining several updates of
Amadeus should result in a sample that covers most companies in Europe. However,
due to dierences in reporting requirements among the underlying vendors of BvD, the
nal sample can be under-sampled in some size categories in some countries/industries.
To perform this robustness check, we follow a procedure used in Klapper, Laeven, and
Rajan (2006). We use data from Eurostat Structural Business Statistics (SBS) on the
true number of rms within a country and industry and three size categories dened by
employment: 2049, 50249 and 250 or more employees. For each country/industry/size
category, we calculate the average number of rms between 2004 and 2007 in both Eurostat
and our Amadeus sample and then calculate the ratio Rci,Size of the Eurostat over the
Amadeus number of rms to obtain a measure of the under-representation of our sample.30
A high value of this ratio suggests that the number of rms in our sample is very low
compared to the true number reported in SBS. Next, we compare the ratios between the
biggest and smallest size categories in a given country/industry cluster. A large dierence
between the coverage of large and small rms would suggest that the rm size distribution
is skewed relative to the population rm-size distribution. To investigate whether this has
a signicant eect on our results, we drop the industry/country clusters where the relative
underrepresentation of small rms to the underrepresentation of large rms (i.e., the ratio
of Rci,Low to Rci,High) is higher than 5 or lower than 0.2. Table 3.A.6 shows that our main
results are unaected.
Fifth, Table 3.A.7 shows the estimates obtained using 3-year and 5-year dierences
specications. As expected, the estimates for the 3-year dierences model are smaller
30The Eurostat SBS data on the rm size distribution have the best coverage after 2004. Additionally,
given our version of Amadeus takes care of the survivorship bias, it is reasonable to expect that any
sample unbalancedness will be the most pronounced in the cross-section rather than over time.
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in magnitude, while the estimates for the 5-year dierences model are larger than those
obtained using the baseline four-years dierences specication.
Finally, Table 3.A.8 documents that our main results are robust to excluding obser-
vations with the imputed values of employment.
3.7 Conclusions
We examined the productivity impact of European-level network services liberalization.
To do so, we built an empirical framework that isolates the source of variation in industry-
specic liberalization that is exempt of variation in country/industry-specic politico-
economic conditions and productivity prospects. Our ndings show that, as a response
to removing regulatory barriers to entry and reducing state ownership, network services
rms experienced on average 5.5% productivity gains over a four-year period. In our
sample, the within-rm average productivity gains due to liberalization account for more
than one-third of the actual within-rm average productivity gains of all rms operating
in network services industries.
The magnitude of our estimates of within-rm productivity gains is in line with earlier
ndings in the literature that examines the impact of trade liberalization on the produc-
tivity of rms operating in liberalized markets. In particular, since our study concerns
eliminating regulatory barriers in output markets, our estimates can be compared to esti-
mates of output tari reduction in manufacturing. As an illustration, Amiti and Konings
(2007) or Topalova and Khandelwal (2011), among others, suggest corresponding esti-
mates on the order of 9.5% and 3.5%, respectively. To our advantage, since network
services are mostly non-tradable, import competition has a limited scope to bias our
results.
The distinction between the liberalization of output vs. input markets is an important
one, because existing ndings in the literature show that a reduction of input taris has
a signicantly stronger productivity impact on rms compared to a reduction of output
taris. With this distinction in mind, our results are also consistent with Arnold, Nicoletti,
and Scarpetta (2008), who nd that one unit change in the OECD index of product market
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regulation implies within-rm productivity gains on the order of 10%. They study input
liberalization, which suggests why their estimate is larger than ours. Also, they are
interested in measuring the impact of liberalization in all services, both network and
non-network ones, on the productivity of rms operating in any business activity. Our
contribution is that we track down the initial source of these gains by focusing on network
services that are the most important among all services inputs and the ones that are, to
a large extent, liberalized by now.
Finally, we note that our nding that the gains from the liberalization came from
the within-rm productivity improvements rather than from the reallocation of resources
across rms is also in line with earlier studies of liberalization. In this regard, our conclu-
sions regarding reallocation come with a caveat: We lack a full empirical model of entry
and exit. Moreover, due to the length of our sample period, our results capture more
short-term developments following the liberalization as opposed to long-term eects.
Turning to the policy implications, our ndings suggest that the regulatory reforms
for network services were successful in increasing the threat of competition for incumbents
and thus inducing them to become more productive. Our results are in support of the
European Commission's demand to extend liberalization to other market services.
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3.8 Main Tables and Figures
Figure 3.1: Liberalization in Services Industries  1998  2007
 
Note: Box-plot of the distribution of the Index of Overall Liberalization over all countries and 
industries in the sample. Scale is 0–6 from the most to least restrictive of competition. 
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Figure 3.2: Liberalization in Services Industries  1998  2007
 
Note: Changes in the Index of Overall Liberalization (IOL). The scale is 0–6 from the most to least 
restrictive of competition. 





















































































































































































































Table 3.1: Summary Statistics of Services Industries by Country
Country # Obs. Pctile 10 Median Pctile 90 Pctile 10 Median Pctile 90 1998 2007
Austria (AT) 226 70.2 194.3 597.7 38 470 2396 1.6 4.0
Belgium (BE) 646 67.4 207.8 796.3 26 124 1159 2.9 4.4
The Czech Rep. (CZ) 501 12.1 49.0 202.3 33 150 1250 1.2 4.4
Germany (DE) 5070 91.6 197.2 416.3 30 98 972 4.3 5.6
Spain (ES) 4293 16.4 50.6 346.5 22 44 426 3.4 4.8
Finland (FI) 1537 29.1 127.2 347.7 25 64 374 3.4 4.7
France (FR) 1523 64.0 207.8 712.7 23 58 669 1.5 4.7
Hungary (HU) 802 3.8 12.6 49.4 24 157 1908 2.2 4.9
Italy (IT) 3227 44.5 120.8 483.7 24 56 549 1.6 4.4
Poland (PL) 1653 8.4 24.2 86.7 30 135 1694 0.3 3.9
Portugal (PT) 223 30.9 110.3 603.9 23 188 8649 1.6 4.3
Sweden (SE) 1461 68.7 159.5 552.0 23 44 361 3.2 3.5
Total Sample 21162 19.1 126.5 415.4 24 71 836 2.7 4.8
IOL
The table reports summary statistics for labor productivity (in 1995 EUR ths.) and employment for twelve countries in our sample. Labor
productivity is calculated as the double-deflated value added over employment, where country/sector specific output and intermediate
input deflators come from EU KLEMS. # Obs. corresponds to the number of observations in Amadeus. Column 3 reports the average
value of the Index of Overall Liberalization (IOL) in the first and last year of our sample for each country. 
(3)(2)(1)
VA / Employee Employment
Table 3.2: Change in the Index of Overall Liberalization over Sample Period
Country Airlines Electricity Gas Post Railways Telecom
AT 0.4 3.0 2.0 1.7 0.0 1.5
BE 1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5 0.8 2.2
CZ 1.8 3.8 5.5 1.0 0.0 4.2
DE 0.0 1.5 0.5 3.0 1.5 2.8
ES 2.9 1.7 2.3 0.6 1.5 1.5
FI 0.1 0.8 1.0 0.6 0.0 2.6
FR 3.7 3.8 4.5 1.3 1.5 1.1
HU 4.7 3.0 2.9 0.9 0.8 2.8
IT 1.1 4.5 3.0 0.9 0.8 2.3
PL 4.0 2.8 2.5 2.1 0.0 5.1
PT 1.8 2.9 4.3 2.3 0.8 2.7
SE 0.8 0.0 2.0 0.6 0.8 1.7
Mean 1.8 2.4 2.7 1.4 0.7 2.5
The table reports overall change in IOL between the first and last year of our sample for each
Country/Industry cluster.
Table 3.3: Summary Statistics of Services Industries
Country # Obs. Pctile 10 Median Pctile 90 Pctile 10 Median Pctile 90
Airlines 1350 53.3 152.7 325.9 26 122 1705
Electricity 8188 25.5 169.3 438.8 26 87 1140
Gas Services 2595 43.2 165.9 615.9 24 67 484
Postal Services 2664 10.5 36.4 206.5 22 46 430
Railways 1024 15.7 55.0 166.4 27 115 1815
Telecom 5341 19.5 90.3 449.0 23 60 650
The table reports summary statistics for labor productivity (in 1995 EUR ths.) and employment for six industries in
our sample. # Obs. corresponds to the number of observations in Amadeus. 
(1) (2)
VA / Employee Employment
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Table 3.4: Liberalization and Within-rm Productivity Change
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Dependent Variable Δ TFPR Δ TFPR Δ TFPR Δ TFPR Δ TFPR Δ TFPR Δ ln(Va/Empl)
LP LP LP LP W-LP OLS
4-year diff 4-year diff 4-year diff 4-year diff 4-year diff 4-year diff 4-year diff
∆ IOL 0.063*** 0.056*** 0.049*** 0.064*** 0.056*** 0.046*** 0.035**
4-year diff (0.021) (0.016) (0.018) (0.016) (0.015) (0.013) (0.016)
Country * Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE Yes
Country * Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry * Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adjusted R2     0.059 0.093 0.119 0.124 0.203 0.157 0.175
Country / Industry clusters 70 70 70 70 70 70 70
Observations 6040 6040 6040 6040 6040 6040 6040
∆ IEL 0.018 0.028*** 0.020 0.024* 0.027** 0.023** 0.014
4-year diff (0.012) (0.010) (0.015) (0.013) (0.012) (0.009) (0.011)
Country * Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE Yes
Country * Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry * Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adjusted R2     0.053 0.090 0.117 0.121 0.202 0.156 0.175
Country / Industry clusters 70 70 70 70 70 70 70
Observations 6040 6040 6040 6040 6040 6040 6040
Panel A: Effects of Overall Liberalization
Panel B: Effects of Entry Liberalization
The table reports estimates from OLS regressions of 4-year differences in productivity on 4-year differences in the Index of Overall Liberalization
(IOL) in Panel A and on 4-year differences in the Index of Entry Liberalization (IEL) in Panel B. TFPR LP is calculated as a residual from estimating
a logarithmic Cobb-Douglas revenue production function using the Levinsohn-Petrin approach. TFPR W-LP is calculated by estimating a
logarithmic Cobb-Douglas value added production function using the Wooldridge modification of the Levinsohn-Petrin approach with unobserved
productivity shocks being approximated by 3rd-order polynomials in material costs and capital. TFPR OLS is calculated as a residual from a
logarithmic regression model of revenue Cobb-Douglas production function estimated separately for each industry by OLS. All specifications
include a constant, not reported. Robust standard errors (clustered at the country/industry level) are reported in parentheses. ***, **, * denote
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
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Table 3.5: Liberalization and Change in Employment
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Dependent Variable ∆Empl ∆Empl ∆Empl ∆Empl ∆Empl ∆Empl ∆Empl
4-year diff 4-year diff 4-year diff 4-year diff 4-year diff 4-year diff 4-year diff
Productivity in the TFPR TFPR TFPR TFPR TFPR TFPR ln(Va/Empl)
Interaction Term LP LP LP LP W-LP OLS
∆IOL 0.034* 0.033** 0.040* 0.002 0.006 0.013 0.066*
4-year diff (0.018) (0.016) (0.021) (0.022) (0.021) (0.022) (0.038)
∆IOL* Lagged Productivity -0.012 -0.007 -0.004 0.008 0.012 0.002 0.024*
4-year diff * 4-year lag (0.011) (0.012) (0.013) (0.013) (0.009) (0.022) (0.013)
Lagged Productivity -0.029*** 0.005 0.003 -0.005 -0.025** 0.096*** 0.093***
4-year lag (0.009) (0.016) (0.017) (0.016) (0.012) (0.029) (0.020)
Country * Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE Yes
Country * Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry * Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adjusted R2     0.051 0.059 0.083 0.096 0.095 0.104 0.119
Country / Industry clusters 70 70 70 70 70 70 70
Observations 6040 6040 6040 6040 6040 6040 6040
∆IEL 0.016 0.027** 0.027* 0.010 0.019 0.011 0.031
4-year diff (0.011) (0.011) (0.014) (0.014) (0.015) (0.012) (0.016)
∆IEL* Lagged Productivity -0.008 -0.008 -0.009 -0.004 -0.010 -0.006 0.009
4-year diff * 4-year lag (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.008) (0.013) (0.014)
Lagged Productivity -0.035*** -0.004 -0.006 -0.012 0.010 0.103*** 0.100***
4-year lag (0.008) (0.014) (0.014) (0.013) (0.018) (0.026) (0.028)
Country * Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE Yes
Country * Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry * Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adjusted R2     0.051 0.060 0.084 0.096 0.095 0.104 0.118
Country / Industry clusters 70 70 70 70 70 70 70
Observations 6040 6040 6040 6040 6040 6040 6040
The table reports in Panel A the estimates from OLS regressions of 4-year logarithmic differences of firm employment (Empl) on 4-year differences
in the Index of Overall Liberalization (IOL), with its interaction with the 4-year lagged productivity measure as given in the column header. Panel B
presents the results for the equivalent specifications concerning the 4-year differences in the Index of Entry Liberalization (IEL). All specifications
include a constant, not reported. Robust standard errors (clustered at the country/industry level) are reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
Panel A: Effects of Overall Liberalization




































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































   
   
   
   
   
   








   
   
   
   
   
   
   






































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   







   
   
   
   
   
   
   
















































































































Table 3.7: Convergence in Liberalization in Europe over Time
(1) (2) (3)
Sample Period 1998-2007 1988-1997 1978-1987
Dependent Variable Δ IOL Δ IOL Δ IOL
4-year diff 4-year diff 4-year diff
IOL -0.228*** -0.061 -0.002
4-year lag (0.048) (0.065) (0.003)
Constant 1.514*** 0.651*** 0.013*
(0.199) (0.097) (0.007)
Adjusted R2     0.155 0.002 0.002
Observations 427 418 426
IOL -0.458*** -0.236*** 0.005
4-year lag (0.051) (0.081) (0.007)
Country * Year FE Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes
Adjusted R2     0.474 0.303 0.002
Observations 427 418 426
Panel B: Model with Additional Controls
The table reports estimates from industry-level OLS regressions of 4-year differences in the Index of
Overall Liberalization (IOL) on the 4-year lagged value of IOL. The sample is comprised of 12 countries
and 6 network industries that are included in the Amadeus firm-level sample. Regressions are estimated
separately over 3 periods: 1978-1987, 1988-1997 and 1998-2007. Panel A presents results for a simple
linear model with an included intercept. Panel B presents results for the model that includes additional
controls: country/year fixed effects and industry fixed effects. Robust standard errors (clustered at the
country/industry level) are reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and
10% levels, respectively.
Panel A: Model without Controls
155
Table 3.8: Liberalization and Within-rm Productivity Change: IV Estimates
(1) (2) (3)
Productivity Measure Δ TFPR Δ TFPR Δ TFPR
Estimation Method LP W-LP OLS
4-year diff 4-year diff 4-year diff
∆ IOL 0.079*** 0.053*** 0.052***
4-year diff (0.017) (0.017) (0.015)
Country * Year FE Yes Yes Yes
Country * Industry FE Yes Yes Yes
Industry * Year FE Yes Yes Yes
Country / Industry clusters 70 70 70
Observations 6040 6040 6040
Lagged IOL -1.018*** -1.018*** -1.018***
4-year lag (0.028) (0.028) (0.028)
Partial R2     0.79 0.79 0.79
F-statistics 1307.75 1307.75 1307.75
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000
Panel B: First-Stage Regression
The table reports estimates of 2-step GMM regressions of 4-year differences in productivity
on 4-year differences in the Index of Overall Liberalization (IOL) instrumented by 4-year
lagged IOL. All specifications include a constant, not reported. Robust standard errors
(clustered at the country/industry level) are reported in parentheses. For the first stage
regression, the bottom panel reports the estimated coefficient and the standard error of 4-
year lagged IOL, its partial R2, F-statistics of the test of its significance and corresponding p-
values. ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
Panel A: Second-Stage Regression
Table 3.9: The Eects of Overall Liberalization on Firms of Dierent Productivity
(1) (2) (3)
Productivity Measure Δ TFPR Δ TFPR Δ TFPR
Estimation Method LP W-LP OLS
4-year diff 4-year diff 4-year diff
∆ IOL 0.076*** 0.068*** 0.055***
4-year diff (0.020) (0.019) (0.018)
∆ IOL * Lagged High Productivity -0.034 -0.037 -0.029
4-year diff * 4-year lag (0.024) (0.031) (0.024)
Lagged High Productivity -0.034 -0.156*** -0.156***
4-year lag (0.024) (0.051) (0.047)
Country * Year FE Yes Yes Yes
Country * Industry FE Yes Yes Yes
Industry * Year FE Yes Yes Yes
Adjusted R2     0.146 0.229 0.199
Country / Industry clusters 70 70 70
Observations 6040 6040 6040
The table reports the estimates from OLS regressions of 4-year differences in productivity on 4-
year differences in the Index of Overall Liberalization (IOL) interacted with the dummy
variable, Lagged High Productivity, which takes the value one if the productivity of a given
firm was above the median productivity of its respective industry as of 4 years ago and zero
otherwise. All specifications include a constant, not reported. Robust standard errors (clustered
at the country/industry level) are reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote significance at
the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
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Table 3.10: The Eects of Overall Liberalization on Firms of Dierent Size
(1) (2) (3)
Productivity Measure Δ TFPR Δ TFPR Δ TFPR
Estimation Method LP W-LP OLS
4-year diff 4-year diff 4-year diff
∆ IOL 0.066*** 0.064*** 0.052***
4-year diff (0.021) (0.016) (0.018)
∆ IOL * Lagged High Employment -0.003 -0.018 -0.013
4-year diff * 4-year lag (0.024) (0.019) (0.020)
Lagged High Employment -0.003 -0.001 0.036**
4-year lag (0.024) (0.020) (0.016)
Country * Year FE Yes Yes Yes
Country * Industry FE Yes Yes Yes
Industry * Year FE Yes Yes Yes
Adjusted R2     0.125 0.203 0.158
Country / Industry clusters 70 70 70
Observations 6040 6040 6040
The table reports the estimates from OLS regressions of 4-year differences in productivity on 4-
year differences in the Index of Overall Liberalization (IOL) interacted with the dummy
variable, Lagged High Employment, which takes the value one if the employment of a given
firm was above the median productivity of its respective industry as of 4 years ago and zero
otherwise. All specifications include a constant, not reported. Robust standard errors (clustered
at the country/industry level) are reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote significance at
the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
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3.A Appendix Tables
Table 3.A.1: The ETCR Indicators: Regulatory Areas by Industry
Barriers to entry Public ownership Market structure Vertical integration Price controls
Airlines X X
Electricity X X X
Gas Services X X X X
Postal Services X X
Railways X X X X
Telecom X X X
Regulatory areas
The table reports regulatory areas covered by the ETCR for individual industries. “X” denotes a regulatory area that is
covered by the respective ETCR as a separate index. Source: Table 2 of Conway and Nicoletti (2006).
Table 3.A.2: The Correspondence among Industry Classications
 NACE r. 1.1
NACE r. 1.1        
2 digit
Eurostat EU KLEMS 
Airlines 621, 622 62 I62 60t63
Electricity 401 40 E401 E
Gas Services 402 40 E402 E
Postal Services 641 64 I641 64
Railways 601 60 I601 60t63
Telecom 642 64 I642 64
Table 3.A.3: Correlations of Firm-level Productivity Measures
 TFPR LP TFPR W-LP TFPR OLS
TFPR W-LP 0.88
TFPR OLS 0.55 0.49
ln (VA/Empl) 0.64 0.75 0.62
Correlations of Firm-level Productivity Measures 
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Table 3.A.4: Robustness to Removing Countries
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent Variable ∆ TFPR ∆ TFPR ∆ TFPR ∆Empl ∆Empl ∆Empl
LP W-LP OLS
4-year diff 4-year diff 4-year diff 4-year diff 4-year diff 4-year diff
Productivity in the TFPR TFPR TFPR
Interaction Term LP W-LP OLS
∆ IOL 0.077*** 0.067*** 0.056***
4-year diff (0.019) (0.015) (0.017)
∆ IOL * Productivity 0.003 0.006 -0.008
4-year diff * 4-year lag (0.016) (0.011) (0.029)
Observations 5371 5371 5371 5371 5371 5371
∆ IOL 0.044*** 0.052*** 0.034**
4-year diff (0.017) (0.017) (0.014)
∆ IOL * Productivity 0.002 0.009 -0.001
4-year diff * 4-year lag (0.014) (0.010) (0.023)
Observations 4341 4341 4341 4341 4341 4341
∆ IOL 0.060*** 0.042* 0.036**
4-year diff (0.021) (0.022) (0.016)
∆ IOL * Productivity 0.009 0.011 0.013
4-year diff * 4-year lag (0.016) (0.012) (0.025)
Observations 5267 5267 5267 5267 5267 5267
∆ IOL 0.064*** 0.052*** 0.047***
4-year diff (0.018) (0.018) (0.015)
∆ IOL * Productivity 0.008 0.013 0.000
4-year diff * 4-year lag (0.014) (0.010) (0.021)
Observations 4887 4887 4887 4887 4887 4887
The table reports the estimates from OLS regressions for specifications corresponding to columns (4-6) of Table 3.4 and columns (4-6) of
Table 3.5. For each panel, all specifications are estimated on a subsample obtained by removing a corresponding set of countries. For
productivity regressions, we report the estimate of the coefficient on the (4-year) change in the IOL. For employment regressions, we report the
estimate of the coefficient on the (4-year) change in the IOL interacted with a (4-year) lagged productivity measure specified in the column
header. Robust standard errors (clustered at the country/industry level) are reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%,
5% and 10% levels, respectively.
Panel D: Removing Spain
Panel A: Removing the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland
Panel B: Removing Germany
Panel C: Removing Italy
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Table 3.A.5.a: Robustness to Removing Industries
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent Variable ∆ TFPR ∆ TFPR ∆ TFPR ∆Empl ∆Empl ∆Empl
LP W-LP OLS
4-year diff 4-year diff 4-year diff 4-year diff 4-year diff 4-year diff
Productivity in the TFPR TFPR TFPR
Interaction Term LP W-LP OLS
∆ IOL 0.067*** 0.054*** 0.048***
4-year diff (0.018) (0.015) (0.014)
∆ IOL * Productivity 0.003 0.010 0.007
4-year diff * 4-year lag (0.014) (0.010) (0.021)
Observations -0.006 0
∆ IOL 0.063*** 0.067*** 0.049***
4-year diff (0.016) (0.015) (0.014)
∆ IOL * Productivity 0.018 0.018 0.008
4-year diff * 4-year lag (0.019) (0.011) (0.028)
Observations 3290 3290 3290 3290 3290 3290
∆ IOL 0.048** 0.057*** 0.025*
4-year diff (0.020) (0.019) (0.015)
∆ IOL * Productivity 0.014 0.020 -0.001
4-year diff * 4-year lag (0.015) (0.012) (0.026)
Observations 5221 5221 5221 5221 5221 5221
The table reports estimates from OLS regressions for specifications corresponding to columns (4-6) of Table 3.4 and columns (4-6) of Table 3.5.
For each panel, all specifications are estimated on a subsample obtained by removing a corresponding set of industries. For productivity
regressions, we report the estimate of the coefficient on the (4-year) change in the IOL. For employment regressions, we report the estimate of the
coefficient on the (4-year) change in the IOL interacted with a (4-year) lagged productivity measure specified in the column header. Robust






Table 3.A.5.b: Robustness to Removing Industries
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent Variable ∆ TFPR ∆ TFPR ∆ TFPR ∆Empl ∆Empl ∆Empl
LP W-LP OLS
4-year diff 4-year diff 4-year diff 4-year diff 4-year diff 4-year diff
Productivity in the TFPR TFPR TFPR
Interaction Term LP W-LP OLS
∆ IOL 0.072*** 0.058*** 0.049***
4-year diff (0.016) (0.015) (0.013)
∆ IOL * Productivity 0.008 0.014 0.008
4-year diff * 4-year lag (0.014) (0.010) (0.022)
Observations -0.014 0
∆ IOL 0.063*** 0.053*** 0.043***
4-year diff (0.016) (0.015) (0.013)
∆ IOL * Productivity 0.007 0.012 0.003
4-year diff * 4-year lag (0.014) (0.010) (0.022)
Observations 5826 5826 5826 5826 5826 5826
∆ IOL 0.068*** 0.040* 0.059***
4-year diff (0.019) (0.020) (0.017)
∆ IOL * Productivity -0.002 -0.002 -0.025
4-year diff * 4-year lag (0.015) (0.010) (0.021)
Observations 4753 4753 4753 4753 4753 4753
The table reports estimates from OLS regressions for specifications corresponding to columns (4-6) of Table 3.4 and columns (4-6) of Table 3.5.
For each panel, all specifications are estimated on a sub-sample obtained by removing a corresponding set of industries. For productivity
regressions, we report the estimate of the coefficient on the (4-year) change in the IOL. For employment regressions, we report the estimate of
the coefficient on the (4-year) change in the IOL interacted with a (4-year) lagged productivity measure specified in the column header. Robust





Table 3.A.6: Robustness to Removing Unbalanced Country/Industry Clusters
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent Variable ∆ TFPR ∆ TFPR ∆ TFPR ∆Empl ∆Empl ∆Empl
LP W-LP OLS
4-year diff 4-year diff 4-year diff 4-year diff 4-year diff 4-year diff
Productivity in the TFPR TFPR TFPR
Interaction Term LP W-LP OLS
∆ IOL 0.066*** 0.060*** 0.050***
4-year diff (0.017) (0.015) (0.014)
∆ IOL * Productivity 0.005 0.014 0.006
4-year diff * 4-year lag (0.014) (0.010) (0.022)
Country / Industry clusters 60 60 60 60 60 60
Observations 5688 5688 5688 5688 5688 5688
The table reports estimates from OLS regressions for specifications corresponding to columns (4-6) of Table 3.4 and columns (4-6) of
Table 3.5 on the subsample created by removing country/industry clusters for which the firm size distribution appears unbalanced
relative to firms' size distribution reported in Eurostat.See section 6 for the description of the method used to indentify unbalanced
clusters. For productivity regressions, we report the estimate of the coefficient on the (4-year) change in the IOL. Foremployment
regressions, we report the estimate of the coefficient on the (4-year) change in the IOL interacted with a (4-year) lagged productivity
measure specified in the column header. Robust standard errors (clustered at the country/industry level) are reportedin parentheses. ***,
**, * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% leve s, respectively.
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Table 3.A.7: Robustness to Dierent Long Dierences Specications
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent Variable Δ TFPR Δ TFPR Δ TFPR ∆Empl ∆Empl ∆Empl
LP W-LP OLS
Productivity in the TFPR TFPR TFPR
Interaction Term LP W-LP OLS
∆ IOL 0.056*** 0.037* 0.041***
3-year diff (0.018) (0.019) (0.015)
∆ IOL * Productivity 0.009 0.013 0.015
3-year diff * 3-year lag (0.013) (0.009) (0.021)
Observations 8051 8051 8051 8051 8051 8051
∆ IOL 0.087*** 0.062** 0.053***
5-year diff (0.023) (0.026) (0.016)
∆ IOL * Productivity 0.003 0.007 0.015
5-year diff * 5-year lag (0.016) (0.013) (0.031)
Observations 4455 4455 4455 4455 4455 4455
The table reports estimates from OLS regressions for 3-year and 5-year differences specifications corresponding to columns (4-6) of Table 3.4 and
columns (4-6) of Table 3.5. For productivity regressions, we report the estimate of the coefficient on the change in the IOL. For employment
regressions, we report the estimate of the coefficient on the change in the IOL interacted with a lagged productivity measure specified in the column
header. Robust standard errors (clustered at the country/industry level) are reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%
and 10% levels, respectively.
Model in 3 year differences
Model in 5 year differences
Table 3.A.8: Robustness to Removing Observations with Imputed Employment
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent Variable ∆ TFPR ∆ TFPR ∆ TFPR ∆Empl ∆Empl ∆Empl
LP W-LP OLS
4-year diff 4-year diff 4-year diff 4-year diff 4-year diff 4-year diff
Productivity in the TFPR TFPR TFPR
Interaction Term LP W-LP OLS
∆ IOL 0.064*** 0.051*** 0.044***
4-year diff (0.015) (0.014) (0.014)
∆ IOL * Productivity 0.014 0.015 0.005
4-year diff * 4-year lag (0.014) (0.010) (0.021)
Country / Industry clusters 60 60 60 60 60 60
Observations 5473 5473 5473 5473 5473 5473
The table reports estimates from OLS regressions for specifications corresponding to columns (4-6) of Table 3.4 and columns (4-6) of
Table 3.5 on the subsample created by removing observations with imputed value of employment. For productivity regressions, we report 
the estimate of the coefficient on the (4-year) change in the IOL. For employment regressions, we report the estimate of the coefficient on
the (4-year) change in the IOL interacted with a (4-year) lagged productivity measure specified in the column header. Robust standard




Abiad, A., N. Oomes, and K. Ueda. 2008. The quality eect: Does nancial liberalization
improve the allocation of capital? Journal of Development Economics 87 (2):270282.
Acemoglu, D., P. Aghion, and F. Zilibotti. 2006. Distance to frontier, selection, and
economic growth. Journal of the European Economic Association 4 (1):3774.
Ackerberg, D., K. Caves, and G. Frazer. 2006. Structural identication of production
functions. Mimeo.
Aghion, P., N. Bloom, R. Blundell, R. Grith, and P. Howitt. 2005. Competition and
innovation: An inverted-U relationship. Quarterly Journal of Economics 120 (2):701
728.
Aghion, P., P. Howitt, and C. García-Peñalosa. 1998. Endogenous growth theory. Cam-
bridge: The MIT Press.
Agrawal, A. and J.F. Jae. 2003. Do takeover targets underperform? Evidence from op-
erating and stock returns. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 38 (04):721
746.
Ahern, K.R. and J. Harford. 2010. The importance of industry links in merger waves.
Journal of Finance, forthcoming.
Alesina, A., S. Ardagna, G. Nicoletti, and F. Schiantarelli. 2005. Regulation and invest-
ment. Journal of the European Economic Association 3 (4):791825.
Amiti, M. and J. Konings. 2007. Trade liberalization, intermediate inputs, and produc-
tivity: Evidence from Indonesia. American Economic Review 97 (5):16111638.
Andrade, G., M. Mitchell, and E. Staord. 2001. New evidence and perspectives on
mergers. Journal of Economic Perspectives 15 (2):103120.
Angelini, P. and A. Generale. 2008. On the evolution of rm size distributions. American
Economic Review 98 (1):426438.
Angrist, J.D. and J.S. Pischke. 2008. Mostly harmless econometrics: An empiricist's
companion. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
163
Arnold, J., G. Nicoletti, and S. Scarpetta. 2008. Regulation, allocative eciency and
productivity in OECD countries: Industry and rm-level evidence. OECD Economics
Department Working Paper 4109, OECD.
Ashenfelter, O. 1978. Estimating the eect of training programs on earnings. Review of
Economics and Statistics 60 (1):4757.
Baker, M., J.C. Stein, and J. Wurgler. 2003. When does the market matter? Stock
prices and the investment of equity-dependent rms. Quarterly Journal of Economics
118 (3):9691005.
Baltagi, B.H. and P.X. Wu. 1999. Unequally spaced panel data regressions with AR (1)
disturbances. Econometric Theory 15 (6):814823.
Banerjee, A. V. and E. Duo. 2005. Growth theory through the lens of development
economics. In Handbook of economic growth, vol. 1, edited by P. Aghion and S. Durlauf.
Amsterdam: Elsevier, 473552.
Barone, G. and F. Cingano. 2011. Service regulation and growth: Evidence from OECD
countries. Economic Journal 121 (555):931957.
Bartelsman, E.J., J.C. Haltiwanger, and S. Scarpetta. 2009. Cross-country dierences
in productivity: The role of allocation and selection. NBER Working Papers 15490,
National Bureau of Economic Research.
Barth, J.R., G. Jr. Caprio, and R. Levine. 2004. Bank regulation and supervision: what
works best? Journal of Financial Intermediation 13 (2):205248.
Bartholdy, J., B.W. Blunck, and T. Poulsen. 2009. What drives private and public merger
waves in Europe. Mimeo.
Basu, S., J.G. Fernald, N. Oulton, and S. Srinivasan. 2003. The case of the missing
productivity growth: Or, does information technology explain why productivity accel-
erated in the US but not the UK? NBER Working Papers 10010, National Bureau of
Economic Research.
Beck, T., A. Demirguc-Kunt, L. Laeven, and R. Levine. 2008. Finance, rm size, and
growth. Journal of Money, Credit and Banking 40 (7):13791405.
Beck, T., A. Demirguc-Kunt, L. Laeven, and V. Maksimovic. 2006. The determinants of
nancing obstacles. Journal of International Money and Finance 25 (6):932952.
Beck, T., A. Demirguc-Kunt, and R. Levine. 2000. A new database on nancial devel-
opment and structure. World Bank Economic Review 14:597605.
Beck, T., A. Demirguc-Kunt, and V. Maksimovic. 2005. Financial and legal constraints
to growth: does rm size matter? Journal of Finance 60 (1):137177.
Becker, M.J. and S.E. Thomas. 2010. The indirect eects of changes in product market
competition. Mimeo.
Bekaert, G., C.R. Harvey, C. Lundblad, and S. Siegel. 2007. Global growth opportunities
and market integration. Journal of Finance 62 (3):10811137.
164
Bena, J., C. Fons-Rosen, and P. Ondko. 2009. Zephyr: ownership changes database.
Mimeo.
Bena, J. and S. Jurajda. 2011. Financial development and growth in the EU single
market. Economica 78 (311):401428.
Bena, J. and K. Li. 2010. Corporate innovations and mergers and acquisitions. Journal
of Finance, forthcoming.
Bloom, N., M. Draca, and J. Van Reenen. 2011. Trade induced technical change? The
impact of chinese imports on innovation, IT and productivity. NBER Working Papers
16717, National Bureau of Economic Research.
Bloom, N., P. Romer, and J. Van Reenen. 2010. A Trapped Factors Model of Innovation.
LSE / Stanford manuscript.
Bloom, N. and J Van Reenen. 2007. Measuring and explaining management practices
across rms and countries. Quarterly Journal of Economics 122 (4):13511408.
Boyd, J.H. and E. C. Prescott. 1986. Financial intermediary-coalitions. Journal of
Economic Theory 38 (2):211232.
Boylaud, O. and G. Nicoletti. 2000. Regulation, market structure and performance in
telecommunications. OECD Economics Department Working Papers 237, OECD.
Branstetter, L.G., F. Lima, L.J. Taylor, and A. Venancio. 2010. Do entry regulations
deter entrepreneurship and job creation? Evidence from recent reforms in portugal.
NBER Working Papers 16473, National Bureau of Economic Research.
Ciccone, A. and E. Papaioannou. 2006. Adjustment to target capital, nance and
growth. CEPR Discussion Papers 5969, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
Conway, P. and G. Nicoletti. 2006. Product market regulation in the non-manufacturing
sectors of OECD countries: Measurement and highlights. OECD Economics Depart-
ment Working Papers 530, OECD.
Cook, J.R. and L.A. Stefanski. 1994. Simulation-extrapolation estimation in para-
metric measurement error models. Journal of the American Statistical Association
89 (428):13141328.
David, J.M. 2011. The Aggregate Implications of Mergers and Acquisitions. Job Market
Paper.
De Loecker, J. 2011. Product dierentiation, multiproduct rms, and estimating the
impact of trade liberalization on productivity. Econometrica 79 (5):14071451.
Demirguc-Kunt, A., L. Laeven, and R. Levine. 2004. Regulations, market structure,
institutions, and the cost of nancial intermediation. Journal of Money, Credit and
Banking 36 (3):593622.
Doms, M.E. and T. Dunne. 1998. Capital adjustment patterns in manufacturing plants.
Review of Economic Dynamics 1 (2):409429.
165
Dyck, A. and L. Zingales. 2004. Private benets of control: An international comparison.
Journal of Finance 59 (2):537600.
Eberhardt, M. and C. Helmers. 2010. Untested assumptions and data slicing: A critical
review of rm-level production function estimators. Economics Series Working Papers
513, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
Eslava, M., J.C. Haltiwanger, A. D. Kugler, and M. Kugler. 2009. Trade reforms and
market selection: Evidence from manufacturing plants in Colombia. NBER Working
Papers 14935, National Bureau of Economic Research.
Fan, J.P.H. and V.K. Goyal. 2006. On the patterns and wealth eects of vertical mergers.
Journal of Business 79 (2):877902.
Fiorio, C. and M. Florio. 2009. The reform of network industries, privatisation and
consumers welfare: evidence from the EU15. UNIMI - Research Papers in Economics,
Business, and Statistics 1088, Universita degli Studi di Milano.
Fisman, R. and I. Love. 2004. Financial development and growth in the short and long
run. NBER Working Papers 10236, National Bureau of Economic Research.
. 2007. Financial dependence and growth revisited. Journal of the European
Economic Association 5 (2-3):470479.
Foster, L., J. Haltiwanger, and C. Syverson. 2008. Reallocation, rm turnover, and
eciency: Selection on productivity or protability? American Economic Review
98 (1):394425.
Galindo, A., F. Schiantarelli, and A. Weiss. 2007. Does nancial liberalization improve
the allocation of investment? Micro-evidence from developing countries. Journal of
Development Economics 83 (2):562587.
Grimpe, C. 2007. Successful product development after rm acquisitions: The role of
research and development. Journal of Product Innovation Management 24 (6):614628.
Grimpe, C. and K. Hussinger. 2008. Pre-empting technology competition through rm
acquisitions. Economics Letters 100 (2):189191.
Grossman, S.J. and O.D. Hart. 1986. The costs and benets of ownership: A theory of
vertical and lateral integration. Journal of Political Economy 94 (4):691719.
Guner, N., G. Ventura, and Y. Xu. 2008. Macroeconomic implications of size-dependent
policies. Review of Economic Dynamics 11 (4):721744.
Harford, J. 2005. What drives merger waves? Journal of Financial Economics
77 (3):529560.
Hart, O. and J. Moore. 1990. Property rights and the nature of the rm. Journal of
Political Economy 98 (6):11191158.
Hoberg, G. and G. Phillips. 2010. Product market synergies and competition in mergers
and acquisitions: A text-based analysis. Review of Financial Studies 23 (10):3773.
166
Hsieh, C. and P.J. Klenow. 2010. Misallocation and manufacturing TFP in China and
India. Quarterly Journal of Economics 124 (4):1403  1448.
Ilyina, A. and R.M. Samaniego. 2008. Technology and nance. IMF Working Papers
08/182, International Monetary Fund.
Inklaar, R., M. O'Mahony, and M. Timmer. 2005. ICT and Europe's productivity per-
formance: Industry-level growth account comparisons with the United States. Review
of Income and Wealth 51 (4):505536.
Inklaar, R., M.P. Timmer, and B. Van Ark. 2008. Market services productivity across
Europe and the US. Economic Policy 23:139194.
Islam, S.S. and A. Mozumdar. 2007. Financial market development and the importance
of internal cash: Evidence from international data. Journal of Banking & Finance
31 (3):641658.
Jamasb, T. and M. Pollitt. 2005. Electricity market reform in the European Union:
Review of progress toward liberalization & integration. Energy Journal 26 (Special
I):1142.
Jensen, M.C. 1986. Agency costs of free cash ow, corporate nance, and takeovers.
American Economic Review 76 (2):323329.
Jensen, M.C. and R.S. Ruback. 1983. The market for corporate control: The scientic
evidence. Journal of Financial economics 11 (1-4):550.
Jorgenson, D.W., M.S. Ho, and K.J. Stiroh. 2005. Growth of U.S. industries and invest-
ments in information technology and higher education. In Measuring Capital in the
New Economy, NBER Chapters. Cambridge: National Bureau of Economic Research,
Inc, 403478.
Jovanovic, B. and P.L. Rousseau. 2002. The Q-theory of mergers. American Economic
Review 92 (2):198204.
. 2008. Mergers as reallocation. Review of Economics and Statistics 90 (4):765
776.
Klapper, L., L. Laeven, and R. Rajan. 2006. Entry regulation as a barrier to entrepreneur-
ship. Journal of Financial Economics 82 (3):591629.
Klette, T.J. and Z. Griliches. 1996. The inconsistency of common scale estimators
when output prices are unobserved and endogenous. Journal of Applied Econometrics
11 (4):34361.
La Porta, R., F. Lopez-De-Silanes, and A. Shleifer. 2002. Government ownership of
banks. Journal of Finance 57 (1):265301.
Leuz, C., K.V. Lins, and F.E. Warnock. 2009. Do foreigners invest less in poorly governed
rms? Review of Financial Studies 22 (8):32453285.
Levine, R. 2005. Finance and growth: Theory and evidence. In Handbook of Economic
Growth, vol. 1, edited by P. Aghion and S. Durlauf. Amsterdam: Elsevier, 865934.
167
Levinsohn, J. and A. Petrin. 2003. Estimating production functions using inputs to
control for unobservables. Review of Economic Studies 70 (2):317.
Li, X. 2011. Productivity, restructuring, and the gains from takeovers. Journal of
Financial Economics, forthcoming.
Lichtenberg, F.R. 1992. Corporate takeovers and productivity. Cambridge: The MIT
Press.
Love, I. 2003. Financial development and nancing constraints: International evidence
from the structural investment model. Review of Financial Studies 16 (3):765791.
Lucas, R.E. 1978. On the size distribution of business rms. Bell Journal of Economics
9:508523.
Maksimovic, V. and G. Phillips. 2001. The market for corporate assets: Who engages in
mergers and asset sales and are there eciency gains? Journal of Finance 56 (6):2019
2065.
Maksimovic, V., G. Phillips, and N. R. Prabhala. 2008. Post-merger restructuring and the
boundaries of the rm. NBER Working Papers 14291, National Bureau of Economic
Research.
Manne, H.G. 1965. Mergers and the market for corporate control. Journal of Political
Economy 73 (2):110120.
McGuckin, R.H. and S.V. Nguyen. 1995. On productivity and plant ownership change:
New evidence from the Longitudinal Research Database. RAND Journal of Economics
26 (2):257276.
McKinnish, T. 2008. Panel data models and transitory uctuations in the explanatory
variable. Advances in Econometrics 21:335358.
Melitz, M.J. 2003. The impact of trade on intra-industry reallocations and aggregate
industry productivity. Econometrica 71 (6):16951725.
Melitz, M.J. and G.I.P. Ottaviano. 2008. Market size, trade, and productivity. Review
of Economic Studies 75 (1):295316.
Michaely, R. and M. Roberts. 2006. Dividend smoothing, agency costs, and information
asymmetry: Lessons from the dividend policies of private rms. Mimeo.
Nickell, S.J. 1996. Competition and corporate performance. Journal of Political Econ-
omy 104 (4):724746.
Nicoletti, G. and F.L. Pryor. 2006. Subjective and objective measures of governmen-
tal regulations in OECD nations. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
59 (3):433449.
Nicoletti, G. and S. Scarpetta. 2003. Regulation, productivity and growth: OECD evi-
dence. Economic policy 18 (36):972.
168
Nilsen, O.A. and F. Schiantarelli. 2003. Zeros and lumps in investment: Empirical
evidence on irreversibilities and nonconvexities. Review of Economics and Statistics
85 (4):10211037.
Nocke, V. and S. Yeaple. 2007. Cross-border mergers and acquisitions vs. greeneld
foreign direct investment: The role of rm heterogeneity. Journal of International
Economics 72 (2):336365.
Olley, G.S. and A. Pakes. 1996. The dynamics of productivity in the telecommunications
equipment industry. Econometrica 64 (6):12631297.
Oulton, N. and S. Srinivasan. 2005. Productivity growth and the role of ICT in the
United Kingdom: An industry view, 1970-2000. CEP Discussion Papers 0681, Centre
for Economic Performance, LSE.
Parente, S.L. and E.C. Prescott. 1994. Barriers to technology adoption and development.
Journal of Political Economy 102 (2):298321.
Pasiouras, F., S. Tanna, and C. Zopounidis. 2007. The identication of acquisition targets
in the EU banking industry: An application of multicriteria approaches. International
Review of Financial Analysis 16 (3):262281.
Raa, T. and E.N. Wol. 2001. Outsourcing of services and the productivity recovery in
US manufacturing in the 1980s and 1990s. Journal of Productivity Analysis 16 (2):149
165.
Rajan, R.G. and L. Zingales. 1998. Financial dependence and growth. American Eco-
nomic Review 88 (3):559586.
Restuccia, D. and R. Rogerson. 2008. Policy distortions and aggregate productivity with
heterogeneous establishments. Review of Economic Dynamics 11 (4):707720.
Rhodes-Kropf, M. and D.T. Robinson. 2008. The market for mergers and the boundaries
of the rm. Journal of Finance 63 (3):11691211.
Rhodes-Kropf, M., D.T. Robinson, and S. Viswanathan. 2005. Valuation waves and
merger activity: The empirical evidence. Journal of Financial Economics 77 (3):561
603.
Rhodes-Kropf, M. and S. Viswanathan. 2004. Market valuation and merger waves.
Journal of Finance 59 (6):26852718.
Rousseau, Peter L. 2006. The Q-Theory of Mergers: International and Cross-Border
Evidence. 2006 Meeting Papers 153, Society for Economic Dynamics.
Sapir, A., P. Aghion, G. Bertola, M. Hellwig, J. Pisani-Ferry, D. Rosati, J. Viñals, H. Wal-
lace, M. Buti, M. Nava et al. 2004. An agenda for a growing Europe: the Sapir report.
Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Schmidt, K.M. 1997. Managerial incentives and product market competition. Review
of Economic Studies 64 (2):191213.
Servaes, H. 1991. Tobin's Q and the gains from takeovers. Journal of Finance 46 (1):409
419.
169
Shleifer, A. and R.W. Vishny. 2003. Stock market driven acquisitions. Journal of
Financial Economics 70 (3):295311.
Syverson, C. 2011. What determines productivity? Journal of Economic Literature
49 (2):326365.
Topalova, P. and A. Khandelwal. 2011. Trade liberalization and rm productivity: The
case of india. Review of Economics and Statistics 93 (3):9951009.
Townsend, R.M. 1979. Optimal contracts and competitive markets with costly state
verication. Journal of Economic Theory 21 (2):265293.
Triplett, J.E. and B.P. Bosworth. 2003. Productivity measurement issues in services
industries: Baumol's disease has been cured. Economic Policy Review 9 (3):2333.
Van Ark, B., M. O'Mahony, and M.P. Timmer. 2008. The productivity gap between
Europe and the United States: trends and causes. Journal of Economic Perspectives
22 (1):2544.
Van Beveren, I. 2012. Total factor productivity estimation: A practical review. Journal
of Economic Surveys 26 (1):98128.
Vickers, J. 1995. Concepts of competition. Oxford Economic Papers 47 (1):123.
Wooldridge, J.M. 2009. On estimating rm-level production functions using proxy vari-
ables to control for unobservables. Economics Letters 104 (3):112114.
Wurgler, J. 2000. Financial markets and the allocation of capital. Journal of Financial
Economics 58 (1):187214.
Yang, L. 2008. The real determinants of asset sales. Journal of Finance 63 (5):2231
2262.
170
